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Chapter 1 
Executive summary 
The creation and maintenance of a system of free and undis-
torted competition is one of the basic principles on which 
the European Communities were built. Subsidies risk threat-
ening the efficient functioning of this system as they often 
reduce efficiency and distort trade in a similar way to protec-
tionist measures. The founding fathers of the European 
Communities therefore established a strict Community con-
trol of national State aids under the basic principle that aids 
which may distort competition between firms in different 
Member States are incompatible with the common market 
unless derogations are granted. The Commission's second 
survey on State aids in the Community nevertheless ident-
ified ECU 82 billion, or 2,2 % of Community GDP, of 
average annual national State aids between 1986 and 1988. 
The full benefits from the completion of the internal market 
will only materialize if governments do not distort the adjust-
ment process with more national State aids. A profound 
strengthening of Community State aid policy is therefore 
required. Today considerable progress has been made: trans-
parency has improved, mandatory repayment of illegal aid 
has increased discipline, strict rules have been agreed for 
steel and shipbuilding, clear priorities have been established 
and major existing aid schemes are under review. But the 
process has to continue and new challenges have to be 
addressed : the need to improve convergence in the run-up 
to economic and monetary union should bring national 
expenditures on subsidies under additional scrutiny; a com-
mitment to more subsidy discipline would contribute to 
achieve an even more open international trading system in 
the Uruguay Round of the GA TT negotiations; the long-
term efficiency of Community industry requires an effective 
Community and international control of subsidies. But in 
general at the beginning of the 1990s Community State aid 
policy is recovering the bite intended by its founders a?d 
necessary for further efficient integration of the Commumty 
economies. 
There is no generally agreed definition of subsidies. For the 
purpose of this study subsidies should be understood broadly 
as all forms of specific transfers from the government sector 
which directly or indirectly benefit enterprises, for which the 
government receives no equivalent compensation in return 
and which are granted with the purpose of changing market 
outcome. 
The particular subset of all subsidies which are subject to 
Community policy is referred to as 'State aids'. State aids 
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are basically those subsidies which distort intra-Community 
competition. They are defined in detail by Community law 
and the decisions of the Commission and the Court of 
Justice. 
Subsidies are a widely used policy instrument. They are 
granted for example to encourage the use of public transpor-
tation, the intensification of research and development, the 
purchase of catalytic converters, the use of domestic coal ~r 
the employment of handicapped workers. But economic 
theory points out that subsidies and the taxes required to 
finance them often introduce distortions and reduce dom-
estic and international welfare. The activities of enterprises 
to obtain subsidies, administrative inefficiencies and inter-
national retaliation cause additional welfare losses. Modem 
welfare and trade theory have, however, stressed the point 
that in the presence of market distortions, for example exter-
nalities or economies of scale, finely tuned subsidies can 
in theory restore efficiency or capture income from other 
countries. A rational decision on subsidies therefore requires 
both a theoretical and an empirical evaluation of the case 
at hand; for the latter the instruments are far less well 
developed. The onus of proof lies at any rate heavily on the 
advocates of subsidization. A policy rule of no subsidies 
except under particular circumstances remains an appropri-
ate rule of thumb. 
The total of the subsidies granted in the Member States is 
difficult to establish due to the various forms subsidies can 
take and the lack of a comprehensive national statistical 
effort in most Member States. But for those subsidies which 
are subject to Community rules the Commission has made 
a pioneering effort and has by means of its first and second 
survey on State aids in the Community, published in 1989 
and 1990, established a degree of transparency unmatched 
by most Member States and its trade partners. 
The second survey identifies an alarming ECU 82 billion in 
annual total national State aids in the Member States on 
average between 1986 and 1988, which amounts to 2,2 % 
of Community GDP, 4,5 % of total general government 
expenditure in the Community or more than twice the Com-
munity budget. The differences between Member States are 
considerable, with Denmark and the United Kingdom 
spending just 1 % of their GDP, but Belgium, Greece, Italy 
and Luxembourg spending 3 % and more. 
State aids are heavily concentrated: nearly 60 % of the total 
go to the three sectors: transport - mostly railways -
(30 %), the coal industry (J6 %) and agriculture/fisheries 
(13 %). In the coal sector subsidization per employee is 
extremely high, with Belgium and Germany far above the 
Community average; in the mean time Belgium has an-
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nounced the closure of its last coal-mines. The remaining 
40 % of total aid mainly goes to manufacturing, of which 
steel and shipbuilding have come down to only 4 %, but 
other sectors (for example cars, electronics, aviation) now 
directly receive about 18 % of total aid with subsidization 
particularly high in Greece, Spain, France and Portugal. 
Total State aid to manufacturing is twice as high on average 
in those countries which are wholly or in large parts lagging 
behind in their economic development (Greece, Spain, Ire-
land, lt?.ly and Portugal) than in the other countries but aid 
per person occupied in manufacturing is also very high in 
Belgium. Concerning 'horizontal' aids which have no sec-
toral or regional specificity there is heavy subsidization of 
trade/export in Greece, Ireland, France, Belgium, of general 
investment in Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, and of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. 
Surveillance and control of national State aids has from 
the beginning of the Communities been transferred to the 
Community level. The ECSC and EEC Treaties established 
the rather straightforward basic principle that State aids, in 
so far as they distort trade between Member States, are 
forbidden unless a derogation is specifically accorded, either 
in the Treaties themselves or by the Commission or Council 
acting under powers granted by the Treaties. To allow effec-
tive Community control the Member States are obliged to 
notify the Commission in advance of measures which could 
constitute State aids. The Commission is the master of the 
procedure - under the control of the Court of Justice -
deciding in each single case whether Community control 
actually applies and whether a derogation can be granted. 
Key elements of the identification of State aids are well 
established: they are granted by a public body in a Member 
State, involve some cost to the public purse, benefit en-
terprises, involve better terms than normal market con-
ditions, are specific to certain sectors, regions or firms and 
affect competition with other Member States. Some current 
discussion surrounds the treatment of public enterprises 
where the Commission, repeatedly supported by the Court 
of Justice, considers those transactions as State aids which 
would not be undertaken by a commercial investor under 
similar circumstances. Another difficult problem is to dis-
tinguish between aids and 'general measures', i.e. distortions 
in intra-Community competition which may arise from 
changes mainly in the fiscal and social security system of a 
Member State. For the latter different, far less strict Treaty 
rules apply. A key criterion is the degree of de facto specificity 
of the measure. In spite of all attempts for precision there is 
an inevitable grey zone where the Commission has to decide 
the applicability of the State aid rules case by case. 
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The main possible reasons for derogations allowed for in 
the EEC Treaty are regional problems, important projects of 
Community interest or the development of certain economic 
activities. In each case the Commission has to assess from 
the point of view of the Community as a whole the potential 
harm done, in particular from the potential trade distortion, 
against the contribution the aid may make towards other 
Community objectives. 
If the Commission considers a measure to constitute a State 
aid and no derogation to be applicable, it initiates the pro-
cedure foreseen in the Treaty inviting the Member State 
concerned but also all other Member States to submit their 
positions. Eventually the Commission takes a final decision 
against which the normal avenue of appeal is to the Court 
of Justice. Since 1985 the Commission has systematically 
ordered Member States to recover illegal State aid from the 
recipient and this has considerably strengthened Community 
State aid discipline. The Commission has also begun to 
review existing State aid schemes and to verify whether the 
reasons for derogation still exist and whether the schemes 
have been abused. 
While the basic principle and procedures are rather straight-
forward, their application has become highly diversified. To 
some extent the application has blurred or even put into 
question the basic principle : for coal, many agricultural and 
fisheries aids and railways secondary legislation has in fact 
provided the basis for granting high amounts of national 
State aids under limited Community control; for coal the 
relevant Commission decision will, however, expire at the 
end of 1993. In cases of particular importance to competition 
in the Community the Commission has defined its rules for 
decisions on State aid requests in a series of directives, 
communications, or letters to improve transparency and 
consistency. There are rules on aids with particular objectives 
(on regional aid, aid for research and development, environ-
ment, rescue and restructuring, general aid and employment 
and training aid), on different forms of aid (State guarantees, 
public holdings in company capital) and on specific sectors 
(coal and steel, agriculture, fisheries, transport, shipbuilding, 
synthetic fibres, textiles and clothing and motor vehicles). 
A common thread running through many of the rules is a 
negative attitude towards operating aids, which are held to 
be conservative in their effects and not likely to lead to a 
lasting solution to the problems which they address. 
Another key preoccupation of the application of Community 
State aid policy is to assure that national State aids are 
compatible with the improvement of regional cohesion. The 
Commission therefore permits a higher degree of subsidiza-
tion for regional purposes in the least developed Community 
regions. Some leeway is granted for national State aids 
addressed to national regional imbalances but even then 
the wider Community context is taken into account. The 
problem remains that the least developed regions often do 
not have the financial means to take full advantage of their 
broader margins and their effective subsidization remains 
below what wealthier Member States can offer. Further-
more, State aids with other objectives also often have a 
regional bias which is difficult to establish and to shape in 
favour of the least developed regions. A stricter discipline 
on State aids in the wealthier regions is therefore essential to 
prevent national State aids undermining other Community 
efforts to improve its economic and social cohesion. 
Since the middle of the 1980s the Community has tightened 
the discipline it imposes on national State aids. This is a 
necessary concomitant of the drive towards the completion 
of the internal market and economic and monetary union 
(EMU). State aids must be prevented from becoming a 
major obstacle to reaping the full benefits of accelerating 
economic integration in the Community. Economic inte-
gration will intensify competition and induce an acceleration 
of structural change which will expand the Community's 
production possibilities, increase its growth and employment 
prospects and improve its competitiveness in world markets, 
provided national governments refrain from using national 
State aids to try to affect the outcome of this process. 
Furthermore, the importance of convergence in the run-up 
to final EMU adds additional urgency to the control of State 
aids as they weigh heavily on those budgets whose deficits 
or public debt are far above Community average. 
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Both the Cecchini Report on the 'Economics of 1992' and 
the report 'One market, one money' on the economic effects 
of EMU confirm this increased need to restrict State aids. 
The Commission has reacted not by seeking new legal pro-
visions but by strengthening the effectiveness of Community 
State aid control and identifying types of aid which merit 
particularly close attention. It is reviewing existing schemes, 
seeking better information on the impact of schemes and 
increasing its efforts to limit the overall volume of aid 
granted. Categories of aid under particular scrutiny are 
general investment aid schemes, capital injections into pub-
licly owned enterprises, support for national champions and 
export aids. 
For the Community, as the world's biggest trading bloc, 
it is also important to assure an open and competitive 
international trading system. Such a system can be the more 
beneficial for all participants the more they agree on inter-
national surveillance of State aids and counter-measures, 
even if this reduces national sovereignty. From the nego-
tiations with the EFT A countries on a European economic 
space emerges a combination of comprehensive self-disci-
pline on the basis of established Community practice, close 
consultation and a joint court for disputes. In the far wider 
realms of the GA TT the Community is playing an active 
role in the current Uruguay Round of negotiations, seeking 
a strengthening of the GA TT Codes on subsidies as well as 
on anti-dumping. The key to success will be to obtain a 
balanced progress in both the discipline on subsidies and on 
countervailing measures. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
From the foundation of the European Communities it had 
been understood that trade liberalization has to be ac-
companied by an adequate cross-border competition policy. 
It would only be acceptable to sovereign Member States to 
renounce the use of protectionist instruments for trade 
among each other if they could be assured that competition 
with other Member States would be reasonably fair. Further-
more, the founding fathers of the Community shared the 
conviction that only undistorted competition would provide 
an efficient division of labour and see the strongest gains 
emerge from the liberalization of trade. 
Therefore the Treaties creating the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) already provided for a Community compe-
tition policy. For private enterprises they introduced con-
straints on cartels (Article 85 EEC) and on the abuse of 
market power (Article 86 EEC). On granting aid to their 
enterprises the governments agreed to tie their own hands 
and to install far-reaching control at Community level. They 
established the basic principle that State aids, in so far as 
they distort trade between Member States, are forbidden 
unless a derogation is specifically accorded, either in the 
Treaties themselves or by the Commission or Council acting 
under powers granted by the Treaties. On that basis second-
ary legislation, rulings by the Court of Justice and, in particu-
lar, hundreds of case-by-case decisions of the Commission 
per year shaped Community State aid policy. 
In the mid- l 980s the Community set out to take its economic 
integration one major step forward by completing its internal 
market by the end of 1992. Many non-tariff barriers to intra-
Community trade, for example in public procurement or 
national technical standards, were tackled. But the benefits 
of the internal market would be threatened if the adjustment 
process was distorted by uncompetitive behaviour of en-
terprises or national governments. A strengthening of Com-
munity competition policy was thus from the beginning an 
essential part of the internal market process. 
With regard to the private sector the authority to control 
mergers between enterprises of Community dimension was 
transferred to the Commission. Community State aid policy 
was reinforced not by means of new legislation but by 
applying existing rules so as to best meet the requirements 
of the internal market. 
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Today, well before the end of 1992, Community State aid 
policy has already developed considerably: transparency of 
national State aids, a prerequisite for efficient Community 
State aid policy, has been established for the first time with 
two surveys on State aids in the Community; the introduc-
tion of repayment of those State aids which are found to 
violate the Treaty enhances the effectiveness of Commission 
decisions; national aid to the steel sector is dramatically 
reduced; clear priorities are established aiming at an elimin-
ation of aid schemes which do not serve any Community 
objective; existing aid schemes, which provide the basis for 
most State aid, are reviewed critically. Overall the effective-
ness of Community State aid policy has gained credibility. 
But the development of Community State aid policy cannot 
stop here. Difficult questions still require a more precise 
answer, for example the identification of State aids for public 
enterprises, which becomes even more important as the 
transport sector and public utilities are opened up to broad 
intra-Community competition. Furthermore, the run-up to 
economic and monetary union poses new challenges : for 
example, budgetary convergence requires significant adjust-
ment of budgetary policies in seyeral Member States, and it 
is often those Member States which spend more than the 
Community average on national State aids. State aid policy 
in the Community also has to be seen in a wider context: 
the growing integration of world markets requires an active 
contribution by the Community to strengthen the inter-
national surveillance of trade-distorting State aids and coun-
ter-measures, in particular in the framework of the ongoing 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
The study takes stock of Community State aid policy at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Chapter 3 summarizes the economic 
rationale for subsidy control against the background of both 
traditional and modern economic analysis and reviews some 
empirical approaches to measure their impact. Chapter 4 
presents the current picture of State aids in the Community 
mainly on the basis of the Community surveys on State aids. 
An overview of the legal bases for Community State aid 
policy is provided by Chapter 5. Compared to the rather 
straightforward legal bases the application of Community 
State aid policy has become highly diversified. Chapter 6 
therefore tries to introduce some transparency to that do-
main. Chapter 7 points out aspects of State aid policy cur-
rently under review. Chapter 8, last but not least, puts 
Community State aid policy in the context of international 
arrangements on State aid policy and countervailing meas-
ures, with particular reference to the current round of GA TT 
negotiations. 
Chapter 3 
Economic rationale for subsidy 
control 
3.1. Introduction 
Subsidies are a widely employed instrument of public inter-
vention into the market process. They are granted to encour-
age for example the use of public transportation, the intensi-
fication of research and development efforts, the purchase 
of catalytic converters, the use of domestic coal or the 
employment of handicapped workers. Their use is, however, 
strongly debated as there is no consensus on questions like: 
will a certain subsidy achieve a specific objective, will the 
side-effects be beneficial or harmful, what is the impact on 
the trading partners, why are subsidies used at all? The 
following provides an overview of typical methods used to 
analyse these questions and the answers they provide. After 
an attempt to define subsidies, it will present theoretical 
approaches in different theoretical contexts and examples of 
empirical evaluations. At the end some tentative conclusions 
are suggested. 
3.2. Definition 
Economic analysis does not dispose of an agreed definition 
of a subsidy. Prest's observation that 'there is no neat and 
tidy single all-purpose definition of producer subsidies' 1 is 
maintained in the more recent literature.2 For the purpose 
of an analysis of the economic effects of subsidies it appears 
appropriate to use a broad definition. Thus this study con-
siders those government interventions into a market econ-
omy to be subsidies which meet all the following criteria: 
(i) they provide transfers from the government sector which 
directly or indirectly benefit enterprises and which entail 
direct budgetary costs either in terms of expenditure or 
of revenue forgone; this distinguishes them from tariff 
or non-tariff protection or regulations. Additionally, 
there are 'regulatory subsidies' in the sense that govern-
ment regulations impose direct transfers from con-
sumers to producers by fixing prices above market 
prices, e.g. in agriculture or for electricity; 
Prest (1976), p. 65. 
Bruce (1990), Gerrltse (1989), Fritzsche et al. (1988). 
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(ii) the recipients are outside the administrative sector, but 
transfers to railways, telecommunication services and 
other economic activities which are often undertaken 
by public enterprises may well be subsidies; 
(iii) the government receives no equivalent compensation in 
return, thus a public procurement price above market 
price is a subsidy; 
(iv) subsidies contain an element of specificity, i.e. they are 
destined for a specific group of economic agents (e.g. 
SMEs or enterprises of a specific region) or for pro-
ducers or consumers of a particular product (e.g. cars 
with catalytic converters), service or factor of pro-
duction which sets them apart from general government 
taxing or spending activities (e.g. on defence, the ju-
diciary system, the education system); and 
(v) they are used as a policy instrument with the purpose 
of affecting a given or expected outcome of the market 
process by changing relative prices so as to encourage 
or discourage certain economic behaviour3 and/or by 
changing income distribution. 
This broad definition of subsidies exceeds the narrow finan-
cial definition of direct transfers to firms, even if the latter is 
still predominant in empirical studies as it is readily available 
from national accounts. Instead it encompasses the whole 
range of forms subsidies can take: grants, credit on preferen-
. tial terms, tax concessions,4 equity investments which would 
not be undertaken by a commercial investor, provision of 
public goods or services at below market prices as well as 
public procurement above market prices. 
The definition also includes both direct subsidies received 
directly by the economic actor undertaking the activity to 
be assisted and indirect subsidies in the form of a higher 
output price or a lower input price due to subsidies given to 
other firms or persons in the economy. Subsidies may be 
paid to the consumer or the producer; their incidence may, 
however, be quite different from policy intentions depending 
on demand and supply elasticities in any particular market. 
Furthermore, subsidies can be linked to gross output, inter-
mediate inputs or primary inputs. They may be directed at 
traded or at non-traded goods. The economic effect may be 
quite different in each case. 
The broad definition of subsidies will be used for the theor-
etical analysis. The empirical examples make this definition 
The change in behaviour is the central aspect for example in the subsidy 
definition of Shoup (1972) for the US Congress. 
'Tax expenditures' in the American literature. 
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operational in different ways depending mainly on data 
availability. Furthermore, competition policy in the Com-
munity concerns only a subset of all subsidies which is 
defined by the Treaties and by a long history of Commission 
competition policy: details are developed in Chapter 5. To 
underline the distinction, subsidies which are subject to Com-
munity competition policy procedures are called 'State aids' . 
3.3. Theoretical economic aspects 
Subsidies are an instrument of economic policy to encourage 
certain behaviour. They change behaviour because they 
change the relative costs and prices which producers, con-
sumers and suppliers of factors of production face. As the 
resulting change in the allocation of resources may increase 
or decrease economic welfare, both domestic and foreign, a 
thorough understanding of the economic processes set in 
motion by subsidies is required - but only partially available 
and only partially uncontested. 
The following provides some of the conclusions of economic 
theory in different analytical contexts: a closed economy 
under first-best and second-best conditions and the case of 
an open economy. It also looks at some macroeconomic 
implications and reviews the political economy of subsidies. 
(a) Subsidies in a closed economy under 
first-best conditions 
Traditional microeconomic theory has shown that under 
a rigorous set of assumptions concerning both consumer 
preferences and production functions, perfectly competitive 
markets achieve an allocation of resources which is Pareto 
efficient and which is only determined by consumer prefer-
ences and the production possibilities of an economy. 
Among the assumptions are that there are no externalities in 
either consumption or production, no significant increasing 
returns to scale, large numbers of buyers and sellers in each 
market and perfect information.5 In this part it will be 
assumed that all other markets except possibly the market 
under consideration are in competitive equilibrium. 
There is no mechanism which assures that the resulting 
income distribution is optimal with regard to a society's 
values about inter-personal equity. But if, in addition, lump-
sum transfers and taxes can be carried out costlessly, then 
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For a formal presenta tion of these assumptions see Debreu (1959), 
Chapter 6. 
any distributional objective can be obtained without im-
pinging on allocational efficiency. Then distributional effects 
of a policy instrument can in fact be disregarded. Such a 
theoretical setting is called first-best (welfare) analysis. 
Under the assumptions of first-best analysis and if the mar-
ket directly affected by subsidies is otherwise undistorted, 
subsidies can only reduce economic welfare. The competitive 
markets assure that prices are the monetary measures of the 
marginal benefits of goods to households and of the marginal 
costs of production to firms. The equilibrium price and the 
transacted quantity for each product maximize net social 
welfare, i.e. total social value minus total social costs. A 
subsidy for a product lowers the price consumers pay and 
increases the price producers receive: the transacted quantity 
increases but the additional utility to consumers is less than 
the social costs of production: net welfare is reduced. 
GRAPH 3.1 : Efficiency loss due to an output subsidy 
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Graph 3.1 illustrates this welfare loss for the case of a single 
market: an output subsidy s shifts the supply curve S to S', 
the additional social utility is qbcq' whereas the additional 
social costs are qbaq': the triangle abc represents the ef-
ficiency or 'deadweight' loss. Or, from a different angle, 
both consumers and producers gain: the increase in the 
consumers' utility - the consumers' surplus - is p'cbp, the 
producers' surplus is pbap". But together they gain less than 
the subsidy required, which is p'cap". 
This method can also be used to assess the distribution of 
the costs and benefits of a subsidy: in the example illustrated 
above both consumers and producers gain, but tax-payers 
lose. The precise distribution of the gain, i.e. the subsidy 
incidence, depends on the actual supply and demand elas-
ticities. As these are difficult to determine in practice there 
is the risk of 'benefit snatching':6 subsidies mainly intended 
to benefit consumers may well all end up with producers, if 
demand elasticities are high and supply elasticities are low. 
This is why subsidy policy is sometimes considered as 'shoot-
ing from the hip'.7 
While this analysis is simplistic, it illustrates the way subsid-
ies alter market outcome in favour of the subsidized product 
(for example the consumption of coal by electricity pro-
ducers), which is one reason why they are widely used as a 
policy instrument. It also depicts clearly why subsidies may 
be a threat to economic welfare: subsidized goods are over-
produced and over-consumed as compared to an ideally 
efficient economy. First-best welfare analysis is therefore 
still widely used as a first approximation for the evaluation 
of economic policies. 8 
The straightforward conclusion of first-best analysis with 
competitive markets, that all subsidies are welfare-reducing 
and thus 'bad' changes when one of its assumptions breaks 
down and the possibility of market imperfection or 'market 
failure' has to be considered. The main reasons for market 
imperfection to be considered in the analysis of subsidies are 
externalities and public goods, increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect information. Each factor shall now be discussed in 
turn. The possibility of imperfect competition per se, i.e. the 
problems of monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour, are 
disregarded here as they are mainly addressed by legislation 
or regulations to enforce competition.9 The results derived 
Wolfson ( 1990). 
Gerritse (1989); but he also points out that 'one of the policy-makers 
in this country ... has contended on several occasions that he'd rather 
miss six out of ten times than not shoot at all'. 
See, for example, Ford (1990). 
For a recent presentation of Community policy to maintain competitive 
market structures see 'Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the 
European Community', European Economy No 40, May 1989. 
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are robust to different market structures as long as market 
entry is not too restricted. The analysis remains in the realms 
of first-best, i.e. it still assumes that governments can employ 
costless lump-sum redistribution and that other markets are 
not distorted. 
(i) Externalities and public goods 
Externalities are said to be present if an activity undertaken 
by an individual affects - as an unintended by-product -
other individuals without being properly reflected in the 
competitive market prices. 10 In more formal terms externalit-
ies are interpreted as activities of consumers or producers 
entering the utility functions or production functions of 
other consumers or producers. There may be consumption 
externalities, for example the use of a road by one car driver 
reduces the usefulness of the road to other drivers without 
a market mechanism to determine pecuniary compensations 
between them, l l production externalities, for example the 
use of river water by one firm as a coolant reduces its value 
to a similar firm downstream, and production-consumption 
externalities, for example the pollution of a lake due to a 
production process reduces its recreational value to con-
sumers. The external effect may be positive ('external econ-
omies') or negative ('external diseconomies'). There is also 
the possibility of intergenerational externalities, for example 
in the consumption of non-renewable resources. 
The ultimate cause of externalities is the absence of markets. 
This may be due to a lack of enforceable property rights 12 
because property rights are difficult to assign (for example 
for the ownership of the atmosphere)l3 or to enforce as 
unpaying users ('free riders') are difficult to exclude. If a 
market could be created the owner would negotiate a market 
price which would restore efficiency. One approach to the 
problem of externalities therefore focuses on the creation 
of missing markets, for example by emission of pollution 
certificates. 
The allocative implication of an externality is that market 
prices no longer reflect social costs and benefits. A difference 
arises between the private costs/benefits which determine 
10 The externalities considered here are sometimes labelled 'technological 
externalities' to distinguish them from 'pecuniary externalities' which 
are reflected in price adjustments. 
11 Such cases are typically analysed as public goods problems which will 
be discussed below as a special case of externalities. 
12 Coase (1960). 
13 One reason may be the potentially vast distributional implications. 
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the individual activities and the social costs/benefits · which 
results in an inefficient allocation of resources . 
Graph 3.2 illustrates the case of party A emitting a positive 
externality on party B as a by-product of an activity X 
(e.g. R&D expenditures of firm A benefit partially firm B). 
Maximizing his individual net benefits and disregarding the 
externality A will produce x• which remains below the 
socially optimal x•• where the marginal costs MCx and 
total social benefits (MBa + MBb) would be equal. The 
loss in efficiency is ace . 
GRAPH 3.2: Allocative implications of a positive externality 
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If the externalities cannot be remedied by an effective allo-
cation of property rights (for example patent protection in 
the example mentioned above), Pareto optimal allocation 
can still be restored by using subsidies to make A profit 
from the external benefit, i.e. to 'internalize' the externalities. 
The subsidy s to be paid to A for expanding his activity X 
beyond x• (a 'marginal' subsidy) is equal to the marginal 
benefit done to B at the optimum, or be. The subsidy 
increases social welfare as the gains to A (adb) and B (aecb) 
exceed the costs of the subsidy (acbd) by ace. A difficulty is 
the correct evaluation of the external benefit, and it may in 
practice also turn out to be elusive to define the reference 
level of activity (X*) beyond which a subsidy is to be granted. 
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Subsidies can also be used in the opposite case of external 
diseconomies: party A, whose river pollution for example 
reduces the utility of the river for recreational purposes, can 
be offered a subsidy to reduce this activity. This is done in 
practice although equity considerations might suggest in-
stead that the 'polluter pays' a tax reflecting the external 
damage. Both solutions are equal from an efficiency point 
of view but the distributional outcome differs.14 Both ap-
proaches are confronted with the informational problem of 
the correct evaluation of the external damage. A subsidy 
involves the additional difficulty that it encourages ad-
ditional participation in the damaging activity to cream off 
the subsidy if entry is not limited. 
The case of public goods can be considered similar to the case 
of external economies: as with an activity causing external 
economies, public goods jointly benefit third parties, whose 
number is usually large. Additional users reduce the utility 
of the existing users only marginally - until congestion 
starts - and are difficult to exclude. Typical public goods 
are defence, law enforcement, radio and television. Public 
goods can in principle be supplied by the State as well as by 
private enterprises: but private suppliers have to be subsi-
dized for the external economies they cannot capture. A 
subsidy can restore efficiency analogously to the case illus-
trated in Graph 3.2 which can be interpreted as, for example, 
a scholarship granted to a student to internalize the social 
benefit from his investment in his own human capital or a 
subsidy to a private firm to run a prison. As the number of 
recipients of external benefits is large, the problem of correct 
evaluation of their marginal benefits becomes very difficult 
to overcome, in particular as individual consumers have no 
interest in revealing them but try to act as ' free riders'. 
( ii) Increasing returns to scale 
Increasing returns to scale in production arise when unit 
costs fall in the long term along with increasing output. If 
they cover a large part of output as compared to market 
demand the entire output is produced by very few firms, in 
the extreme case by 'natural monopolies'. Examples are 
activities which require high set-up costs but are then avail-
able at relatively low marginal costs: rail services, telephone, 
electricity, television. 
The limited number of efficient suppliers would result in 
market prices above unit costs and quantities below the 
social optimum. Government intervention may then improve 
14 This holds only under first-best assumptions; subsidies have to be finan-
ced which may introduce other distortions (see below); a tax may on 
the other hand reduce the number of suppliers. 
GRAPH 3.3 : Government intenention in the case of 
increasing returns to scale 
efficiency (see Graph 3.3): public regulation to impose price 
setting at unit costs CXaJ reduces the inefficiency (from cbd 
to cfe). If the government imposes price setting at marginal 
costs CXopt) it eliminates the distortion; but in the latter case 
the enterprise faces unit losses (cg) which would have to be 
covered by a subsidy s. 
The main problem is the correct identification of unit and 
marginal costs as private firms have an incentive to make 
exaggerated claims to the regulating authorities. Such activi-
ties are therefore sometimes undertaken under public owner-
ship, which may, however, give rise to other efficiency prob-
lems. 
( iii) Imperfect information 
So far perfect information has been assumed about present 
and future prices of all goods and factors of production. If 
instead uncertainty is admitted, a number of areas emerge 
where subsidies may improve efficiency. 
To a certain extent risks can be covered by contingency 
markets such as insurance or futures but no full set of such 
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markets exists. IS As a result risk-adverse financial markets 
are biased against activities which involve high risks because 
they are new or because of long pay-back periods. The actual 
interest rate for such activities is above the social optimum; 
as a result such activites are not sufficiently undertaken by 
the private sector on its own and this could be remedied by 
subsidization. This argument is often invoked to justify 
subsidies for 'infant industries' . It requires, however, that 
governments can make a better assessment of market possi-
bilities than the financial markets and 'pick the winners' . 
Information itself can be considered a product whose pro-
duction creates external economies. It will therefore be insuf-
ficiently supplied unless its production is subsidized or pub-
licly provided. 
Imperfect information is sometimes invoked in another sense 
to claim that individuals do not give sufficient preference to 
certain 'merit goods' 16 whose consumption would 'do them 
good' in the eyes of decision-makers (e.g. the consumption 
of Wagner operas). Subsidies are then used to encourage 
specific consumption. Such reasoning is, however, hard to 
reconcile with the assumption of consumer sovereignty. 
The analysis has so far focused on single markets. Of course 
the removal of market failure by means of a subsidy has 
knock-on efTects on a whole range of markets: if for example 
a scholarship internalizes external economies, an individual 
may spend more on education and less on other consumer 
goods and this will afTect their prices and also the relative 
prices of factors of production. The methodological appar-
atus to determine the full new set of prices and quantities is 
'general equilibrium analysis' .17 Under first-best assump-
tions the reallocation of resources does not introduce new 
inefficiencies. The arguments presented above therefore do 
not change. 
(b) Second-best analysis 
The convenience of first-best analysis, that efficiency aspects 
of policy instruments can be discussed within the markets 
afTected disregarding the state of the other markets and 
disregarding distributional issues, evaporates once it is ad-
mitted that the government does not dispose of a full set of 
instruments to assure that the optimality conditions are met 
in all markets. In other words, if the conditions of optimality 
are not met in one market due to for example externalities 
15 Because of high transaction costs and asymmetric information (a 
principal-agent problem) which creates moral hazards and adverse selec-
tion. 
16 Musgrave (1959). 
17 For empirical examples see Chapter 3.4. 
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or taxes which are not lump-sum and if the government 
cannot correct for that, the efficiency effects of policies in 
other markets are no longer unambiguous. 
The question then becomes: what are the effects of a certain 
policy in one market given a specific distortion in another 
market? As there is potentially an infinite number of such 
distortions and as the efficiency and distributional effects of 
a policy instrument are significantly different depending on 
the form and number of the distortion(s) allowed for, there 
is no longer a unique normative theory of public policies. 
The following can therefore only try to highlight some of 
the implications of the change in the theoretical reference 
on the conclusions concerning subsidies. 
In second-best analysis subsidies offered for a product in an 
undistorted market may - contrary to first-best analysis 
above (Graph 3. I) - actually improve total welfare if they 
help to reduce a distortion in another market. The real world, 
'a distorted world of imperfect competition and market 
failure', 18 may thus be improved by countervailing distor-
tions. 
18 Wolfson (1990), pp. 11 land 112. 
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GRAPH 3.4: Effect of subsidies in one market given 
a distortion in a substitute market 
XI Xl' 
A simple example is shown in Graph 3.4: it depicts two 
markets for goods XI (transport by bus) and X2 (individual 
transport) 19 which are supposedly substitutes. X2 causes 
external diseconomies and its social marginal costs SMC2 
therefore exceed the market price P2. In second-best analysis 
it is assumed that the government has no instrument at its 
disposal to eliminate the distortion directly. Instead it may 
try to increase consumption of product XI, in this example 
by means of a subsidy s, which would lower PI to PI' and 
shift demand for X2 down to 02'. Net welfare improves as 
long as the welfare loss due to the subsidy sin market XI , 
indicated by the familiar triangle efh, is smaller than the 
reduction in the welfare loss on market X2, i.e. the quadrant 
abdc. The net result depends on the demand and supply 
elasticities in both markets as well as on the cross elasticities 
between them which raises considerably the information 
requirements to determine the efficient subsidy in specific 
cases. 
Second-best analysis also introduces the fact that in reality 
taxes can rarely be lump-sum. Instead governments must 
use distorting unit taxes on consumer goods and production 
l9 All other markets are assumed to be in equilibrium. 
X2' X2 
factors for financing expenditure. An analysis of the welfare 
effects of subsidies therefore has to take the additional 
distortions created by their financing into account. The real 
income costs of raising the tax revenue may, according to 
some estimates, be twice the revenue due to the distortional 
and administrative costs associated with raising the tax rev-
enue.20 
Furthermore, if there is a distortion, income distribution can 
no longer be disregarded in the determination of welfare 
effects. A subsidy and the additional tax required to finance 
it may bring an economy closer to or further away from the 
distributional optimum defined by a society's distributional 
preferences. The distributional welfare effects have to be 
added to the allocational effects to determine the net result 
of a policy. 21 
(c) Open economy aspects 
The analysis presented focused on the domestic economic 
effects of subsidies. But the high and growing degree of 
economic integration in the Community and in the world 
economy requires additional consideration of the effects of 
subsidies in an international context. 
Main questions to be considered here are: what are the 
effects of a subsidy in an open economy. what are the effects 
on a trading partner and on the world economy, and what 
is the efficient reaction if a trading partner introduces a 
subsidy? 
The following presents some theoretical approaches often 
used for such questions . It cannot aspire to any degree of 
completeness given the wide variety of cases distinguished 
by the number of countries and products, the consideration 
of domestic and/or trade distortions, the degree of factor 
mobility, the relative sizes of the countries involved, etc. 
Traditional normative trade theory concludes that under the 
assumptions of the first-best welfare framework presented 
above, free trade will result in an efficient international 
division of labour determined by comparative advantage. 
The discussion of subsidies against such a setting first has 
to consider the existence of market failure : as shown above 
market failure (e.g. external effects) may actually require a 
judicious set of distortion-correcting subsidies (or taxes) to 
achieve efficiency; of course the other factors, i.e. the politi-
20 Munk ( 1989), p . 80. 
21 Munk (1977) for example shows the impact of alternative sources of 
government revenue on optimal public sector pricing. 
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ea! costs of subsidies, the distortions introduced by the 
additional taxation and - in an international context - the 
threat of retaliation (see below), still have to be taken into 
account. 
In the absence of market failure traditional trade theory 
concludes that subsidies are an instrument of protectionism 
equivalent to tariffs distorting the international division of 
labour. National and global welfare are reduced, but total 
welfare of the trading partner may well be enhanced. 
GRAPH 3.5: Effect of an export subsidy on domestic welfare 
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This can be illustrated. Graph 3.5 depicts the partial-equilib-
rium situation of one expor~d product in a small country 
(i .e. the world market price P is fixed): given its demand D 
and supply Sit exports the quantity X. If the country decided 
to stimulate exports by means of an export subsidy s, exports 
would increase to X', the producers' surplus would increase 
by abde but, given the cost of the subsidy of abce, domestic 
welfare would be reduced by bed. Choosing a domestic 
subsidy instead of an export subsidy would cause the same 
efficiency loss but the transfer to domestic producers would 
be even higher. 
If the additional exports are significant in relation to world 
demand, the world market price of the exported product 
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falls; this deterioration in the terms of trade further reduces 
domestic welfare. The case of a reduction of imports by 
subsidizing domestic production is equivalent. Thus, in the 
absence of market failure, the use of subsidies to improve 
the balance of trade is welfare-reducing. In addition the 
effects on the trading partner have to be taken into account. 
GIU-_PH 3.6: Effect of an export subsidy on importing country 
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These are illustrated in Graph 3.6 for a small importing 
country: due to the subsidization by the exporting country, 
the border price of the importing country falls from P to Ps; 
its domestic production falls from Q to Q' while imports 
increase from M to M'. Domestic producers are the losers 
(producers' surplus falls by abgh) but for the economy 
overall these losses are more than compensated by the gain 
for consumers (adeh) which consume more at a lower price; 
consumers here include downstream producers which use 
the imported product as an input for their production. 
The analysis highlights the potential conflict of interest be-
tween producers, consumers and tax-payers : it is producers 
who benefit from domestic subsidies or suffer from subsidiz-
ation of foreign production; the impact on consumers, tax-
payers and on the economies overall may be quite different. 
The political theory of protectionism stresses along similar 
lines as the political theory of subsidization (see below) 
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that commercial policy is often determined by producers' 
interests rather then by the aggregate national interest. One 
indication for that is that actual GA TT rules on subsidies 
and countervailing duties (see Chapter 8) indeed focus on 
material damage to producers rather than to the economy 
overall. 
If then an importing country wants to protect its producers 
from the effects of a foreign subsidy, it may for example 
charge a countervailing duty on the subsidized imports. This 
would not only restore domestic production but also result 
in a transfer from the foreign to the domestic tax-payer. 
The consumers would, however, lose the advantage of the 
cheaper imports and the economy overall would be worse 
off than with no reaction at all. If countervailing duties are 
not available (as in the European Community), the im-
porting country may decide to counter-subsidize domestic 
producers: while that would put domestic producers on an 
equal footing with their foreign competitors, a counter-
subsidy would add a domestic distortion. 
In both cases the intention of the export-subsidizing country 
would be frustrated which is likely to induce additional 
efforts from that country and probably further counter-
measures. Each round in that process of 'bidding up' intro-
duces additional distortions and reduces global welfare. 
Pressures from domestic producers may not be the only 
reason for governments to take counter-measures: in the 
absence of international coordination counter-measures may 
provide governments with a 'bargaining chip' to persuade 
other governments to abstain from subsidization. But effec-
tive international supervision is a clearly superior approach. 
The arguments so far refer to a situation of no market 
failure. But modem trade theory recognizes that increasing 
returns to scale and the associated imperfect competition 
explain an important part of trade between industrialized 
countries. For such goods a 'strategic trade policy', which 
exploits the returns of scale in its domestic production 
through tariffs and subsidies and deters foreign competitors 
from entering the market, may in fact increase national 
welfare by shifting profits from abroad to the home industry. 
Global welfare is still reduced. 
This case is often illustrated with the Airbus/Boeing exam-
ple:22 assume that Airbus and Boeing have identical cost 
structures to produce a specific aircraft and that the global 
market is profitable for either firm if it enters alone, but 
unprofitable for both if both enter. If Boeing has a head 
22 Krugman {1987), p. 135. 
start to commit itself to production before Airbus, it will be 
the only supplier and reap large profits. Europe's govern-
ments can change the outcome if they offer a subsidy to 
Airbus sufficient to make Airbus enter the market even 
against the Boeing competition. Boeing will then be deterred 
from entering,23 and the Airbus subsidy will shift all of the 
profits from the USA to Europe. 
Thus modem trade theory indeed acknowledges that in some 
cases 'sophisticated government intervention' in inter-
national trade can increase domestic welfare. But it also 
highlights the economic difficulties of effectively im-
plementing such a policy: the required information is difficult 
to obtain, new foreign firms may enter the market and 
dissipate the national gain from intervention and there is the 
risk - as other domestic sectors always suffer from the 
subsidization of one sector - that there will still be an 
overall loss in national welfare, if the government does not 
pick exactly the right sector. 
( d) Macroeconomic aspects 
As the aggregate expenditure on subsidies in many countries 
amounts to a quite significant share of government expendi-
ture and GDP (see Chapter 4), the effects of subsidies also 
have to be considered from a macroeconomic point of view. 
In very general terms subsidies can be regarded as an instru-
ment of fiscal supply-side policy which initially reduces in-
flationary pressures and stimulates economic activity, similar 
to a reduction in the taxation of enterprises. The longer-
term impact then depends on the kind of subsidy granted 
(output, factor specific, export), the way of financing it 
(higher deficits and/or increases in taxation), the reaction of 
the subsidized enterprises (higher profits and/or reduction 
in prices, increases in output, additional investment and 
employment), of the employees (higher wage claims), of 
savings (which may increase to compensate for higher defi-
cits), of monetary policy (accommodating or not, thus influ-
encing the effect on interest rates) and the exchange rate. 
To illustrate the different factors determining the macro-
economic effects of subsidies one may sketch a specific 
example: the introduction of employment subsidies, i.e. 
transfer payments to enterprises according to their wage bill 
or the number of persons employed. On the supply side such 
subsidies directly reduce labour costs and increase profits 
inducing reduced prices, higher real output and employment; 
more exports and less imports can also be expected. In 
23 Unless Boeing in tum obtains subsidies which will make both firms stay 
in the market at profits below the subsidies with a net loss for both 
economies. 
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addition employment would in the medium term benefit 
from a substitution effect as it replaces other, now relatively 
more expensive factors of production. Employment subsidies 
lower labour costs without directly affecting the remuner-
ation of labour; the reduced unemployment and the possi-
bility of higher taxes to finance the subsidies are, however, 
likely to increase wage pressures. 
The effects on the demand side depend on the financing of 
the subsidies: their direct budgetary impact is very likely to 
be negative, even if it is attenuated by additional revenues 
and reduced expenditures due to higher economic activity 
and lower unemployment. The budgetary costs can either 
be allowed to increase the public deficit or have to be covered 
by higher taxes or cuts in other public expenditures. Higher 
deficits add an element of deficit spending to the effect of 
the subsidies; higher private saving, crowding out of private 
investment and pressures on the exchange rate have to be 
taken into account. Higher taxes negate much of the stimul-
ating effect of subsidies, although the substitution effect may 
still favour employment. Another aspect is the development 
of the trade balance which will initially improve at the 
expense of the trading partners. The longer-term effects 
depend on their reaction and on a possible adjustment of 
the exchange rate. 
(e) The political economy of subsidies 
It has been shown above that the use of subsidies as a policy 
instrument may hurt economic welfare and have serious 
international repercussions. Why then are subsidies so widely 
used? A positive explanation of actual subsidy decisions is 
attempted by the theory of public choice or the political 
economy ofprotection.24 It recognizes explicitly that subsid-
ies are granted and administered by a political process in 
which the actors, politicians and administrators are not 
neutral but act according to their own preferences and the 
constraints they face. The non-neutrality of the public sector 
adds further distortions sometimes labelled 'government fail-
ure' in analogy to 'market failure'. 
If subsidy decisions are an endogenous result of a political 
process it becomes part of the profit maximization effort of 
enterprises to invest resources to obtain subsidies. Politicians 
may be susceptible to such 'rent-seeking'25 because selective 
aid to industry may be an effective tool for maximizing the 
'popularity function' of governments26 if used to support 
24 For an overview of the various theories concerning the political economy 
of protection see Baldwin (1984). 
25 Krueger (1974). 
26 Burton (1983). 
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enterprises in marginal constituencies. The costs can be 
'hidden' in the complexities of a modern tax system. The 
asymmetry that subsidies typically raise the welfare of small 
groups by large amounts, while spreading the costs across 
larger, more diffuse groups, which are more difficult to 
organize, provides a steady bias towards excess subsidiza-
tion. 
One implication of rent-seeking is that the budget constraint 
for er,terprises becomes 'soft':27 it is no longer determined 
by market forces but by a bargaining process with the 
government. The resulting pattern of subsidization will de-
pend strongly on the bargaining power of the enterprise or 
sector concerned: big enterprises, politically strategic re-
gions, powerful industrial organizations are more likely to 
extract subsidies than small or newly established enterprises. 
Furthermore, the information whose essential importance 
for the evaluation of subsidies has been shown above is to 
some extent provided by the potential recipient and thus 
subject to a 'principal-agent' problem: the agent (a potential 
recipient) may be tempted to inflate its cost estimates to 
extract a higher subsidy. The principal (a politician or a 
civil servant) in charge of the policy may have neither the 
resources nor the incentive to probe into such claims. 
Proposals have been made to make the political process 
more responsive to the preferences of society overall and 
thus to reduce the risk of built-in excess subsidization: they 
range from more stringent requirements for parliamentary 
majorities to grant subsidies (for example two-thirds), a 
stronger role for the administration as compared to the 
legislature in determining the details of subsidy policy, to 
the institution of an international arbiter further removed 
from national interest groups. 
The existence of market failure is thus a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for a subsidy to be welfare-improving: 
the costs of rent-seeking, the administrative costs of im-
plementation and enforcement of government policies, inef-
ficiencies due to imperfect information of government and 
distortions due to inappropriate incentives for policy-makers 
and administrators also have to be taken into account. 
3.4. Empirical studies 
While theoretical analysis is able to identify factors and 
mechanisms for the evaluation of the economic effects of 
subsidies, it is for empirical analysis to shed light on the 
actual costs and benefits of specific subsidies. In spite of the 
27 Kornai (1979); this argument is often used to explain enterprise behav-
iour in administered economies. 
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large number and volume of subsidies employed in the 
European Community (see Chapter 4) and elsewhere there 
is, however, remarkably little empirical analysis of their 
effects. This may be due both to the lack of transparency of 
the various forms of subsidies and to rather limited pressures 
for justification of subsidies. While the former has been 
significantly reduced in the European Community with the 
first and second surveys on State aids (see Chapter 4), the 
latter is growing with the integration of the Community and 
the world economy (see Chapter 8). 
There are empirical studies which look at the impact of 
subsidies either by correlating them with sectoral perform-
ance, or by means of a partial or a general equilibrium 
model. General equilibrium models are also used to measure 
the impact of total subsidization. In addition there are stud-
ies on the macroeconomic effects of subsidies on the basis 
of macroeconometric models. 
The most straightforward studies only try to verify whether 
subsidies at least went along with improvements regarding 
their primary objectives without looking at efficiency losses. 
They confront a measure of subsidization with the develop-
ment of output, employment or observed competitiveness of 
the recipients. 
In one such study Soltwedel et a/.28 look at the development 
of the textile and the shipbuilding sectors in several Member 
States during the first half of the 1980s. In that period 
both sectors underwent substantial restructuring which was 
accompanied by various forms of public intervention. In the 
textiles industry subsidization reached a significant degree 
in Belgium (up to l % of value-added) and France (up to 
2,9 %); nevertheless both countries were unable to expand 
their share in intra-EC trade. In shipbuilding subsidization 
was much higher: France and Italy subsidizing up to 50 % 
of the production costs of ships, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom up to 30 %, Belgium and Germany 
some 20 %.29 With regard to production or export shares 
there appears to have been a positive impact of new subsidy 
measures in the first year; but in the longer term subsidiza-
tion and production share even appear to have been nega-
tively correlated. 
Such an approach can serve as a quick first impression of 
the performance of subsidized activities: if performance does 
not improve in spite of the subsidization this may indicate 
the need for a policy review. Its usefulness is, however, very 
28 Soltwedel et al. ( 1988). 
29 Indicative orders of magnitude; actual subsidization varied widely de-
pending on the nationality of the purchaser and the construction year. 
limited as it does not permit the isolation of the role of 
subsidies from other factors nor, as there is no reference 
solution, any estimation of what would have happened with-
out the subsidy. 
A rather recent approach tries to model particular industries 
to quantify the effects of trade and industrial policies under 
imperfect competition due to economies of scale.30 The ap-
proach is partial equilibrium, i.e. all other sectors are as-
sumed not to be affected. The model is 'calibrated' to a 
particular industry using actual performance of a specific 
year, for example, production, imports, number of domestic 
firms, domestic market shares in addition to estimates for 
cost functions and demand elasticities from various industry 
studies, and choosing the remaining parameter values in 
such a way that the model reproduces the actual results.31 
Venables and Smith32 use this approach to quantify the 
effects of tariffs, export subsidies and domestic producer 
subsidies in the cases of the refrigerator and footwear indus-
tries in the United Kingdom in 1982. They explicitly allow 
for the number of brands per firm and the number of firms 
to vary. 
In the case of the refrigerator industry, a 10 % export subsidy 
is calculated to slightly reduce domestic but to improve 
foreign welfare, if the number of firms and brands is fixed. 
If they are allowed to vary, domestic firms increase the 
number of brands and thus increase domestic sales as well. 
As a result net domestic welfare actually increases (by I % 
of base consumption), foreign welfare is reduced but global 
welfare enhanced. 
A similar government expenditure for a I ,5 % domestic 
production subsidy improves domestic welfare already with 
a fixed number of firms and brands as lower prices induce 
higher domestic consumption. Again domestic welfare is 
further enhanced when additional brands are permitted (to 
1,4 % of base consumption). Foreign welfare is reduced in 
any case, but global welfare gains. It may be interesting to 
note that producers gain relatively more from the export 
subsidy, whereas consumers would prefer the domestic sub-
sidy. In the footwear industry where economies of scale are 
smaller the results are equal in principle but the domestic 
welfare gains from export or producer subsidies are smaller. 
Such models are useful illustrations for the quantitative 
implications of countering a 'distortion' - in this case econ-
30 Developed by Dixit (1984) and Baldwin and Krugman (1986). 
31 Krugman suggests calling this method of quantification 'Industrial pol-
icy exercises calibrated to actual cases', Venables (1986), p. 661. 
32 Venables (1986). 
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omies of scale - with a counter-distortion: subsidies. Its 
main weakness is that it is partial equilibrium, i.e. the second-
ary effects on other markets, in particular the factor markets, 
are not taken into account: other, not subsidized, sectors 
which may also have economies of scale, would be negatively 
affected, and may in addition have to face the retaliation 
from the rest of the world. The welfare costs of taxation to 
finance the subsidies and the general costs of 'government 
failure' also have to be taken into account. 
A model developed to capture the interaction between the 
different sectors of production and factor supplies is the 
computable general equilibrium model Orani. 33 This model 
attempts to capture the efficiency effects of industrial policies 
and to calculate their macroeconomic impacts on GDP, 
employment, the trade balance, etc. As in the partial equilib-
rium studies above, the parameter values of the model are 
chosen to reflect a specific economy in a reference year. A 
key element of this model is detailed input-output tables; in 
addition specific regions and/or categories of labour can be 
explicitly specified. The analysis is comparative static. 
The Centre for International Economics of Australia has 
applied such a model to estimate the 'Costs of coal industry 
assistance in West Germany'.34 They estimate that the Ger-
man coal industry benefited in I 987 of direct and indirect 
financial aid and of price support worth DM 10,6 billion 
('producer subsidy equivalent'). Removing the price support 
would result in an increase of German GDP by DM 38 
billion and a net employment gain of I 57 OOO. The fall in 
electricity prices would benefit all sectors of the economy 
and allow exporting industries to expand their production, 
in particular iron and steel, electrical engineering and mech-
anical engineering. 
Gerken et al. 35 use such a model to compare the costs of 
different policies to stabilize the employment of unskilled 
labour in German regions affected by a 10 % decline in 
world market prices for steel. They find that a subsidy on 
steel production of 2, I % could achieve that objective at an 
annual budgetary cost of DM 2,5 billion. Other sectors and 
regions profit from the lower steel prices, but if additional 
taxes are introduced to finance the subsidy, aggregate output 
declines by 0,12 %. Furthermore, the sectoral subsidy pre-
vents restructuring in the region concerned which makes it 
likely that the subsidy has to be paid permanently. An 
alternative measure would be a regional wage subsidy: the 
33 Developed by Dixon et al. ( 1982). 
34 Centre for International Economics (1990). 
35 Gerken et al. ( 1986). 
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objective of maintaining the level of unskilled employment 
could then be achieved at annual budgetary costs of OM 
0, 7 billion, the lower costs mainly due to directly stimulating 
employment across all sectors of the region. Furthermore, 
when capital shifts away from steel production to other 
sectors, the expenditure on subsidies can be further dimin-
ished to OM 0,04 billion. 
On one occasion such a model has been used to calculate 
the effects of abolishing all subsidies in Germany. Weiss et 
a/.36 estimate that a removal of all subsidies combined with 
an equivalent reduction in taxation would increase German 
GDP by 0,9 % and provide additional employment for low-
skilled as well as for high-skilled labour by 2,2 % and 1,6 % 
respectively. Behind these aggregate results lies a far-reach-
ing restructuring of German production with dramatic pro-
duction decline in agriculture, food processing, coal and 
aerospace and expansion in electrical and mechanical engin-
eering, consumer goods and construction. The overall capital 
intensity of production, currently artificially elevated due to 
the subsidies, would decline. 
These models are useful tools in particular to analyse the 
sectoral interaction and to compare the costs of different 
forms of government intervention. They still do not capture 
the administrative costs and the international repercussions 
of intervention. The results depend strongly on the par-
ameters chosen, some of which can be estimated but which 
cannot be rigorously tested. Furthermore, they assume that 
resources can be costlessly re-employed in other activities. 
The model also makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
efficiency gains from a reallocation of resources and the 
macroeconomic effects. 
The macroeconomic impact of subsidies may be estimated 
with macroeconometric models. Such models specify the 
behavioural equations for both the demand and the supply 
side to different degrees of detail and estimate behavioural 
parameters with econometric techniques. A broad range of 
macroeconomic models is widely used for macroeconomic 
forecasts and policy analysis. 
Whitley and Wilson,37 for example, use the 'Cambridge 
growth project multisectoral dynamic model' to estimate the 
effects of general employment subsidies, i.e. a reduction in 
the social security contributions, and of marginal employ-
ment subsidies, i.e. subsidies granted only for additional jobs 
created. Marginal employment subsidies have been advo-
36 Weiss et al. ( 1988). 
37 Whitley (1983). 
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cated in the early 1980s to combat rising unemployment.38 
The United States of America, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland have at some point in time offered such schemes. 
Whitley and Wilson find that a marginal employment sub-
sidy of 33 % of average earnings would indeed induce higher 
employment which would reach 0,3 % after six years. The 
main gains would be in labour-intensive sectors like distri-
bution and miscellaneous services. The budgetary costs 
would be an increase in the budget deficit of0,2 % of GDP, 
the balance of trade would deteriorate - due to a rather 
low export price elasticity- by 0, I % of GDP, but the price 
level would remain significantly below the reference level 
(-0,4 %). If instead general employment subsidies were 
used with the same initial budgetary costs, the improvement 
of employment would be somewhat smaller ( + 0,2 % after 
six years) with a similar deterioration in the balance of 
payments and a reduction in the price level. Given the high 
costs of administering and policing a marginal employment 
subsidy scheme, the authors remain sceptical as to whether 
a complex marginal scheme would be preferable to a more 
straightforward cut in employers' national social security 
contributions. 
3.5. Outlook for future research 
The economics of subsidies are not a widely researched 
subject. While the welfare implications in traditional first-
best welfare and foreign trade models are well developed, 
this is far less the case with regard to second-best. More 
general equilibrium analysis is required therefore to improve 
the understanding of the effects of subsidies on efficiency 
and distribution given various distortions both in domestic 
and in foreign markets. This should facilitate the choice of 
the most efficient instrument to achieve different policy 
objectives. Furthermore, the analysis of subsidies is mainly 
static. The dynamic implications of different kinds of subsid-
ies on innovation and technical progress require further 
analysis. 
With regard to the political economy of subsidies and protec-
tionism, an interesting question concerns the reduction of 
'government failure': what political decision-making and 
administrative structures are best able to implement public 
preferences and to minimize administrative costs? Concern-
ing the international spill-overs of national subsidy decisions 
there is also the question of the best division of responsi-
bilities between the national, the Community and the global 
level. 
38 See, for example, Layard (1980). 
The prerequisite for empirical research is transparency. With 
regard to the European Community transparency has greatly 
improved with the availability of the first and second surveys 
on State aid in the Community (see Chapter 4). This should 
now provide a reasonable database for empirical research. 
Research could still be useful into the different national 
subsidy statistics to better understand the different defi-
nitions and measurement concepts applied. The annual re-
port on government aids in EIT A countries could develop 
into a similarly comprehensive source of information. For 
other industrialized and newly industrialized countries trans-
parency still needs considerable improvement. 
Empirical research could expand in two directions: on the 
one hand there is a need for comprehensive cost/benefit-
analysis of various forms of subsidies and even individual 
subsidy cases both to improve the understanding of the 
relative importance of different factors for the evaluation of 
subsidies and to improve the rationality of actual decision-
making processes. On the other hand, given the data now 
available on subsidies in the EC, it should be possible to 
extend the so far mainly national general equilibrium models 
to explicitly include several Member States. This would 
make it possible to illustrate the cross-border spill-overs of 
subsidies and of other instruments of public intervention. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
Economic theory shows how subsidies and the taxes required 
to finance them often introduce distortions and therefore 
welfare losses into the domestic and the global economy. 
Additional distortions are caused by rent-seeking, adminis-
trative inefficiencies and international retaliation. It also 
shows, however, that in the presence of market distortions 
adequate subsidies can actually restore efficiency. Further-
more, in other cases subsidies may be the instrument with 
the smallest efficiency losses to realize given distributional 
preferences. 
A rational decision on subsidy policy therefore requires a 
careful empirical evaluation of the case at hand. The onus 
of proof still lies heavily on the advocates of subsidization. 
While there is no consensus on an optimal norm for subsidy 
policy, a policy rule of no subsidies except under the most 
convincing circumstances may still be the efficient 'rule of 
thumb'.39 
39 Krugman (1987). 
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Chapter 4 
Trends and patterns of State aid 
4.1. Introduction 
In two surveys1 published in 1989 and 1990, the Commission 
attempted to quantify the aids granted by Member States 
between 1981 and 1988. These surveys did not cover the 
whole range of measures which could come under the defi-
nition of subsidies proposed in Chapter 3, but only the sub-
set of measures which constitute State aids and are subject 
to Community rules in the sphere of competition or transport 
policy (see Chapter 5). The appendix to the present chapter 
summarizes the sources and methodology used in the surveys 
and draws attention to the main limitations of the data. 
These limitations should be borne in mind when reading this 
chapter. 
The second survey found that in the period 1986-88 State 
aids to all sectors amounted to ECU 82 billion per year and 
thus represented 2,2 % of the Community's GDP, ranging 
from a high of 4, 1 % in Luxembourg to a low of I % in 
Denmark and the UK. Aids accounted for 4,5 % of total 
general government expenditure in this period, again with 
the highest percentage in Luxembourg (7,6 % ) and the lowest 
in Denmark (1,7 %) (see Graphs 4.1 and 4.2). Clearly, there-
fore, State aids are of macroeconomic significance in all 
Member States, even though aid levels vary considerably 
between them. 
A sectoral breakdown of the aids shows that manufacturing 
took 41 %, transport (mainly railways) 30 %, the coal indus-
try 16 % and agriculture/fisheries 13 % . It should be noted, 
however, that aid for transport other than by rail is inad-
equately covered by the surveys and that the coal industry 
is the only part of the energy sector included in the data. 
Graph 4.3 shows the evolution of the amounts of aid granted 
by Member States (excluding Spain and Portugal) from 1981 
to 1988. It shows that, in real terms, both total aid and the 
amount granted to manufacturing increased up to 1984 and 
then began to decline, with a particularly sharp fall in 1986, 
followed by a return in 1988 to nearly the same level as in 
1986. Aid to the railways has slowly declined while aid to 
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Commission of the EC (1989) and (1990). These are the main sources 
of the information contained in this chapter. 
the coal industry and agriculture was quite stable in real 
terms over the whole period. The growth in the total volume 
of aid up to 1984 is perhaps a reflection of the fact that real 
GDP growth in the Community was sluggish during this 
period, and the decline from then until 1987 may be largely 
attributable to faster economic growth. The upturn in State 
aids in 1988 does not follow this pattern. Indeed, GDP 
growth, which had been steadily gaining momentum through 
the 1980s, accelerated sharply in that year and other indi-
cators, such as unemployment rates and gross fixed capital 
formation, also showed marked improvements. 
Although it is not possible to say on the basis of data for 
one year2 that the post-1984 trend in State aids has been 
reversed, there is clearly a continuing need for strict control 
at the Community level and self-limitation at the national 
level. 
4.2. Manufacturing industry3 
(a) The volume and evolution of State aid to manufacturing 
In the period 1986-88 aids to manufacturing identified by 
the second survey amounted to ECU 33 7 I 4 million per year, 
or about 1 % of GDP and 4 % of gross value-added in 
manufacturing. 
Table 4.1 relates the aid granted in each Member State to 
several economic indicators. From this table it can be seen 
that by most measures aid was highest in the countries which 
are wholly or in large parts lagging behind the rest of the 
Community in their economic development (Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). However, it is also noteworthy 
that aid per person occupied in manufacturing was very high 
in Belgium. 
Table 4.2 below compares the average yearly amounts given 
as State aid to manufacturing in the periods I 981-85 and 
1986-88. From this table it can be seen that the volume of 
aid in EUR 10 has declined in real terms by 25 %. The 
lowest point was reached in 1987 but the following year saw 
an increase of almost 14 %. The 1988 level was still well 
The interpretation of the 1988 data is also made difficult by the fact 
that some of the figures had to be extrapolated from 1987 because of 
lack of information on actual expenditure. 
A small, but unknown, proportion of the aid considered here as going 
to manufacturing was in fact granted to the service sector. In what 
follows it is generally assumed that this proportion is negligible. 
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GRAPH 4.1 : Total aid as % of GDP 
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GRAPH 4.3: State aids in EUR 10, 1981-88 
million ECU Constant 1988 prices and exchange rates 
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below that of 1981-85 and it is obviously not possible to say 
Table 4.1 on the evidence of one year that the trend has been reversed. 
1986 1987 1988 
6. Coal x Agriculture 
Table 4.2 also shows that State aid volumes decreased more State aid to manufacturing - yearly averages 1986-88 
sharply in Belgium, Denmark, France and Luxembourg4 
than the average. On the other hand, there was a marked Million ECU % % % 
increase in the amount of aid granted in Greece5 and the GDP of GFCF
1 
GVA ' 
German level declined by only 5 %. The increase in Greece 
is mainly attributable to regional aids, which have more than B I 054 0,9 4,3 19,0 
doubled. DK 275 0,3 1,9 5,52 
D 7 639 0,8 2,7 15,7 
GR 1 043 2,5 15,8 n.a. 
E 2 930 1,2 4,9 n.a. 
F 5 664 0,7 3,7 17,5 
IRL 408 1,6 6,1 35,03 
I 9 563 1,5 6,3 27,7 
L 34 0,7 2,5 10,5 
NL 1 070 0,6 3,2 10,62 
p 462 1,4 5,3 28,42 
UK 3 570 0,6 2,6 15,2 
EUR 12 33 714 0,9 3,8 n.a. 
ECU 
per person 
employed' 
1 437 
519 
963 
n.a. 
1 207 
1 253 
1 947 
1 900 
892 
1 182 
568 
666 
1 1474 
It should be noted, however, that aid levels in Luxembourg have been 
very erratic. 
1 Gross valuc•addcd, gross fixed capital fonnation and occupied population in manufacturing. 
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There is, however, some doubt about the accuracy of the data for 
Greece. 
Manufacturing GVA estimated for Ireland. 
2 1986 only. 
l Averageof 1986and 1987. 
4 Excluding Greece. 
Table 4.2 
Aid to manufacturing - annual averages at constant 1988 prices and 
exchange rates 
(million ECUJ 
1981-85 1986-88 % change 
B I 739 I 074 -38 
DK 462 286 -38 
D 8 219 7 827 -5 
GR 802 1 097 +37 
E 3 154 
F 8 804 5 743 -35 
IRL 18 411 -21 
I 14 421 9 898 -31 
L 116 35 -70 
NL I 281 I 092 -15 
p 485 
UK 5 483 3 880 -29 
EUR 10 41 846 31 342 -25 
EUR 12 34 981 
(b) Breakdown of aid by objectives or sectors 
The first and second surveys classify aids to industry in three 
main groups: horizontal, particular sectors and regional. 
Horizontal aids include those schemes which have no sec-
toral or regional specificity, such as general schemes of 
support for research and development, small and medium-
sized enterprises and export subsidies. This category also 
includes general investment aid schemes which are not for-
mally targeted on specific sectors, but which are in practice 
sometimes used to favour certain 'strategic' industries. Sec-
toral aids include schemes targeted on particular industries 
and also ad-hoe aids for individual firms. Rescue and restruc-
turing aids therefore constitute a large part of this category. 
Within each main group, the aids are further broken down 
according to the objective, sector or type of region concerned 
by the measure. Regions are classified in three categories: 
the least favoured (covered by Article 92(3)(a) EEC), Berlin 
and the 'Zonenrandgebiet' of Germany (covered by 
Article 92(2)(c) and others (covered by Article 92(3)(c)). 
Table 4.3 gives a breakdown of aids to manufacturing ac-
cording to this classification and Tables 4.4 and 4.5 relate 
these data to GDP and GVA in manufacturing. From 
Table 4.3 it can be seen that, among the horizontal objec-
tives, research and development and trade/export aids were 
the largest sub-categories, closely followed by schemes of 
support for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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In the sub-category 'Other objectives', large amounts of aid 
were given by Belgium, Germany and Italy. In Germany, 
environmental protection and energy saving accounted for 
60 % of this aid, but in the other two countries most of the 
aid falls into a miscellaneous class which is not further 
defined. 
It will be noted that sectoral aids accounted for very high 
proportions of the total in Spain and France. In the case of 
Spain, 40 % of the sectoral aids went to steel and shipbuild-
ing, since that country was not subject to the full rigour of 
Community controls on aid to these sectors during the 
period under consideration. However, the Community rules 
became fully applicable to the Spanish steel industry after 
1988. Exceptional rules continue to apply to Spanish ship-
building until the end of 1991. Very large reductions in 
Spanish aid to these sectors can therefore be expected from 
1989 onwards. As far as France is concerned, steel and 
shipbuilding accounted for only 20 % of the sectoral aids 
and the high volume of aid in this category is mainly attribu-
table to two large rescue operations in other sectors. 
Regional aid accounted for 36 % of the Community total, 
16 % for the least favoured regions and 20 % for the others. 
(c) Horizontal aid schemes 
Among the horizontal aid schemes, the most important sub-
categories in terms of expenditure are, in order of import-
ance: research and development, export and trade promotion 
and support for SMEs. 
Research and development aid accounted for 10 % of the 
total aid to manufacturing in 1986-88, an increase of two 
percentage points by comparison with 1981-86 (the period 
of the first survey). In addition, Community support for 
R&D amounted to ECU 505 million per annum in the per-
iod 1986-88, about 15 % of the total national aid. 
Export and trade promotion represented 9,6 % of the total 
in the same period, a considerable reduction by comparison 
with the period of the first survey, when it accounted for 
almost 14 %. However, the level remained rather high for 
a form of aid which has important implications for the 
Community's external trade relations. Table 4.6 below 
shows that the reduction in export subsidies was mainly the 
result of cuts in France, Italy and the UK but that there 
were increases, in nominal terms at least, in several other 
Member States, notably Ireland. The table also indicates 
that these subsidies represented a significant proportion of 
the value of the industrial extra-Community exports of Ire-
land, France, Italy and Greece. In relation to Greece, it 
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Table 4.3 
Aids to manufacturing by objective or sector - yearly averages 1986-88, in million ECU 
(% of total in brackets) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 
Horizontal objectives 714 200 2 623 429 366 2 629 193 3 051 15 840 299 I 222 12 581 
(68) (73) (34) (41) (12,5) (46) (47) (32) (44) (79) (65) (34) (37) 
Innovation/R&D 90 l l l l 300 61 162 496 19 486 2 245 8 350 3 330 
(8,5) (40,4) (17) (5,9) (5,5) (8,8) (4,7) (5,l) (5,9) (22,9) (l,7) (9,8) (9,9) 
SMEs 258 3 614 39 36 289 24 885 7 371 ll 301 2 838 
(24,5) (l,l) (8,0) (3,7) (l,2) (5,l) (5,9) (9,3) (20,6) (34,7) (2,4) (8,4) (8,4) 
Trade/export 133 48 132 329 28 l 428 150 645 l 17 8 320 3 239 
(12,6) (17,5) (l,7) (31,6) (l,O) (25,2) (36,8) (6,7) (2,9) (l,6) (l,7) (9,0) (9,6) 
General investment 127 0 51 0 97 346 0 278 5 135 262 207 l 508 
(12,0) (0,7) (3,3) (6,l) (2,9) (14,7) (12,6) (56,7) (5,8) (4,5) 
Other objectives 106 38 526 0 43 70 0 757 0 72 lO 44 I 666 
(10,0) (13,8) (6,9) (l,5) (l,2) (7,9) (6,7) (2,2) (l,2) (4,9) 
Particular sectors 125 58 546 207 2499 2 602 56 l 595 0 69 144 l 201 9 102 
(12) (21) (7) (20) (85,3) (46) (14) (17) (6) (31) (34) (27) 
Steel 0 0 60 0 891 16 0 357 0 0 21 20 l 365 
(0,8) (30,4) (0,3) (3,7) (4,5) (0,6) (4,0) 
Shipbuilding 31 57 166 0 103 476 0 224 0 30 24 452 l 563 
(2,9) (21) (2,2) (3,5) (8,4) (2,3) (2,8) (5,2) (12,7) (4,6) 
Other sectors 94 l 320 207 l 505 2 110 56 l 014 0 39 99 729 6 174 
(9,0) (0) (4,2) (20) (51,4) (37,2) (14) (10,6) (3,6) (21,4) (20,4) (18,3) 
Regional aid 215 17 4473 406 65 435 159 4916 19 161 19 l 146 12 031 
(20) (6) (59) (39) (2,2) (8) (39) (51) (56) (15) (4) (32) (36) 
Least favoured regions 0 0 0 406 n.a. 161 159 4 261 0 0 19 242 5 3131 
(39) (2,8) (39) (44,6) (4) (6,8) (15,8) 
Other regions 215 17 4473 0 n.a. 273 0 655 19 161 0 904 6 717 
(20) (6) (59) n.a. (4,8) (6,9) (56) (15) (25,3) (19,9) 
Total l 054 275 7 642 l 042 2 930 5 666 408 9 562 34 l 070 462 3 569 33 714 
(l 00) (l 00) (l 00) (100) (100) (l 00) (l 00) (l 00) (100) (l 00) (I 00) (100) (l 00) 
I Including all Spanish regional aid. 
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Table 4.4 
Aids to manufacturing by objective or sector, 1986-88, as% of GDP 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 
Horizontal objectives 0,59 0,23 0,27 1,04 0,14 0,34 0,73 0,46 0,28 0,45 0,92 0,20 0,33 
Innovation/R&D 0,07 0,13 0,13 0,15 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,04 0,13 0,02 0,06 0,09 
SMEs 0,21 0,00 0,06 0,09 0,01 0,04 0,09 0,13 0,13 0,20 0,03 0,05 0,08 
Trade/export 0,11 0,05 0,01 0,79 0,01 0,19 0,57 0,10 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,05 0,09 
General investment 0,11 0 0,01 0 0,04 0,04 0 0,04 0,09 0,07 0,81 0,03 0,04 
Other objectives 0,09 0,04 0,05 0 0,02 0,01 0 0,12 0 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,04 
Particular sectors 0,10 0,07 0,06 0,50 0,97 0,34 0,21 0,24 0 0,04 0,44 0,19 0,24 
Steel 0 0 0,01 0 0,35 0,00 0 0,05 0 0 0,06 0,00 0,04 
Shipbuilding 0,03 0,07 0,02 0 0,04 0,06 0 0,03 0 0,02 0,07 0,07 0,04 
Other sectors 0,08 0 0,03 0,50 0,59 0,27 0,21 0,15 0 0,02 0,31 0,12 0,16 
Regional aid 0,18 0,02 0,46 0,98 0,03 0,06 0,61 0,75 0,36 0,09 0,06 0,19 0,32 
Least favoured regions 0 0 0 0,98 n.a. 0,02 0,61 0,65 0 0 0,06 0,04 0,141 
Other regions 0,18 0,02 0,46 0 n.a. 0,04 0 0,10 0,36 0,09 0 0,15 0,18 
Total 0,9 0,3 0,8 2,5 1,2 0,7 1,6 1,5 0,7 0,6 1,4 0,6 0,9 
I Including all Spanish regional aid. 
Table 4.5 
Aids to manufacturing by objective or sector, 1986-88, as% of gross value-added in manufacturing 
B DK D GR E F IRL 1 L NL p UK EUR 12 
Horizontal objectives 2,91 1,35 0,93 6,45 0,61 1,70 2,89 1,99 1,08 2,47 3,35 0,88 1,43 
Innovation/R&D 0,37 0,75 0,46 0,92 0,27 0,32 0,28 0,32 0,14 0,72 0,09 0,25 0,38 
SMEs 1,05 0,02 0,22 0,59 0,06 0,19 0,36 0,58 0,50 1,09 0,12 0,22 0,32 
Trade/export 0,54 0,32 0,05 4,95 0,05 0,92 2,24 0,42 0,07 0,05 0,09 0,23 0,37 
General investment 0,52 0 0,02 0 0,16 0,22 0 0,18 0,36 0,40 2,94 0,15 0,17 
Other objectives 0,43 0,26 0,19 0 0,07 0,05 0 0,49 0 0,21 0,11 0,03 0,19 
Particular sectors 0,51 0,39 0,19 3,11 4,20 1,68 0,84 1,04 0 0,20 1,61 0,87 1,04 
Steel 0 0 0,02 0 1,50 0,01 0 0,23 0 0 0,24 0,01 0,16 
Shipbuilding 0,13 0,38 0,06 0 0,17 0,31 0 0,15 0 0,09 0,27 0,33 0,18 
Other sectors 0,38 0,01 0,11 3,11 2,53 1,37 0,84 0,66 0 0,11 1,11 0,53 0,70 
Regional aid 0,88 0,11 1,59 6,10 0,11 0,28 2,38 3,21 1,37 0,47 0,21 0,83 1,37 
Least favoured regions 0 0 0 6,10 n.a. 0.10 2,38 2,78 0 0 0,21 0,18 0,602 
Other regions 0,88 0,11 1,59 0 n.a. 0,18 0 0,43 1,37 0,47 0 0,65 0,76 
Total 4,3 1,9 2,7 15,7 4,9 3,7 6,1 6,2 2,5 3,2 5,2 2,6 3,8 
Manufacturing GVA estimated. 
Including all Spanish regional aid. 
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should be noted that in 1985 and 1986 the Commission, 
acting under Article 108(3) EEC, authorized the Greek 
Government as a 'safeguard measure' to grant progressively 
diminishing aid for intra-Community as well as extra-EC 
exports until the end of 1989. By now, therefore, Greek 
export aids should have been reduced to a very much lower 
level. In the case of Ireland, the main export aid scheme 
(applicable only to extra-EC exports) was ended in 1990. 
Aid to SMEs has grown from 5 % of the total aid to 
manufacturing in the first survey period to 8 % in 1986-88. 
It is difficult to assess the significance of this aid with 
reference to socio-economic indicators specific to SMEs for 
the following reasons: 
(i) statistics by size of enterprise are very inadequate, 
(ii) the definition of SMEs differs between countries and 
even between schemes in the same country, 
(iii) much of the aid to SMEs is indirect, e.g. in the form of 
advisory services, 
(iv) it is probable that the service sector receives a significant 
proportion of the aid, 
(v) SMEs can also benefit from aid in most of the other 
categories; in particular regional aid schemes often give 
priority and higher rates of aid to smaller firms. 
However, Table 4.7 attempts a comparison of aid per em-
ployee under SME schemes for those countries where it is 
possible to make a very rough estimate of the number of 
employees concerned. 
From these partial and tentative results it appears that 
differences in the size of SME promotion schemes cannot 
be explained entirely by the relative levels of employment. 
The Benelux countries clearly attach much more importance 
to such schemes than do the other Member States. However, 
as noted above, the data do not allow conclusions to be 
drawn about the total support given to SMEs from all types 
of scheme. 
( d) Aid for specific sectors 
The data on specific sectoral aids only distinguish between 
steel, shipbuilding and other sectors. It is probably reason-
able to assume that the motor vehicle industry figures largely 
in the last group. 
As far as the steel industry is concerned, aid was drastically 
reduced in the period 1986-88 by comparison with the period 
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Table 4.6 
Trade/export aid (annual average) 
Amounts As% of 
in non-
million ECU agricultural 
extra-EC 
1981-86 1986-88 % exports 
change 
1986-88 
B/L 98 134 +37 0,8 
DK 52 48 -8 0,6 
D 99 132 +33 0,1 
GR 454 329 -28 (3,3) 1 
E 28 0,3 
F 2 091 1428 -32 3,1 
IRL 83 150 +81 5,6 
I 882 645 -27 1,5 
NL 34 17 -50 0,1 
p 8 0,4 
UK 749 320 - 57 0,6 
EUR 10 4 542 3 203 -29 1,0 
EUR 12 3 239 1,0 
I Percentage of total non-agricultural exports. 
Table 4.7 
SME schemes - total aid and aid per employee in manufacturing 
firms with less than 500 employees (annual average 1986-88) 
Total (million ECU) Per employee (ECU) 1 
B 258 n.a. 
DK 3 n.a. 
D 614 160 
GR 39 n.a. 
E 36 20 
F 289 100 
IRL 24 n.a. 
I 885 270 
L 7 360 
NL 371 470 
p 11 n.a. 
UK 301 n.a. 
EUR 12 2 838 n.a. 
I Rough estimates. 
of the first survey. In Spain and Portugal also a reduction 
can be expected as Community discipline becomes fully 
effective (from I January 1989 and 1991 respectively). 
Table 4.8 shows the situation in the periods 1981-86 and 
1986-88 for each Member State and compares the levels of 
aid per employee. 
Table 4.8 
Aid to the steel industry (annual averages) 
Total in million ECU ECU per employee 
1981-86 1986-88 ~o 1981-86 1986-88 
change 
B 420 0 -100 10 723 0 
DK 7 0 -100 4 118 0 
D 371 60 -84 2 229 432 
GR 0 0 0 0 
E 891 18 588 
F l 513 16 -99 17 151 252 
IRL 31 0 -100 50 243 0 
l 699 357 -79 20 218 5 598 
L 68 0 - JOO 5 271 0 
NL 35 0 -100 l 786 0 
p 21 3 663 
UK 703 20 -97 9 922 359 
EUR 10 4 847 453 -91 9 938 l 167 
EUR 12 l 365 3 088 
In the period 1986-88 the ECSC contributed ECU 
113 million per annum towards the social costs of restructur-
ing the steel industry (retraining, redundancy payments, etc.) 
and ECU 33 million per year for research and demonstration 
projects in the sector. 
Aid to shipbuilding was reduced much less dramatically, as 
Table 4.9 shows, and even increased in terms of ecus (nomi-
nal) per employee. However, it should be noted that the 
sixth Directive with its stricter Community discipline was in 
force for only the last two of the three years covered by the 
second survey. Furthermore, this discipline was not extended 
in full to Portugal until the seventh Directive came into force 
on I January 1991 and special provisions still apply to Spain 
until the end of 1991. Nevertheless, the intensity of aid per 
employee is very striking, particularly in France and the 
UK. 
Table 4.10 shows the year-by-year development of aid to 
shipbuilding in the Community without Spain and Portugal 
and shows that in the first two years of its operation (1987 
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Table 4.9 
Aid to the shipbuilding industry (annual averages) 
Total in million ECU ECU per employee 
1981-86 1986-SS % 198 1-86 1986-88 
change 
B 61 31 -49 14 018 l l 903 
DK 126 57 -55 12 223 8 028 
D 176 166 -6 7 399 10 849 
GR 4 0 - 100 l 742 0 
E 103 6 268 
F 507 476 -6 27 531 48 4232 
IRL 5 QI - 100 13 127 0 
I 237 224 -5 17 905 19 130 
L 0 0 0 0 
NL 74 30 -59 9 424 7 200 
p 24 4 959 
UK 483 452 -6 25 832 41 091 
EUR 10 l 673 l 436 -14 16 817 22 636 
EUR 12 l 563 18 451 
1 No shipyards operating since 1984. The reopening or a shipyard is planned in the near 
future. 
Underestimate: personnel employed in militar) sh,pbmldmg included 111 number of em-
ployees. 
and 1988) the sixth Directive did not have a notable effect on 
total aid volumes, which were already showing a downward 
trend in the two previous years. 
However, it is probable that the large reductions in the aid 
ceiling which have taken place since 1988 will have had a 
more significant impact. 
Table 4.10 
Aid to shipbuilding in EUR 10, 1983-88 
(million ECU) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
l 835 l 992 l 670 l 496 l 270 l 336 
(e) Regional aid 
It is difficult to draw definite conclusions from the data on 
regional aid schemes. The most striking fact about the figures 
collected for the first and second surveys is the large pro-
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portion of total regional aid which went to West Berlin 
(27 % of the EUR 10 total in 1981-86 and 28 % of the EUR 
12 total in 1986-88). In the period 1986-88 this aid amounted 
to ECU 1 786 yearly per head of population, a very much 
higher intensity than in any other regions of the Community, 
including the most disadvantaged (see Table 4.11 ). However, 
the German Government has announced its intention of 
ending the special aid to West Berlin and the 'Zonenrandge-
biet' under the provisions of Article 92(2)(c) EEC. The effect 
on the total level of German regional aid is, however, likely 
to be outweighed by the expenditure needed to help the five 
new Lander to adapt their economies. 
Aid for the most disadvantaged regions of the Community 
(those covered by Article 92(3)(a) EEC, about 20 % of the 
Community's population in 1986 - see box) amounted to 
about 44 % of the total regional aid granted by Member 
States in 1986-88. Table 4.11 shows the aid granted per head 
of population in these regions, indicating a wide variation, 
with the more prosperous Member States granting larger 
amounts of aid per head. 
Table 4.11 
Yearly average regional aid in most disadvantaged regions, 1986-88 
(£CU/head) 
UK F lRL GR E p EC 
204 153 124 45 41 2 81 
1 All regional aid assumed to go to Article 92(3)(a) regions, as no breakdown available. 
However, Greece, Ireland and Portugal qualify in their en-
tirety under Article 92(3)(a) and, consequently, their general 
investment aid schemes could be regarded as having a re-
gional character from the Community's point of view. No 
such scheme appears to exist in Greece and Ireland, but if 
the Portuguese general schemes are taken into account, 
Portugal's average is increased to ECU 27 per head. 
As far as Spain and Portugal are concerned, it is important 
to bear in mind that the regional aid systems were still in 
their infancy in the period of the second survey and that the 
resources devoted to them have probably increased substan-
tially since then. 
In the other assisted regions of the Community, regional aid 
of about ECU 6 700 million per year was granted in the 
period 1986-88. The average aid per head of population was 
ECU 65 per year, or ECU 29 if Berlin and the 'Zonenrandge-
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biet' are excluded. Apart from the latter regions, aid levels 
per inhabitant were particularly high in Luxembourg and 
Belgium and low in Denmark and France. 
Table 4.12 
Yearly average regional aid in Article 92(2)(c) and 92(3)(c) areas, 
1986-88 
Totals in million ECU ECU/head 
B 215 57 
DK 17 15 
D: Berlin 3 340 I 786 
'Zonenrandgebiet' 639 94 
Other 494 25 
E n.a. n.a. 
F 273 12 
11 655 46 
L 19 65 
NL 161 41 
UK 904 46 
EUR 12 (excl. Spain) 6 717 65 
1 Most of the Italian regions of the Centre-North were eligible for regional aid only until 
31 December 1987. 
Aids of a regional character from the Community during 
1986-88 totalled about ECU 400 million per year,6 or about 
5 % of the Member States' regional aid, excluding Berlin 
and the 'Zonenrandgebiet'. One reason for this low volume 
of aid is that most European Regional Development Fund 
resources have been devoted to infrastructure (about 90 % 
in the period in question). This is particularly true in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. It is clear that Community regional aid 
can only have had a modest impact on the overall volume 
and pattern of regional aids. 
6 Commitments. This figure includes ECU 285 million for ERDF aid 
to individual projects, ECU 49 million for interest rebates on ECSC 
reconversion loans and a very rough estimate of the amounts devoted 
to manufacturing and services in the framework of ERDF programmes 
and IMPs, for which no breakdown between infrastructure and industry 
is available. 
The Community's most disadvantaged regions: 
Article 92(3)(a) EEC 
Article 92(3)(a) of the EEC Treaty enables the Commission to 
grant a derogation in favour of State aids ·to promote the 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally 
low or where there is serious underemployment '. As a general 
rule, the Commission has defined these areas as NUTS level II 
regions which have a per capita GDP of not more than 75 % 
of the Community average. The Commission has allowed two 
exceptions to this rule: the Spanish province of Teruel (which 
4.3. Aid to the coal industry 
The coal industry is the only part of the energy sector 
covered by the surveys. National aid to the coal industry 
averaged ECU I O 200 million during the period I 981 -85 
(EUR 10). In the period 1986-88, the average (EUR 12) 
was ECU 12 967 million, of which 56 % was granted by 
Germany, 19 % by France, 9 % each by Belgium and the 
UK and 7 % by Spain. Graph 4.4 shows the evolution in 
~al terms of the aid granted in Belgium, Germany, France 
GRAPH 4.4: Aid to coal-mining, 1981-88 
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is a level III area) and Northern Ireland. The list of regions 
benefiting from this provision largely coincides with that drawn 
up for the purpose of Objective 1 of the Community's structural 
Funds (promoting the development and structural adjustment 
of the regions whose development is lagging behind). 
The eligible regions include the whole of Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, the French overseas departments, most of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno and 56 % of Spain's population. Section 2(b) of 
Chapter 6 gives more detailed information on this subject. 
and the UK over the whole period I 981-88. From this it can 
be seen that in all four countries there was an increase in 
aid between I 98 I and I 983. Thereafter, the volume of aid 
declined in Belgium and France, so that in I 988 the levels 
were respectively I 3 % and 4 % lower than those of I 98 I . 
In Germany, on the other hand, the upward trend was 
resumed at a faster rate after reductions in I 984 and I 985, 
so that the amount of aid granted in I 988 was 35 % greater 
than in I 98 I. Thus, aid to the German coal industry was 
second only to Italian aid to the railways as the largest single 
million ECU Constant 1988 prices and exchange rates 
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item identified by the second survey. The UK showed a very 
sharp increase in 1984 as a consequence of the miners' strike 
but this was followed by a rapid fall and in 1988 the volume 
of aid was reduced to 50 % of the 1981 figure. 
Aid to current production accounts for about 40 % of the 
total, while 60 % is spent mainly on costs arising from 
mine closures and other inherited liabilities (redundancy 
payments, pensions, etc.). Table 4.13 shows the distribution 
between the two categories of aid in the period 1986-88. 
Table 4.13 
Aid to coal-mining (annual averages 1986-88) 
(million ECU) 
Aid to current Other aid Total 
production 
B 287 893 1 180 
D 3 816 3 479 7 295 
E 390 531 922 
F 400 2 045 2 445 
p 2,4 0,2 2,6 
UK 539 584 1 123 
EC 5 435 7 532 12 968 
Taking only aids for current production into account, 
Table 4.14 compares the situation in the six Member States 
concerned.7 From this table it can be seen that during the 
period of the second survey the aid level per underground 
employee and per tonne of coal produced was much higher 
in Belgium and Germany than in the other Member States. 
In the UK, on the other hand, there has been a very great 
reduction in production aid, so that in 1986-88 the aid per 
tonne was about one fifth of the Community average. The 
aid amounts per tonne are compared with approximate 
average prices of imported steam coal in 1987. These com-
parisons should be treated with caution as coal prices vary 
widely according to quality, source, date and place of deliv-
ery. Nevertheless, they give a rough indication of the signifi-
cance of the State aid, which in Belgium and Germany was 
well in excess of the average import price. 
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This table does not give a complete picture of the support for current 
production, as some countries also operate a reference price system 
which has an equivalent effect to aid. 
In relation to Belgium, however, it should be noted that the 
planned closure of the last mines in Limburg will bring an 
end to production aid. 
Table 4.14 
Current production aid to coal-mines (annual averages) 
B 
D 
E 
F 
p 
UK 
EUR 10 
EUR 12 
F.CIJ 
per underground 
employee 
1981-85 1986-88 
13 823 31 279 
14 280 37 551 
10 674 
20 813 25 371 
3 083 
10 332 6 002 
12 826 23 603 
21 637 
F.ClJ per tonne 
1981-85 1986-88 
34,1 72,7 
18,5 46,3 
21,3 
32,l 29,3 
11,0 
22,3 5,3 
20,0 24,9 
24.6 
Average 
1987 
price 
of imported 
steam 
coal 
cir 
ECU/tonne 
36,9 
42,3 
26,8 
40,6 
50,3 
In the period 1986-88 the ECSC contributed about ECU 
86 million per year towards the social costs of restructuring 
the industry and ECU 16 million per year for research pro-
jects in the sector. 
4.4. Aid to the transport sector 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the data on 
transport contained in the surveys relate almost entirely 
to the railways, although small amounts of aid to inland 
waterways and ports are also included. 
In real terms, aid to the railways has shown a slow decline 
since 1985, taking the Community as a whole. Graph 4.5 
shows that in the Community of Ten, the average annual 
aid level in 1986-88 was about 7 % below that of 1981-85. 
Only in Denmark and Luxembourg were there increases 
between the two periods and these were relatively small. 
Substantial reductions occurred in Belgium, Greece, Ireland 
and, especially, the United Kingdom. 
Without adequate data on the other modes of transport, 
these figures cannot be used to draw any conclusions about 
the effects of aid on competition between modes. Even if 
such data had been available, their interpretation would be 
made difficult by differences between modes of transport 
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GRAPH 4.5: Aid to railways in EUR 10 
Annual average at constant 1988 prices 
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and between countries as regards the extent to which users 
contribute to the costs of infrastructure and towards the 
environmental costs of transport. In some countries, more-
over, the railway companies, as public undertakings, are 
subject to special social obligations, in respect of pensions, 
the employment of staff surplus to requirements etc., which 
are not imposed on other transport operators. Graph 4.6 
makes a comparison between the Member States in terms 
of the aid granted in 1986-88 per unit of passenger traffic 
(passenger-kilometre) . It shows that the average aid per 
passenger-kilometre in the Community was ECU 0, 11, the 
aid granted in Luxembourg and Belgium being particularly 
high (ECU 0,74 and 0,23 respectively). However, these re-
sults should be interpreted with caution. Long-distance 
traffic is usually profitable, whereas local services tend to 
make large losses . On small networks where most of the 
traffic is local , the need for subsidies will therefore be greater. 
On the CFL network (Luxembourg), the average distance 
travelled by each passenger was 21 km, compared to a Com-
munity average of 57 km. It is therefore not surprising that 
CFL is fairly heavily subsidized. It is also worth noting that 
in the period 1986-88 about 30 % of the aid to both the 
Belgian and Luxembourg railways was granted as compen-
sation for exceptional pension obligations. This percentage 
is much higher than in other Member States. 
Other factors to be taken into consideration when comparing 
the aid levels are the following: 
(i) some railway companies also receive aid for operating 
ferry services (in Denmark and Italy, for example) or 
bus services (notably in Ireland), which are not included 
in the railway passenger data; 
(ii) aid is also given for freight transport or to cover costs, 
such as infrastructure, which are common to both the 
passenger and freight businesses, but there is no satisfac-
tory method of reducing passenger-km and freight tonne-
km to a common denominator for the purposes of com-
parison . 
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GRAPH 4.6: Aid to railways 1986-88, in ECU per passenger-kilometre 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
e 0,5 ... 
~ 
00 
C 
1,l 
"' 0,4 ..
I>, 
8. 
::i 0,3 u 
- ~ 
0,2 
0,1 
0 
B DK D GR E 
4.5. Aid to agriculture and fisheries 
State aid to agriculture and fisheries, unlike Community 
spending on price support measures, remained remarkably 
stable in real terms over the period 1981-1988, in the region 
of ECU 10 OOO million per year at 1988 prices in the Com-
munity of Ten. 
Graph 4. 7 expresses the aid granted in 1986 in terms of ecus 
per person employed in agriculture, fisheries and forestry, 
while Graph 4.8 shows the aid as a percentage of gross value-
added in the sector. The single year 1986 has been chosen 
because there are large gaps in the data for the two sub-
sequent years, which have been filled by extrapolation. 
It can be seen that the newer Member States (Greece, Spain 
and Portugal) give much lower levels of aid than the Com-
munity average, although aid as a percentage of GV A is 
quite high in Portugal, reflecting the low productivity of 
agriculture in that country. 
Germany and Luxembourg stand out as very large aid givers 
by both measures, while the Netherlands with its high agri-
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cultural productivity has a high level of aid per person 
employed but below-average aid as a percentage of GV A. 
In Germany about half of the aid consists of compensation 
through the VAT mechanism to farmers for price falls re-
sulting from changes in the 'green' rate of exchange. This 
compensation was authorized by the Council but, under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1889/87, it is to be replaced 
by socio-structural aid not linked to the quantities produced, 
such as assistance for product diversification, training and 
research. However, an implementing regulation is required 
to put this change into effect. The Commission made a 
proposal for such a regulation in August 1989 but the 
Council has not yet adopted it. 
Community expenditure on agriculture in the period 1986-
88 averaged ECU 23 635 milJion per year for price support 
measures (EAGGF Guarantee Section) and ECU 
915 million per year for structural measures, such as invest-
ment aid (EAGGF Guidance Section).s In addition, the 
Some of the spending of the Guidance Section is probably included in 
the national aid data . 
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GRAPH 4. 7: Aid to agriculture 1986, in ECU per person employed 
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GRAPH 4.8: Aid to agriculture 1986, as o/e of agricultural GV A 
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price support mechanism entails considerable transfers from 
consumers, who are obliged to pay more than world market 
prices. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The Commission's surveys represent a considerable advance 
towards the objective of transparency, unparalleled by any 
of the Community's trading partners. However, much work 
is still needed to improve the quality of the data by stan-
dardizing definitions and by extending the statistical cover-
age along the lines of the work already undertaken in Germ-
any by five major economic research institutes.9 
Appendix 
Sources and methodology for the Commission's 
surveys of State aidsIO 
(a) Scope of the surveys 
The surveys are restricted to aid to enterprises. Within this 
category, the main focus is on aids which fall within the 
scope of Articles 92 and 93 EEC, although other aids in 
the agricultural, transport, coal and steel sectors are also 
covered. 
The surveys do not include aids of a social nature to individ-
uals and households or assistance for infrastructure, edu-
cational establishments and public vocational training 
centres. So-called 'general measures' (see Chapter 5) are also 
excluded. 
Data on incentives to firms in the context of employment 
policy (employment and training aids) are not normally 
included because of the difficulty of determining whether 
9 See Fritzsche et al. (1988). 
ID This is only a brief outline. For more detail, see the Technical Annexes 
to the two surveys. 
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they constitute State aids covered by the Community rules 
or 'general measures' (see Chapter 6). However, the figures 
on agriculture include expenditure on training courses. 
The following important sectors were omitted from the sur-
veys: energy (apart from coal), public utilities (gas, elec-
tricity, water, telecommunications, postal services) and 
banks and credit institutions. As far as transport is con-
cerned, the data are incomplete. The coverage of aids to 
railways is fairly comprehensive and includes the ferry and 
bus services operated by railway undertakings. The figures 
also include some aid to inland waterways and ports but the 
other modes of transport are excluded because of lack of 
information. 
(b) Sources 
For agriculture and fisheries the main sources of information 
are reports submitted by Member States in accordance with 
a special procedure instituted in 1974. Other national sources 
were used for Spain and Italy. For the Netherlands, as well 
as for France and Luxembourg in the years 1987 and 1988, 
the figures are extrapolations. 
For transport, the data on railway undertakings and inland 
waterways were communicated by the Member States to the 
Commission under the relevant Community legislation. The 
figures also include some aid to ports where this has been 
investigated and approved by the Commission. 
The sources of information on aid to manufacturing industry 
are varied and include national documents relating specifi-
cally to the granting of aid, national accounts and budgets. 
For the steel and coal sectors, the figures are communicated 
regularly to the Commission under the ECSC legislation. 
The data on manufacturing for Greece and Portugal, and 
for Belgium in the period 1986-88, should not be regarded 
as reliable. In the case of Greece, lack of cooperation from 
the national authorities obliged the Commission's depart-
ments to rely to a large extent on estimates and extrapol-
ations. As far as Portugal is concerned, although the national 
authorities cooperated in the execution of the second survey, 
the available information is incomplete. Information sup-
plied by Belgium for the years 1986-88 was received too late 
to be taken into account in the survey. 
It should also be borne in mind that the information on aids 
provided through the tax system is probably incomplete, 
since there is a general lack of transparency in this area. 
(c) Methodology 
As far as possible, the figures are based on actual expendi-
ture, or actual revenue losses in the case of tax relief. How-
ever, in some cases budget appropriations or programmed 
expenditure had to be used and in others the Commission's 
departments were obliged to resort to estimates and extrapol-
ations. 
The surveys attempt to identify the aid element of the trans-
actions covered. This is defined as 'the ultimate financial 
benefit contained in the nominal amount transferred' and 
largely depends on the form in which the aid is provided. 
Where the aid element could not be identified, as for example 
in the case of research and development contracts between 
public authorities and firms, no figures were included. 
The various forms of aid are divided into three main categor-
ies, as described below. 
(i) Where the aid involves straightforward transfers from 
the State to the beneficiary (or straightforward re-
ductions in the beneficiary's tax or social security liabilit-
ies), the aid element is identical with the amount of the 
transfer (or lost revenue). The following forms of aid 
are included in this category: 
grants, 
interest subsidies paid directly to the beneficiary, 
tax relief other than tax deferral, 
reductions in social security contributions, 
equity participation which does not satisfy the 'commer-
cial investor' criterion (see Chapter 5). 
(ii) Where the beneficiary receives a 'soft loan' or is granted 
a tax deferral, the aid element is the interest saved by 
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the beneficiary. The interest saving is estimated using 
reference rates representing the interest rate at which 
companies can borrow in each Member State under 
normal market conditions. The figures given in the sur-
vey for these forms of aid are the present (discounted) 
value of these savings. 
In the case of participatory loans and repayable ad-
vances this approach is not practicable and the net cost 
to the State is taken as the aid element. The net cost is 
defined as the difference between the return received by 
the State and the return which it would have received 
at the reference rate of interest. 
(iii) The last category covers guarantees. The true aid el-
ement of State guarantees varies considerably between 
individual cases. As the best approximation, the surveys 
use the net cost of the guarantees to the State, i.e. 
the difference between payments made by the State to 
honour guarantees and any revenue from premiums or 
other charges. 
(d) The Community's structural instruments 
This chapter gives some information on the aid granted from 
the Community's structural instruments, in particular the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), ECSC 
measures, the Guidance Section of the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF Guidance) 
and the aid system for fisheries. 
It should not be assumed that the national aids identified 
by the surveys are necessarily net of the amounts paid from 
the structural instruments. The Community aid is usually 
paid to the national authorities to part-finance schemes 
which they operate and is not always distinguished in the 
accounts relating to these schemes. 
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Chapter 5 
Treaty provisions 1 
5.1. Introduction 
Andel (1990) points out that the prov1s10ns of the EEC 
Treaty on State aids are unique in the world: 
'They are surprising already in a purely national context if 
one considers the notorious lack of regulations and trans-
parency. And they are, of course, still more surprising in 
the context of international agreements, in particular with 
respect to the wide margin of discretion of the Commission.' 
These remarks are also applicable to the control of State 
aids under the ECSC Treaty. The fact that the founding 
fathers of the Community gave such wide powers to the 
Commission is a clear expression of the importance which 
they attached to limiting State aids as an essential element 
in the creation and maintenance of a common market. 
The main provisions of the EEC Treaty relating to State 
aids in the context of competition policy are to be found in 
Articles 92 and 93. Article 92 lays down the general principle 
that aids which may distort competition between firms in 
different Member States are forbidden but defines circum-
stances in which certain aids may be permitted. In exercising 
its wide discretion under this article, the Commission's pri-
mary duty is to consider each case in the context of the 
Community as a whole: essentially it has to decide whether 
the harm done to competition in the Community is out-
weighed by the contribution that the aid may make towards 
other Community objectives. Article 93 sets out the pro-
cedures by which the Commission can exercise its control 
and imposes specific obligations on the Member States to 
assist the Commission in its task. 
The ECSC Treaty, in its Article 4, appears to impose a much 
more comprehensive ban on State aid as far as the coal 
and steel industries are concerned but, as we shall see, this 
provision now has little practical relevance. 
Von der Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann contains useful commentaries 
on the relevant Treaty articles. 
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5.2. Legal bases 
The State aids which are subject to Community control are 
a sub-set of the much wider category of subsidies as defined 
in Section 2 of Chapter 3, the principal difference being that 
the Treaties are not in the main concerned with limiting 
subsidies which have no impact on intra-Community compe-
tition. 
The basic principle underlying the Treaty provisions on State 
aids can be expressed as follows : State aids, at least in so far 
as they distort trade between Member States, are forbidden 
unless a derogation is specifically accorded, either in the 
Treaties themselves or by the Commission or Council acting 
under powers granted by the Treaties. 
Article 92( I) of the EEC Treaty reads as follows : 
'Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the common market.' 
Incompatibility with the common market under the terms 
of the Treaty automatically implies prohibition. 
The exceptions referred to at the beginning of the above 
quotation are defined in Articles 42 and 77, paragraph 2 of 
Article 90 and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 92. 
Article 42 relates to the agricultural sector (including fishe-
ries) and empowers the Council to make rules restricting 
the application to that sector of the normal competition 
provisions. Article 77 allows aids to transport undertakings 
if the aids 'meet the needs of coordination of transport or if 
they represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain 
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service'.2 
Paragraph 2 of Article 90 concerns 'undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest 
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly'. 
It states that such undertakings are subject to the Treaty 
rules, in particular those on competition, unless the appli-
cation of these rules would obstruct the performance of the 
particular tasks assigned to them. The scope of this exception 
The rules on aid to agriculture and transport are outlined in Chapter 6. 
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is clearly intended to be very narrow but has never been 
tested in relation to the State aid rules. 3 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 92 allow exceptions to be 
made to the general prohibition in the following cases: 
(i) social aid to individual consumers, provided that it is 
granted without discrimination as to the origin of the 
products concerned (Article 92(2)(a)), 
(ii) 'aid to make good the damage caused by natural disas-
ters or exceptional occurrences' (Article 92(2)(b)), 
(iii) regional problems (Article 92(2)(c), 92(3)(a) and 
92(3)(c)), 
(iv) important projects of Community interest 
(Article 92(3)(b)), 
(v) serious disturbance of a Member State's economy 
(Article 92(3)(b)), 
(vi) 'aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities' (Article 92(3)(c)), 
(vii) other categories of aid specified by decision of the 
Council (Article 92(3)(d)). 
As far as coal and steel are concerned, Article 4 of the ECSC 
Treaty declares that 'subsidies or aids granted by States .... in 
any form whatsoever' are incompatible with the common 
market and are to be abolished and prohibited. 
Article 67(2) of the Treaty makes two exceptions to this rule 
which are of only minor interest since the Commission has 
never authorized aid on the basis of these provisions. 
It should be noted that Article 4 is to be interpreted as 
referring only to specific subsidies for the coal and steel 
industries. Measures which are applicable also to other sec-
tors but which confer 'special benefits' on coal and steel 
undertakings come under Article 67(3) ECSC, which em-
powers the Commission to make binding recommendations. 
However, Article 95 ECSC gives the Commission power to 
make, with the unanimous consent of the Council, decisions 
and recommendations 'in all cases not provided for in this 
Treaty' if such measures are needed to attain the basic 
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I. F. Hochbaum (in von der Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlennann, 
December 1984 update) considers that this exception is intended to 
apply only to provisions relating directly to undertakings, not to those, 
like Articles 92 to 94, which concern the actions of Member States. 
However, the Court of Justice judgment in Case 78/76 mentions 
Article 90(2) in terms which imply that it does exempt some aids from 
the provisions of Article 92. 
objectives of the ECSC. Because of the difficulties facing 
these industries as a result of profound structural changes 
in international and Community markets, the Commission 
has made use of these powers to permit specified aids, firstly 
to the coal industry (since 1965) and later to the steel industry 
(since 1980). The provisions of the current Commission 
decisions concerning these aids are summarized in Chapter 6. 
These decisions cover all aid, whether specific or general, so 
that the distinction between subsidies in the sense of Article 4 
and 'special benefits' in the sense of Article 67(3) loses its 
practical significance. The current decision on the coal indus-
try expires at the end of 1993; that concerning the steel 
industry will expire at the end of 1991. 
5.3. The scope of the rules 
A comparison of Article 4 ECSC and Article 92(1) EEC 
shows an apparent difference in the scope of the aid rules, 
since the latter appears to define the relevant aids more 
narrowly by specifying that these are aids which distort or 
threaten to distort intra-Community competition by favour-
ing certain firms or sectors. However, in practice the differ-
ence is of little significance. 
(a) Effect on trade 
The requirement that, to be subject to control, an aid must 
have an actual or potential effect on trade between Member 
States is not as severe a limitation as it might seem, given 
the high and increasing degree of integration of the Com-
munity's economy. The Court of Justice has ruled, for exam-
ple, that Article 92(1) EEC applies even when the firm which 
receives an aid does not export any of its products, if that 
firm is in competition on its home market with producers 
from other Member States.4 Furthermore, although aids for 
exports to non-member countries are dealt with in 
Article 112 EEC, which provides for their progressive har-
monization, the Court has stated that this does not preclude 
the application to such aids of Articles 92 to 94. The Court 
considered that, given the interdependence of markets, the 
possibility of distortion of intra-Community competition 
cannot be ruled out a priori. 5 
(b) The meaning of 'State' 
As far as the source of the aid is concerned, it is clear that 
the Treaty provisions are meant to cover aids from all public 
Court of Justice, Case 102/87. 
Court of Justice, Case 142/87. 
bodies, or agencies acting on their behalf, at national and 
sub-national levels. The Court of Justice has declared, for 
example, that 'there is no necessity to draw any distinction 
according to whether the aid is granted directly by the State 
or by public or private bodies established or appointed by 
it to administer the aid'.6 Similarly, in a case concerning aid 
granted by one of the German Liinder,7 the Court ruled that 
Article 92(1) EEC 'is directed at all aid financed from public 
resources', including aid granted by regional or local bodies, 
'whatever their status and description'. Furthermore, aids 
are deemed to be financed from public resources even if 
those resources are obtained by means of a compulsory levy 
on the sector which benefits from the aid system.8 
(c) Forms of aid 
Aids to enterprises can take many forms, including, for 
example, outright grants, 'soft' loans, tax concessions, 
guarantees and the supply of goods or services at less than 
cost. However, the Treaties make it clear that the form of 
the aid is irrelevant. The Court of Justice has repeatedly 
supported the Commission's view that an important test 
of whether a transaction constitutes aid is the so-called 
'commercial investor principle'.9 
According to this principle, the provision of finance from 
public resources to an enterprise constitutes aid if that firm 
would not, in the given circumstances, be able to obtain the 
sums concerned on the private capital markets, or ifit could 
do so only on terms less favourable to itself. This criterion 
has been evoked most often in relation to State subscriptions 
of capital of undertakings but it can also be applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to any other form of aid. 
(d) Aids and 'general measures' 
Perhaps the most difficult problem in applying the State aid 
rules is to distinguish between true aids and competitive 
advantages for firms in one Member State which arise from 
differences in general economic, fiscal or social policy. In 
the words of Article 92(1) EEC, the problem is to determine 
whether a measure favours 'certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods'. In considering this question, it is 
important to bear in mind that Article 92 is concerned with 
the effects of a measure, not with the Member State's inten-
tions.10 
Court of Justice, Cases 78/76, 290/83 and 57/87. 
Court of Justice, Case 248/84. 
Court of Justice, Cases 47/69, 78/76 and 259/85. 
See, for example, Court of Justice, Cases 234/84, 40/85, 142/87 and 301/ 
87. 
IO Court·of Justice, Cases l 73/73 and 310/85. 
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Government measures which distort, or threaten to distort, 
intra-Community competition can be dealt with in two ways, 
according to the nature of the measure concerned. State aids 
can be regulated under the powers outlined above; other 
measures (known as 'general measures') are not subject to 
the same presumption of incompatibility with the common 
market and have to be tackled, if necessary, by applying 
Articles 101 and 102 of the EEC Treaty, which require 
either the agreement of the Member States concerned or the 
adoption of Council directives. These articles concern the 
elimination of distortions in intra-Community competition 
which arise from differences between legal or administrative 
provisions. 
The provisions which come within the ambit of Articles 101 
and 102 have effects which are not specific to certain firms 
or products and are mainly to be found in the fiscal and 
social security systems of the Member States. Differences in 
these systems can give rise to competitive advantages for 
firms in one Member State by comparison with another. 
However, to treat such advantages as State aids if they are 
non-specific would logically require that the national system 
which places the heaviest burden on enterprises should be 
taken as the norm. This is clearly neither politically feasible 
nor economically desirable. Furthermore, harmonization of 
the systems on the basis of any norm can only take place 
gradually as the Community becomes more homogeneous. 
This is why Articles IOI and 102 make it possible, but not 
mandatory, for the Commission to propose measures in such 
cases. 
In considering the distinction between State aids and 'general 
measures', it is also important to bear in mind that it is often 
difficult to adjust one aspect of a country's tax or social 
security system without disturbing the overall balance of the 
system. Moreover, the apparent advantage conferred by a 
'general measure', which must by definition cover a wide 
range of firms and products, may be considerably diluted 
when viewed in the context of the economy as a whole or 
outweighed by some other national measure. For example, 
it is difficult to determine where the competitive advantage 
lies when a country's corporation tax system combines rela-
tively generous depreciation rules with high tax rates. As 
further illustrations of this point, consider the following 
cases: 
(i) a country where employers pay comparatively small 
social security contributions but, because the social se-
curity system is largely financed from taxation, the tax 
burden on firms is correspondingly higher; 
(ii) a country where a relatively low tax burden on firms is 
offset by higher costs arising from the poor quality of 
infrastructure and public services. 
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In view of the above considerations, an important criterion 
for deciding whether a measure constitutes State aid in the 
sense of Article 92(1) EEC is its degree of specificity, i.e. 
whether it favours 'certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods'. As the concept of specificity is relative, 
not absolute, the application of this criterion is not simple. 
On one hand, for example, it would not be desirable to treat 
as aids tax rules which, without other discrimination, benefit 
firms according to the volume of their investment, even 
though in a sense, such rules favour 'certain undertakings'. 
On the other hand, it would be perverse if State aid controls 
could not be applied to measures, however wide their scope, 
which are clearly designed to distort competition by favour-
ing exports to other Member States. 
(e) Summary: What is a State aid and when is it subject 
to control? 
The following elements of the definition of State aids are 
well established (see Figure 1 for a simplified presentation). 
(i) State aids bestow a competitive advantage on an under-
taking or category of undertakings affected by intra-
Community competition and involve some cost to the 
public purse11 (in terms either of expenditure or of 
revenue forgone). 
(ii) In determining whether there is a cost to the public 
purse, all public bodies are taken into account, including 
all levels of government, public enterprises and quasi-
governmental agencies. Furthermore, all resources con-
trolled by such bodies are relevant, even those derived 
solely from compulsory levies on the enterprises which 
are potential beneficiaries. 
(iii) In assessing the degree of specificity of a measure, it is 
necessary to take into account not only the explicit 
provisions of the laws or regulations concerned but also 
their impact in practice. Furthermore, whenever the 
implementing authorities have discretion in applying the 
measure so that they can influence the concentration of 
the benefits, this potential for concentration can justify 
classifying the measure as a State aid if it meets the 
criteria in point (i). 
(iv) A transaction does not constitute State aid if, in the 
given circumstances, the terms of the transaction are no 
more favourable to the beneficiary than he might have 
obtained on the open market (the 'commercial investor 
principle'). 
11 Favourable treatment under a regulatory measure (e.g. concerning pol-
lution control) would not normally be considered an aid. 
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(v) Community financial assistance does not fall under the 
State aid rules.12 
Figure 1 
Do the State aid rules apply? 
Simplified presentation of the steps for deciding whether a 
measure is a State aid covered by Community rules. 
Measure of a public body NO Rules do not apply 
in a Member State? 1------. '(e.g. Community mea-
1 YES sures) 
Cost to the public purse? NO 
(Including compulsory Rules do not apply 
levy) 
1 YES 
Benefit to enterprises? 
1 YES 
Do normal market con-
ditions apply? 
NO Rules do not apply 
1-----..(e.g. social welfare 
payments) 
YES Not an aid (e.g. loans 
i-----.. on normal commer-
cial terms) 
Special advantages forcer- NO 'General measure'. 
tain sectors or regions? Ad 1----+, Rules do not apply 
hoe aid for specific firms or 
groups of firms? 
1 YES 
Competition with firms in NO 
other Member States? 1-----.. Rules do not apply 
1 YES 
Subject to State aid rules. 
12 However, care is taken to ensure that the use of Community financial 
instruments is compatible with these rules, including the limits on aid 
intensities and sectoral restrictions. 
Any measure which can be classified as a State aid using the 
above criteria should be notified to the Commission under 
Article 93(3) EEC (see Section 5 of this chapter). Ideally, 
Member States should also inform the Commission of any 
borderline cases which may occur. However, under the EEC 
Treaty, the identification of a measure as a State aid does 
not automatically imply that it is subject to the competition 
rules. To be subject to· control, the aid must also distort or 
threaten to distort competition between firms in different 
Member States. 
Obviously. there is still a grey zone where the applicability 
of the State aid rules can only be decided case by case. 
5.4. The derogations 
Having decided that a measure constitutes a State aid with 
an actual or potential distortive effect, the Commission then 
has to determine whether one of the exceptions referred to 
in Section I of this chapter is applicable. 
As far as the ECSC, agriculture and public service obli-
gations in the transport sector are concerned, the relevant 
legislation defines very precisely the aids which fall outside 
the basic competition provisions of the Treaties. These rules 
are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Where Article 92(1) EEC applies, the possible derogations 
are of two sorts. The aids which fall within the three categor-
ies listed in Article 92(2) are declared to be compatible with 
the common market. Therefore, if it can be shown that 
an aid properly belongs to one of these categories, the 
Commission has no discretion to disallow it on the ground 
that it is contrary to the common interest. The aids covered 
by this paragraph are: 
'(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual 
consumers, provided that such aid is granted without 
discrimination related to the origin of the products 
concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disas-
ters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the 
Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division 
of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order 
to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused 
by that division.' 
The aid referred to in point (c) is granted to enterprises in 
the former 'Zonenrandgebiet' (areas bordering on the former 
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German Democratic Republic) and West Berlin. Following 
the reunification of the country, the German Government 
announced its intention to cease granting such aid, thus 
rendering unnecessary the review of the need for the aid 
which had previously been programmed by the Commission 
for 1990. The Commission and the German Government 
are now discussing the timetable for abolition. 
The derogations foreseen in Article 92(3) differ from those 
covered by the previous paragraph in that they are only 
applied at the Commission's discretion. These derogations 
concern: 
'(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas 
where the standard of living is abnormally low or where 
there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project 
of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid 
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest ... , 
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by 
decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority 
on a proposal from the Commission.' 
Very little use has been made of derogation (d). The main 
instances have been the directives on shipbuilding (see 
Chapter 6, Section 3(e)) and legislation relating to some agri-
cultural products. None of these measures added signifi-
cantly to the possibilities for granting aid already foreseen 
by the Treaty. 
In the words of the Court of Justice, the exercise of the 
Commission's discretion under Article 92(3) 'involves econ-
omic and social assessments which must be made in a Com-
munity context'. 13 The aim of this assessment is to determine, 
from the point of view of the Community as a whole, whether 
the benefits to be expected from the granting of aid outweigh 
the disadvantages, in particular but not exclusively the po-
tential trade distortion. The Court of Justice has ruled, for 
example, that the Commission may forbid regional aid for 
an investment which would increase production capacity if 
there is a general problem of overcapacity in the Community 
for the product concerned. Such a prohibition can be based 
both on the seriousness of the potential effect on trade and 
13 Court of Justice, Cases 730/79, 310/85, 142/87 and 301/87. 
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on the argument that aid in such a case would not be 
conducive to the economic development of the region con-
cerned.14 In another case, it was decided that the Com-
mission may refuse a derogation for an aid which would 
result in diverting an investment from a less prosperous to 
a more prosperous Member State. 15 
5.5. Notification and review 
A prerequisite for the enforcement of any rules is that 
the enforcing authority should have adequate information. 
Consequently, Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty16 stipulates 
that 'The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time 
to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant 
or alter aid'. It is significant that this paragraph refers simply 
to aid and does not mention Article 92(1). This implies that 
it is for the Commission, not the Member States, to decide 
whether the aid is within the scope of Article 92(1), since 
only the Commission is competent to form an opinion on 
the Community-wide effects of a measure.17 
Although failure to notify an aid is an infringement of 
the Treaty, the Commission still considers itself bound to 
examine such aids to determine whether or not they are 
compatible with the common market. 
In the event of failure to notify an aid in conformity with 
Article 93(3), the Commission can, if it subsequently decides 
that Article 92(1) applies and that no derogation can be 
granted, order that the recipient must repay the aid to the 
authority which granted it, with interest where appropriate 
(see Section 6 of this chapter). It is, therefore, in the interests 
of both the Member State and the aid recipients that prior 
authorization should be obtained. In cases of non-com-
pliance the Commission's source of information is often a 
belated notification from the Member State concerned but 
it may also be, for example, a press report or a complaint 
from another Member State or from one of the beneficiary's 
competitors. 
14 Court of Justice, Case 310/85. 
15 Court of Justice, Case 730/79. 
16 For the ECSC and agricultural aids not subject to Articles 92 and 93, 
the derived legislation contains detailed provisions on notification. 
17 See Commission of the EC (1983), which states that 'Member States 
cannot evade (the obligation to notify an aid), even if they consider that 
the measures they plan do not have all the characteristics described in 
Article 92(1)'. 
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Article 93(3) does not, however, require that the Commission 
should be informed in advance of every individual award of 
aid. In most cases the grants are made in application of an 
aid scheme, not ad hoe. Provided that the scheme has been 
approved by the Commission, the individual awards under 
it are not normally subject to prior notification. However, 
the Commission may require such notification in special 
cases, e.g. when the cost of the investment or the aid intensity 
exceeds a certain level, or when a 'sensitive sector' is con-
cerned. 
Under Article 94 EEC, the Council may, on a proposal from 
the Commission, make regulations determining inter alia 
the conditions in which Article 93(3) is to be applied and 
exempting certain categories of aid from prior notification. 
This provision has been used in the case of inland transport 
to exempt the major categories of aid. IS 
As far as existing systems of aid are concerned, Article 93( I) 
requires the Commission to keep them under constant re-
view. The Member States have a duty to cooperate with the 
Commission for this purpose. The aim of this review is to 
identify aid schemes which, in their existing form, are no 
longer justified in the light of social and economic changes, 
are proving obstructive to the proper functioning of the 
common market or are being misused. Therefore, it should 
not be assumed that a scheme, once authorized by the 
Commission, can continue indefinitely, even when the 
grounds for a derogation have ceased to exist or the balance 
of costs and benefits to the Community has changed. 
Finally, no discussion of the Member States' obligations to 
inform the Commission about their aids would be complete 
without a mention of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty and 
Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty. These articles place a general 
obligation on Member States 'to facilitate the achievement/ 
performance of the Community's tasks'. The implemen-
tation of competition policy being a major task of the Com-
munity and the Commission being the institution responsible 
for that task, the duty of the Member States to provide all 
necessary information, even beyond the specific require-
ments of Article 93, is clear. 
5.6. Procedural provisions19 
After its initial examination under the EEC Treaty of a new 
aid or an alteration to an existing aid, the Commission may 
18 Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69, 1192/69 and 1107/70. 
19 Slot (1990) provides a critical review of some of the procedral aspects 
of State aid control. 
decide that the aid is compatible with the common market 
or that it is not covered by Article 92(1). In such cases it 
notifies the Member State concerned that it has no objection 
and the State is then free to put the aid into effect. If, on 
the other hand, it finds that Article 92(1) applies but cannot 
find adequate reason for applying one of the derogations 
foreseen by Article 92, it initiates the procedure foreseen in 
Article 93(2). This second stage of the examination involves 
inviting all interested parties, and in particular all Member 
States, to submit their comments within a prescribed time-
limit. It also gives the Member State concerned an oppor-
tunity to present further arguments in favour of the aid. 
Indeed, the procedure is sometimes initiated simply because 
the Member State has been dilatory in providing all the 
information necessary for the Commission's assessment. 
If the Commission still considers, after taking account of 
the comments received, that the aid is incompatible with the 
common market, it takes a final decision forbidding the aid. 
The Member State concerned has the right under 
Article 93(2) to appeal to the Council in exceptional circum-
stances for a decision permitting the aid. However, since 
such a decision requires unanimous support in the Council, 
this right is of little practical importance and the normal 
avenue of appeal is to the Court of Justice. 
With the exception of the right to refer the matter to the 
Council, similar provisions are included in Commission 
Decision 322/89/ECSC governing aid to the steel industry. 
As far as existing aid schemes are concerned, Article 93(1) 
EEC, which requires the Commission to keep such schemes 
under constant review, also empowers it to propose 'any 
appropriate measures required by the progressive develop-
ment or by the functioning of the common market'. If the 
Member State does not agree to implement the Com-
mission's proposals, the Article 93(2) procedure described 
above is initiated. If the comments received cause the Com-
mission to conclude that the scheme remains compatible 
with the common market, the procedure is closed without 
further action; otherwise, the Commission makes a final 
decision requiring the Member State to abolish or amend 
the aid scheme. Such a decision can be based not only on 
the grounds stated in Article 93(1), quoted above, but also 
on evidence that the aid is being misused. 
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In many cases, concerning both new and existing schemes, 
where there is an initial disagreement between the Com-
mission and a Member State it is not necessary to follow all 
the steps outlined above. It is often possible during either 
the first or the second stage of its examination for the 
Commission to negotiate an agreement which removes the 
features of the aid which are objectionable from the Com-
munity's point of view. 
5.7. Enforcement 
In 1973, the Court of Justice stated that the Commission 
had a right to order that a Member State must recover an 
illegal State aid from the recipient. 20 The Court remarked 
that, in order to have a useful effect, Commission decisions 
requiring the abolition or modification of an aid could 
include the obligation to repay any amounts granted in 
violation of the Treaty. In this way the past and future 
consequences of the violation could be effectively eradi-
cated. 21 
However, it was not until 1983 that the Commission an-
nounced its intention of making use of this possibility.22 The 
practice of ordering recovery was introduced gradually and 
was only generalized in 1985. 
In the agricultural sector, the Commission also makes use of 
another sanction: witholding payments from the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. This practice 
was recognized as legitimate by the Court of Justice in a 
judgment made in 1979.23 
20 Court of Justice, Case 70/72. 
21 It can, of course, be argued that simple repayment, even with interest, 
especially if it occurs at a much later date, would not be sufficient to 
rectify the damage done to intra-Community competition. 
22 Commission of the EC (1983). 
23 Court of Justice, Cases 15 and 16/76. 
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Chapter 6 
Application of the Treaty 
provisions 
6.1. Introduction 
The application of the principles laid down in the EEC 
Treaty, as well as the definition of the special rules on 
agriculture, coal and steel, has required a large body of 
derived legislation and Commission guidelines. 
In relation to many agricultural and fisheries aids and to 
aids for coal and steel, the derived legislation in effect substi-
tutes new rules for those contained in the Treaties. In other 
sectors, the Council and the Commission have no power to 
make such a substitution and the derived legislation and 
guidelines serve mainly to clarify the ways in which the 
Commission will exercise its discretion under the EEC Treaty 
and to ensure that the Member States provide adequate 
information for the enforcement of the competition pro-
visions. In the transport sector, the legislation also serves to 
specify the circumstances in which Member States can grant 
aid under Article 77 EEC to 'meet the needs of coordination 
of transport' or to compensate for public service obligations. 
As has been noted in Section 4 of Chapter 5, the derived 
legislation under Article 92(3)(d) EEC does not add signifi-
cantly to the possibilities of derogation. 
The legislative provisions and guidelines can be divided into 
two main categories : horizontal and sectoral. The horizontal 
rules are especially concerned with ensuring that the Com-
mission has adequate information and with regulating par-
ticular forms of aid or types of aid scheme. The category of 
sectoral rules includes the special provisions under the ECSC 
Treaty and those concerning agriculture and transport which 
have been mentioned above, as well as regulations and 
guidelines on some other sectors which are particularly sensi-
tive from the point of view of competition policy. 
In cases where both sectoral and horizontal rules apply, the 
more restrictive of the two will generally be decisive. A 
common thread running through many of the rules is a 
negative attitude towards operating aids, which are held to 
be conservative in their effects and not likely to lead to a 
lasting solution to the problems which they address. In so 
far as they can be deemed to be State aids, employment and 
training subsidies are an exception to this principle. 
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The final section of this chapter deals with financial support 
granted to enterprises by the Community. Although such 
support is not itself subject to the State aid rules, the Com-
mission has an obvious duty to ensure compatibility between 
State aid policies and the operation of the Community's own 
financial instruments. 
6.2. Horizontal rules 
(a) Financial relations between states and public 
undertakings 
Article 90 of the EEC Treaty states that public enterprises 
are subject to the competition rules. The second paragraph 
of that article makes an exception to this general principle 
where the application of the rules would 'obstruct the per-
formance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned' 
to certain types of undertaking. However, as noted in 
Section 1 of Chapter 5, the practical significance of this 
exception is unclear as far as State aids are concerned. 
Article 222 EEC stipulates that This Treaty shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system 
of property ownership' and thus establishes the principle of 
equal treatment of public and private enterprises. However, 
the financial dealings between States and public enterprises 
are particularly complex and the Commission found that 
they tended to be less transparent than transactions involving 
private firms. In order to obtain the information needed to 
ensure that the State aid rules were enforced with the same 
rigour in both public and private sectors, the Commission 
therefore adopted a directive1 'on the transparency of finan-
cial relations between Member States and public undertak-
ings'. 
This directive applies to most public enterprises with a turn-
over of ECU 40 million or more. It requires that accounts 
should be kept in such a way as to show clearly all direct or 
indirect transfers of funds from public authorities2 to these 
enterprises3 and the use made of the funds. Member States 
must ensure that this information is kept at the disposal of 
the Commission for five years from the end of the financial 
year when the transfer of funds occurred or when the last 
of the funds were used by the firm concerned. 
Commission Directive 80/723/EEC, amended by Commission Directive 
85/413/EEC. 
Defined as the State and regional or local authorities. 
Except deposits on normal commercial terms with public financial 
institutions. 
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The directive does not imply that such transfers are auto-
matically to be considered as aids falling under Article 92(1) 
EEC or in any way attempt to define the scope of the State 
aid provisions of the Treaty. It enables the Commission to 
check whether such aids have been granted without notifi-
cation by examining the transactions recorded in this way 
and applying, in particular, the 'commercial investor prin-
ciple' referred to in Chapter 5. 
(b) Ruies concerning aids with particular objectives 
In this category, the Commission has issued guidelines on 
aids aimed at promoting regional development, research 
and development, the protection and improvement of the 
environment and the rescue and restructuring of ailing firms. 
It will shortly be publishing guidelines for schemes directed 
at small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, in order 
to prevent the granting of excessive amounts of aid for 
individual projects by the use of more than one type of 
aid scheme, the Commission has laid down rules on the 
cumulation of aids for different purposes. 
Regional aid 
The EEC Treaty provides for three types of regional dero-
gation, relating respectively to areas of the Federal Republic 
of Germany adversely affected by the division of Germany4 
(Article 92(2)(c)), areas with an abnormally low standard of 
living or serious underemployment (Article 92(3)(a)) and 
other areas (Article 92(3)(c)). 
The regions which can benefit from the last two derogations 
are the subject of precise criteria. 5 The analysis is normally 
conducted on the basis of the standard NUTS6 geographical 
units. GDP data are always expressed in terms of purchasing 
power standards (PPS) in order to allow for differences in 
the cost of living between Member States. 
Regions for which the Commission grants a derogation 
under Article 92(3)(a) (the least favoured regions) are de-
fined as NUTS II regions with a per capita GDP, averaged 
over at least the last three years for which statistics are 
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Aid for the 'Zonenrandgebiet' and West Berlin, which is to be phased 
out (see Chapter 5). 
See Commission of the EC ( 1988a and 1990). 
Nomenclature of statistical territorial units. Level II corresponds to 
German 'Regierungsbezirke', Spanish 'Comunidades autonomas', 
French and Italian 'regions', etc. Level III comprises smaller units such 
as German 'Kreise', 'provinces' in Spain and Italy, 'departements' in 
France, counties and Scottish regions in the United Kingdom. 
available, at least 25% below the Community average. Per 
capita GDP can be regarded as a composite measure of 
three factors: productivity, the rate of participation in the 
labour force and unemployment. It therefore constitutes a 
measure both of the standard of living and of underemploy-
ment as required by Article 92(3)(a). Of course, underem-
ployment also exists in regions where high unemployment 
or a low participation rate is combined with high pro-
ductivity. In these cases, it can be argued that the GDP per 
capita data do not fully reflect the extent of underemploy-
ment. However, the application of this derogation is clearly 
intended to be reserved for the most extreme cases of regional 
disadvantage and it is reasonable to conclude that such 
extreme cases can only be identified by examining the com-
bined working of the three contributory factors, not by 
considering each one separately. 
The Commission makes two exceptions to the above rule. 
One of these is the Spanish province of Teruel, a NUTS 
level III area in the region of Aragon, a region which does 
not itself qualify under the rule. However, Teruel borders 
on other Article 92(3)(a) regions and is considered to be 
extremely underdeveloped with a sparse population and a 
high degree of dependence on agriculture. The other excep-
tion is Northern Ireland, included in the list because of its 
exceptional problems. 
At present, pending a decision on the new German Liinder, 
the Article 92(3)(a) derogation is applied to regions compris-
ing about one fifth of the Community's population, includ-
ing the whole of Greece, Ireland and Portugal (see Table 6.1 ). 
These regions lie mainly on the southern and western periph-
ery of the Community. In these regions investment aid up 
to 75% NGE7 of the investment cost can be granted. How-
ever, the Commission requires a differentiation of aid rates 
within this limit to reflect the relative socio-economic situ-
ation of different areas. Temporary operating subsidies may, 
as an exception from the normal rule, also be permitted in 
these regions on certain conditions. 
Article 92(3)(c) opens up wider possibilities of derogation 
in favour of regional aids and allows the Commission to 
authorize aid intended to further the development of areas 
in a Member State which are disadvantaged in relation to 
the national average. However, the Commission still has to 
consider the wider Community context when examining such 
aids. Consequently, the Commission's method for applying 
Article 92(3)(c)8 takes account of a region's situation in 
relation to both the national and the Community averages. 
Net grant equivalent, which takes account of the effect of taxation (see 
point c, 'Measuring aid intensity'). 
Commission of the EC (1988a). 
Table 6.1 
List of regions to which Article 92(3)(a) EEC applies 
Member State Region Population 
(1.1.1990) 
in million 
Greece Whole country 10,046 
Ireland Whole country 3,499 
Portugal Whole country 10,337 
France French overseas departments 1 1,270 
(est.) 
Italy Campania 5,809 
Abruzzi 1,266 
Molise 0,335 
Puglia 4,069 
Basilicata 0,623 
Calabria 2,153 
Sicilia 5,173 
Sardegna 1,658 
Spain Galicia 2,807 
Castilla y Leon 2,629 
Castilla-La Mancha 1,713 
Extremadura 1,128 
Andalucia 6,903 
Murcia 1,024 
Ceuta y Melilla 0,124 
Canarias 1,478 
Teruel 0,156 
(1986) 
Comunidad Valenciana 3,781 
United 
Kingdom Northern Ireland 1,584 
Total 69,565 
I Guadeloupe. Guiana. Maninique and RCunion. 
To qualify for a derogation under this provision a region 
must normally show the following minimum disparity in the 
national context: 
(i) per capita GDP at least 15% below the national average, 
or 
(ii) an unemployment rate at least 10% higher than the 
national average. 
Because regional development policies deal with long-term 
problems and long-term measures, the indices used are five-
year averages. 
In order to take the Community context into account, the 
above thresholds are adjusted so that, if the Member State 
is better off than the Community average, a greater deviation 
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from the national average is needed in order to qualify. The 
adjustment formula is as follows: 
modified threshold = 
( basic th,eshold + _b_a_si_c_th_r_e_sh_o_Id_x_1_0_0_) .;- 2 
European index 
The thresholds are expressed as indices, where the national 
average equals 100. Thus the basic threshold for GDP/capita 
is 85 and that for unemployment is 110. The European index 
refers to the situation of the Member State in relation to the 
Community average ( = l 00). An example of the application 
of the formula is given in the box. 
Because disparities in unemployment rates are extremely 
wide, the Commission decided not to impose a modified 
threshold value of more than 145. 
When an area does not satisfy the above conditions the 
Commission proceeds to a second stage of analysis. In this 
stage, the Commission takes other economic indicators into 
account. These indicators may, amongst others, include fore-
casts of impending job losses, net migration, population 
density and dependence on declining sectors. Especially 
when an area is very close to the threshold values required 
in the first stage, this second stage may reveal an adequate 
justification for authorizing regional aid. 
Once it has decided on a derogation under Article 92(3)(c), 
the Commission fixes the investment aid ceiling for each 
area individually. This ceiling is not normally higher than 
30% NGE. Parts of Madrid and Asturias provinces in Spain 
are exceptional cases where a limit of 45% has been fixed; 
however, the Commission has recently proposed with-
drawing this concession as far as Madrid province is con-
cerned. 
Research and development 9 
As the Community has set itself the objective of improving its 
international competitiveness by strengthening the scientific 
and technological basis of its industry, 10 and in view of 
the important externalities involved, there is a generally 
favourable attitude towards aid for R&D. 
9 See Commission of the EC (1986). 
IO Article 130f of the EEC Treaty. 
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Threshold formula for regional aid (Article 92(3)(c) EEC) -
Example of application to the province of Twente, Netherlands 
The province of Twente is a NUTS level III area, and is thus at 
the appropriate level for the application of the Commission's 
method for deciding whether regional aid should be permitted. 
Averaged over the last five years for which statistics are avail-
able, the Netherlands had a GDP per capita index of 107 and 
an unemployment index of 97 (EC = 100). Consequently, for 
Dutch areas the threshold values to qualify under the first stage 
of the Commission's method are: 
GDP/head 
[ 
8 500 J 85+--
107 
+ 2 = 82 
Support for fundamental research not directed towards com-
mercial objectives does not fall under Article 92(1) EEC. 
For other R&D activities, a distinction is made between 
basic and applied research, basic research being theoretical 
and experimental work not leading directly to the creation 
of new products or production processes. For basic research, 
aid up to 50% of the cost is normally allowed. In the case 
of applied research the aid rate depends on the distance from 
the market but is typically limited to 25%. SMEs, firms in 
the least favoured regions and projects of special Community 
interest may receive additional aid of up to 10 percentage 
points. 
Large projects are examined individually by the Com-
m1ss1on. 
Environment 
In environmental matters, the Commission aims to move 
towards the 'polluter pays' principle. However, in a memor-
andum to Member States in 1974, I I the Commission noted 
that 'environmental "costs" are either not taken into account 
or only inadequately taken into account in the economic 
systems of the Member States'. Consequently, it set out in 
this memorandum conditions on which it would be prepared 
to allow State aid for investments aimed at protecting the 
environment. These conditions were amended by a Com-
mission communication issued in 1980. 12 During a tran-
11 Commission of the EC (1974). 
12 Commission of the EC (1980). 
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Unemployment 
[ 
11000] 
110 + -;:, + 2 = 112 
In other words, a Dutch region qualifies if, on average over the 
last five years, either its per capita GDP is not more than 82% 
of the Dutch average or its unemployment rate is at least 12% 
above the national level. 
For Twente, Eurostat data on GDP per head are available only 
for 1986-88, not the last five years, but they indicate a level 
slightly above 82% of the national average. On this test, Twente 
does not appear to qualify. However, the province's unemploy-
ment rates over the period 1985-89 yield an index of 114,9 
(NL = 100). This is higher than the threshold of 112 and re-
gional aid can therefore be authorized. 
sitional periodl3 to give Member States time to implement 
the 'polluter pays' principle, such aid is considered to qualify 
for derogation under Article 92(3)(b) EEC (important pro-
jects of European interest), if it satisfies the following tests: 
(i) The investment is needed to comply with major new 
obligations imposed by national or Community law. 
(ii) Aid must not exceed 15% NGE of the investment cost. 
(iii) The aid may be granted only for adapting installations 
which have been operating for at least two years before 
the introduction of the new environmental standards. 
(iv) Any portion of the investment which leads to an increase 
in production capacity, normal replacement investments 
and operating costs shall be ineligible for assistance. 
In these documents, the Commission also announced that it 
would consider derogations under Article 92(3)(c) (pro-
motion of 'certain' activities and 'certain' areas) for aids to 
promote research and development work on less polluting 
products or processes, including the construction of pilot 
plants, and to subsidize certain investments made necessary 
by sudden, major changes in environmental standards. 
In subsequent practice, however, the Commission has been 
prepared to accept under Article 92(3)(c) a further category 
of aids: those which provide an incentive to go beyond 
legally enforceable norms. In such cases, the Commission 
13 Originally until 1980, extended to 1986 and then prolonged indefinitely 
pending review. 
takes a tolerant view provided that the aid does not cover 
the full additional cost of meeting the higher standards and 
that the conditions of aid do not discriminate according to 
the origin of the equipment required. 
Rescue and restructuringl4 
Because of their potential harmful effects in delaying necess-
ary adaptions to market conditions, aids in this category 
have to be strictly controlled. 
Rescue aids are those granted to keep a firm in business 
while a recovery plan is being prepared. The Commission 
may be willing to authorize such aid if it is restricted to the 
minimum amount and time (generally six months) necessary. 
Restructuring aid may be allowed if the restructuring plan 
offers good prospects of restoring viability and the aid is no 
more than is needed to support the firm until the plan bears 
fruit. Where the sector concerned is characterized by chronic 
overcapacity, the Commission normally requires an irrevers-
ible reduction in capacity. 
General aid schemes 
In the past some aid schemes have been tolerated even 
though they have no specific industrial or regional objectives. 
These are known as general aid schemes and are subject to 
special provisions on prior notification and annual reports, 
laid down in a letter from the Commission to Member States 
dated 14 September 1979_15 
This letter specifies, with reference to the size of the invest-
ments concerned and the aid intensity, the cases when indi-
vidual aid proposals must be cleared with the Commission 
in advance. It also requires annual reports on the operation 
of the schemes. The information contained in these reports 
must, inter alia, include a breakdown of the aid granted by 
sector and by type of region. This enables the Commission 
to judge whether particular competition problems are likely 
to arise from a concentration of aid on any sector and 
whether a scheme is hindering the implementation of re-
gional policy by favouring non-assisted areas. 
The importance of these rules is diminishing as the Com-
mission takes steps to secure the abolition of general aid 
schemes. 
14 See Commission of the EC (1979a). 
15 Commission of the EC (1979b). 
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Cumulation of aids 
In many cases the same project may be eligible for aid under 
more than one scheme operated by a Member State. In some 
of these cases the schemes contain rules, often inserted at 
the insistence of the Commission, which limit the total inten-
sityl6 of aid from all sources for any one project. Where 
such rules do not exist, the Commission has taken steps to 
ensure that significant cases of aid cumulation do not escape 
its control. 
In a communication publis4ed in 1985, 17 the Commission 
required prior notification of cases of cumulation where the 
investment cost exceeds ECU 12 million or total aid intensity 
exceeds 25% NGE. The following are exempted from this 
requirement: 
(i) investments of less than ECU 3 million, whatever the 
cumulative aid intensity, 
(ii) cumulation resulting in a total aid intensity of Jess than 
10%, whatever the investment cost, 
(iii) cases where the cumulative intensity is no more than 
the maximum authorized by the Commission in respect 
of any one of the schemes concerned. 
These rules cover the subsidization of expenditure on fixed 
assets. Aid for staff training is also covered when this sup-
plements investment aid and is directly linked to the invest-
ment. 
When prior notification is required by these rules, Member 
States must also supply information on any other related 
aid, even if it is not directly linked to investment in fixed 
assets. This information enables the. Commission to form a 
more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the 
case. 
Employment and training aids 
The Commission's first survey identified employment and 
training aids in the Community of Ten averaging ECU 
2 660 million per year in the period 1981-86. Although this 
is a substantial amount, almost equal to the spending on 
R&D aid in the same period, this figure was not included 
in the main findings, because of certain peculiarities of 
employment and training measures which make them diffi-
cult to treat in the same way as other State aids. 
16 i.e. aid as a proportion of the eligible costs of the project. 
17 Commission of the EC (1985). 
61 
Part I - Fair competition in the internal market: Community State aid policy 
Firstly, such measures are frequently non-specific, in the 
sense that they do not explicitly discriminate between sectors 
or regions. Hence, unless it can be shown that in practice 
these measures tend to favour certain types of enterprise or 
geographical areas, they do not fall under Articles 92 and 
93 of the EEC Treaty. As they are usually targeted on certain 
disadvantaged groups (such as the long-term unemployed 
or women seeking to return to work), there is a possibility 
of some sectoral bias, e.g. towards industries which employ 
large numbers of unskilled workers or where women tra-
ditionally predominate. However, it can also be argued that 
any such bias arising solely from the choice of target group 
is unlikely to be sufficiently narrow to justify the application 
of the State aid rules. The Commission thus finds itself in 
the grey area where the distinction between State aids and 
general measures is unclear. 
Where training measures are concerned, there are additional 
reasons for the Commission to be reluctant to interfere. 
Unless the training is heavily slanted towards the needs of 
the employer who receives the aid, normal labour mobility 
means that the externalities involved are extremely im-
portant: the skills acquired in training may be transferred 
not only between firms but between sectors and countries. 18 
Furthermore, vocational training systems vary widely be-
tween Member States; the costs which in one country are 
borne by the employer may in another country be borne by 
the State as the provider of free educational and training 
facilities. Any training subsidy granted by the State in the 
first country will be notifiable under Article 93(3) EEC but 
will not necessarily confer a clear competitive advantage 
in comparison with the second country's (non-notifiable) 
expenditure on freely available training provision. 
However unclear the legal position may be, the existence of 
training and employment aids does not normally present the 
Commission with practical problems, since the Community's 
policy in the social field is to promote efforts both to improve 
employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups and 
generally to upgrade the skills base of the Community econ-
omy. Consequently, the Commission adopts a generally 
favourable attitude towards aids of this sort and is therefore 
rarely called upon to pronounce on the applicability of the 
State aid provisions of the Treaty. 1-!')wever, should a case 
arise where the incidence of the aid is sufficiently specific 
and where the level of aid is judged to be excessive, the 
Commission would undoubtedly raise objections. 
18 A minimum element of transferable skills is a normal condition, for 
example, for the co-financing of such schemes by the European Social 
Fund. 
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(c) Rules on different forms of aid 
Measuring aid intensity 
The intensity of an aid, i.e. the proportion of the firm's 
expenditure on a project which is covered by the aid, is an 
important factor in assessing its impact on competition. As 
aids can take many forms (capital grants, tax relief, interest 
rebates, etc.), the Commission had to devise methods for 
reducing them to a comparable measure of intensity. In most 
cases, this measure is the net grant equivalent (NGE). The 
principles for calculating the NGE of aids for investment 
were first applied to regional aid schemes 19 and later ex-
tended to other types of scheme. These principles cover 
capital grants, tax relief ('fiscal aid'), loans at reduced rates 
and interest rebates.In essence, the methodology consists of 
calculating the ratio between the present value of the aid 
(after tax) and the present value of the investment expendi-
ture. For example, the gross grant equivalent of a soft 
loan is the present value of the recipient's interest savings, 
discounted at the appropriate reference rate and expressed 
as a percentage of the cost of the project. 
As fiscal legislation usually stipulates that only the net cost 
to the investor can be depreciated, the tax liability of the 
firm increases if it receives aid. Consequently, the net benefit 
derived from the aid is reduced by an amount which depends 
on the tax rate and the depreciation rules. The net grant 
equivalent takes this effect into account and thus eliminates 
the influence of differences between tax systems. In calculat-
ing the NGE, it is assumed that the firm makes a profit from 
the outset, sufficient to pay the maximum taxes that could 
be levied on the aid. 
State guarantees 
The provision of a guarantee by the State or by a financial 
institution acting on its behalf can bestow a significant 
competitive advantage on a firm. This is particularly true 
where the conditions of the guarantee restrict the legal steps 
which a guarantor may take to recover the debt from a 
defaulting firm. 
Consequently the Commission has declared20 that it will 
not approve the granting of State guarantees unless their 
mobilization gives the guarantor the right to apply, if necess-
ary, for a compulsory declaration of bankruptcy or a similar 
measure. 
19 Council Resolution of 20 October 1971. Commission of the EC (1979c) 
revises some aspects of the methodology. 
20 Commission of the EC (1989a). 
Public authorities' holding in company capital 
As in the case of dealings between States and public en-
terprises, the acquisition of public holdings in private com-
panies may present particular problems in determining 
whether aid is involved. Consequently, the Commission has 
issued special guidelines on this subject.21 In the light of the 
'commercial investor principle', the guidelines identify four 
basic types of transaction : 
(i) acquisition of a holding in an existing company without 
any injection of fresh capital, 
(ii) an injection of fresh capital in circumstances which 
would be acceptable to a private investor under normal 
market conditions, 
(iii) injections of fresh capital in circumstances where a pri-
vate investor would be unwilling to invest, 
(iv) capital injections which cannot be assigned with cer-
tainty to either category (ii) or category (iii). 
In the cases referred to in point (i), there is clearly no aid 
and the Commission does not impose any special obligations 
on Member States. Although the transactions covered by 
point (ii) do not constitute aids either, the Commission re-
quires regular reports on them in order to ensure, retrospec-
tively, that the Member States are interpreting the 'commer-
cial investor principle' correctly. These reports must also 
cover the uncertain cases referred to in point (iv). 
However, those injections of fresh capital which are clearly 
aids (the third category) and any uncertain cases where there 
is a presumption of aid must be notified to and approved 
by the Commission before the transaction is carried out. 
The guidelines state that there is a presumption of aid when 
a capital injection is combined with aid in some other form or 
when the sector concerned is experiencing special difficulties. 
6.3. Sectoral rules 
Except in the case of transport, probably the most important 
problem taken into account in the specific sectoral rules is 
that of persistent overcapacity in the Community industries 
concerned. A general principle of the rules in such cases is 
that aid for investments which would increase the output of 
the products in question should be strictly limited or even 
forbidden outright. 
21 Commission of the EC (1984a). 
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(a) Coal and steel 
Commission Decision 322/89/ECSC, valid until the end of 
1991, allows limited aid to iron and steel companies for 
research and development, protection of the environment, 
costs related to the closures of plants and investments in 
Greece and the new German Liinder, provided that they do 
not lead to an increase in capacity. 
For the coal industry, Commission Decision 2064/86/ECSC, 
in force until the end of I 993, permits the following types 
of aid under certain conditions: 
(i) aid to cover operating losses, 
(ii) aid to allow rebates to be granted on the prices of 
supplies to the Community iron and steel industry, 
provided that there is no competition from extra-Com-
munity suppliers at the point of consumption, 
(iii) aid up to 50% of investment costs, provided that the 
investment helps to improve competitivity and any new 
capacity created is economically viable, 
(iv) employment aid for underground workers, 
(v) aid to finance social grant schemes specific to the in-
dustry, 
(vi) aid to cover inherited liabilities arising from restruc-
turing. 
(b) Agriculturc22 
The rules concerning both agriculture and fisheries dis-
tinguish between aids which are co-financed by the Com-
munity and others. Although the conditions of eligibility 
may be somewhat wider in the case of schemes without 
Community financial support, it is a general requirement 
that such schemes should not offer higher amounts or rates 
of aid than the equivalent Community schemes. 
As far as investment aids for farmers are concerned, the 
rules are complex.23 They specify in detail the conditions 
under which certain aids can be permitted, with particular 
emphasis on ensuring that aid schemes are less generous 
towards the larger and more productive farms and on reduc-
ing the costs of production. They also impose restrictions 
on aid to certain sectors where the problem of surplus 
22 Some of the aid schemes mentioned here are mandatory. 
23 See in particular Council Regulation (EEC)No 797/85. 
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production is especially serious; for example, most invest-
ments in egg and poultry farming are excluded and the 
eligibility of pig and dairy farming investments is strictly 
limited. 
In order to help restore the balance between demand and 
supply, special provision is made for aiding investments in 
conversion to non-surplus products and afforestation of 
farm land. 
Income support for farmers is permitted, within limits, in 
the following cases : 
(i) set-aside of arable land, 
(ii) extensification of production, 
(iii) conversion to non-surplus products, 
(iv) disadvantaged agricultural areas. 
Farmers may also be compensated in environmentally sensi-
tive areas for loss of income resulting from the adoption of 
more environment-friendly methods. 
Under a transitional scheme,24 more general income support 
can be given to the less productive farms for a maximum of 
five years. For each farmer the amount of the aid, which is 
degressive, is fixed in relation to the loss incurred as a result 
of changes in the common agricultural policy. 
Price support measures in agriculture (e.g. intervention buy-
ing and export refunds), being Community measures, are 
not subject to the State aid rules. 
(c) Fisheries 
The rules for this sector cover the fishing fleet, fish farming 
and processing and marketing. 25 
A general principle of the control of State aids in this sector 
is that aid must be compatible with multiannual guidance 
programmes drawn up by the Member States and approved 
by the Commission under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4028/86. This means that the Commission can check the 
overall impact on the sector of the aid system operated by 
the Member State. For example, the Commission can ensure 
that the net effect of schemes to promote the modernization 
24 Council Regulation (EEC) No 768/89. 
25 See in particular Commission of the EC (1988b). 
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of the fishing fleet, on one hand, and to encourage the 
withdrawal of vessels from fishing activity, on the other 
hand, is to promote the efficiency of the sector rather than 
to create or perpetuate surplus capacity. 
( d) Transport 
As noted in Section 1, Article 77 of the EEC Treaty allows 
Member States to compensate undertakings in the road, 
rail and waterway sectors for the public service obligations 
imposed on them. Council Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 
defines the circumstances in which such obligations may be 
imposed, gives transport undertakings the right to compen-
sation for fulfilling the obligations and lays down the pro-
cedures for paying such compensation. The obligations may 
be: 
(i) to operate a service with a given frequency and capacity, 
(ii) to carry passengers or goods at specified rates and 
conditions, 
(iii) to apply preferential tariffs and conditions to certain 
categories of goods or passengers. 
The obligations should be met in the least costly way and 
the compensation must be calculated so as to match exactly 
the net cost to the carrier. 
Apart from preferential rates and conditions for certain 
categories of passenger, the latest amendment26 of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1191/69 only allows public service obli-
gations to be imposed in relation to urban, suburban and 
regional services. For long-distance services, and as a pre-
ferred option for all services, Member States must conclude 
freely negotiated 'public service contracts' with the transport 
undertakings if they wish non-commercial objectives to be 
taken into account. The contracts will, of course, make 
provision for compensatory payments. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 allows transport 
undertakings to receive State aid to cover some other costs, 
notably: 
(i) infrastructure costs, 
(ii) research and development in the field of new transport 
technologies, 
(iii) costs arising from the elimination of excess capacity. 
26 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1893/91. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1192/69 relates only to the 
railways and seeks to improve the transparency of financial 
relations between governments and the railway companies. 
It also allows some further types of aid to be given, in 
particular aid to cover specific social costs not borne by 
other enterprises and the costs of crossing facilities. 
As far as the railways are concerned, the above regulations 
should, in principle, allow them to enjoy a high degree 
of commercial independence, by restricting the power of 
governments to impose obligations and by giving an en-
titlement to compensation when public service obligations 
are imposed. Furthermore, these regulations attempt to pro-
vide a 'level playing field' for competition between the modes 
of transport by allowing aid to cover costs, such as the 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure, which are 
not (or not directly and fully) borne by other transport 
enterprises. Nevertheless, Council Decision 75/327 still per-
mits governments to pay general deficit subsidies to railway 
undertakings. 
Air transport is dealt with in a policy paper and guidelines 
published by the Commission in 1984.27 In the policy paper, 
the Commission states that it sees no need for special legis-
lation on compensation for public service obligations im-
posed on air carriers, as the EEC Treaty rules are adequate 
for dealing with all known cases of aid in this sector. In view 
of the danger that liberalization of the regulatory system 
could lead to a 'subsidy race' in civil aviation, the document 
envisages tighter control of aid to the sector. This control is 
essentially based on the same principles as apply to other 
sectors under Articles 92 and 93 EEC. 
However, the Commission announces its intention of apply-
ing the rules in such a way as not to put Community airlines 
at a competitive disadvantage in relation to airlines of non-
member countries which give subsidies or other forms of 
preferential treatment. The Commission also expresses a 
generally favourable attitude towards aid for air services in 
underdeveloped regions. Aid to promote the purchase and 
use of particular types of aircraft, if it does no more than 
cover the additional costs of those aircraft, is considered to 
be indirect aid to the manufacturers, rather than to the 
airlines, and assessed as such. 
The Commission's guidelines on aid to shipping companies28 
were drawn up in the context of world-wide excess capacity, 
high manning costs for Community companies compared 
with their main competitors and a general growth in both 
27 Commission of the EC (1984b). 
28 Commission of the EC (1989c). 
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protectionism and the use of 'flags of convenience'. The 
Commission considers that the common interest is served 
by appropriate measures to maintain ships under Com-
munity flags and encourage the employment of Community 
seafarers. However, the amount of aid must be in proportion 
to the objective and is therefore subject to a ceiling fixed by 
the Commission with reference to the gap in operating costs 
between Community-registered ships and their main com-
petitors. Aid must be temporary and preferably on a declin-
ing scale. Furthermore, aid should not contribute to the 
creation or maintenance of excess capacity in market seg-
ments where there is 'manifest overcapacity'. 
(e) Shipbuilding 
Aid to shipbuilding has been the subject of a series of Council 
directives since 1969. It is now governed by the seventh 
Directive, No 90/684. Like the sixth Directive of 1987, it 
provides for operating aid, including any aid given to ship-
owners for buying new ships, to be subject to a ceiling fixed 
annually by the Commission. The ceiling, which is to be 
progressively lowered, takes account of the difference be-
tween the costs of the most competitive Community yards 
and the prices charged by their main international rivals. 
Since 1987 the ceiling has been reduced for most ships from 
28 to 13 % in 1991 and for small, specialized vessels from 20 
to 9%.29 Depending on the form of the aid (contract-related 
or otherwise), the ceiling is applied as a percentage of either 
the contract value before aid or the shipyard's annual turn-
over in shipbuilding or conversion.30 Where there is compe-
tition for a contract between shipyards in more than one 
Member State, the Commission may impose an aid limit 
lower than the ceiling. Operating aid for ship repairing is 
not allowed. 
Investment aid may not be given for projects which would 
increase the Member State's shipbuilding capacity (except if 
the Member State has no existing capacity or only one 
shipyard). The Commission may allow aid to be given for 
permanent closures or reductions in capacity (e.g. to finance 
redundancy payments or conversion to non-shipbuilding 
activities) and for R&D. 
(f) Synthetic fibres, textiles and clothing 
In these sectors, the Commission will not approve aid for 
investments which would lead to increased capacity if for 
the product concerned there is structural excess capacity or 
29 From 1991 the lower ceiling applies also to all ship conversion. 
30 Export credits in accordance with the OECD understanding on export 
credits for ships are not counted towards the ceiling. 
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persistent stagnation of demand. However, aid for conver-
sion to activities outside these sectors is, in principle, viewed 
favourably. 
Each case of aid for the synthetic fibres industry has to be 
notified individually. 
(g) Motor vehicles3 I 
All case:; of aid to this sector have to be notified individually. 
Investment aid in assisted regions is scrutinized carefully, 
the benefits for regional development being weighed against 
possible adverse effects on the sector as a whole. 
Other investment aids may be permitted if they relate to 
fundamental rationalization, beyond the firm's capacity to 
finance from its own resources or borrowing, or to products 
or processes which are genuine innovations from the Com-
munity standpoint. 
Rescue and restructuring aid is only allowed if the Com-
mission is convinced that there is a Community interest in 
keeping the firm in business and there is a satisfactory 
restructuring plan. As a condition for approving aid, the 
Commission may require reductions in capacity. 
No new operating aids are to be approved and all existing 
aids of this sort are to be phased out. 
6.4. State aid policy and the Community's 
financial instruments 
The Community has at its disposal various instruments for 
providing financial support directly or indirectly to firms. 
These include notably: 
(i) the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which fin-
ances the price support mechanism in agriculture, 
(ii) the structural Funds, i.e. the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund 
(ESF) and the Guidance Section of the EAGGF, 
(iii) structural measures in the fisheries sector, 
(iv) various provisions for promoting R&D and the develop-
ment of energy resources, 
31 Commission of the EC (1989b). 
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(v) grants and loans under the ECSC Treaty for the coal 
and steel industries, 
(vi) the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the New 
Community Instrument for borrowing and lending 
(NCI). 
It can be said of these instruments generally that their 
exclusion from the competition provisions of the Treaties is 
justified by the fact that their resources are allocated accord-
ing to Community criteria with the specific intention of 
avoiding any advantage to particular Member States which 
is not in conformity with Community policy.32 However, it 
is essential for the Commission to ensure that the operation 
of the Community's financial instruments is consistent with 
State aid policy. 
This consistency is assured in two ways. Firstly, State aid 
policy does not function in a vacuum : the compatibility of 
aids with the common market is largely determined by the 
common interest, which itself is a function of the whole 
spectrum of Community policies, including those which gov-
ern the Community's financial instruments. Secondly, de-
cisions on the allocation of Community funds are made in 
the light of State aid policy, so that, for example, the struc-
tural Funds cannot co-finance aid schemes which have not 
been approved by the Commission. In many cases, the re-
quirement of compatibility with competition policy is specifi-
cally mentioned in the relevant legislation. For example, 
Article 7(1) of the Framework Regulation33 governing the 
structural Funds states that 'Measures financed by the struc-
tural Funds or receiving assistance from the EIB or from 
another existing financial instrument shall be in keeping 
with the provisions of the Treaties ... and with Community 
policies, including those concerning the rules on competition 
, 
In the case of the EAGGF Guidance Section, the rules on 
State aid to farmers and those concerning the award of 
Community grants are usually combined in the same regu-
lation (notably Regulation (EEC) No 797 /85). 
There are, of course, occasions when the assessment of an 
aid under competition rules can differ from that made in the 
context of another Community policy. One example can be 
found in the context of regional policy. Both the Com-
mission's State aid policy and Community structural policy 
32 Note also that it would be legally absurd for the Commission to sit in 
judgment, as the authority charged with controlling aids, on decisions 
which it has made as the authority responsible for executing the budget. 
33 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88. 
aim at concentrating aid on the regions in greatest need. 
However, State aid policy takes account of both the national 
and the regional contexts (see section 2(b) of this chapter), 
while the eligibility of areas for assistance from the structural 
Funds under regional objectives depends almost solely on 
their socio-economic conditions relative to a Community 
standard. 
One consequence of this difference is that 10% of the Com-
munity's population live in areas where national schemes of 
regional aid are authorized but where the Community gives 
no financial support for regional development purposes. It 
can be argued that the granting of national aid in these areas 
weakens the effectiveness of Community structural policy to 
the extent that they compete for investment with the regions 
to which the Community accords a priority. However, the 
amounts and intensities of State aid awarded in such areas 
are usually small, so that the effect on other regions is not 
likely to be great. 
Another result of the difference in criteria is that there are 
areas (covering 5,5 % of the Community's population) where 
the reverse situation holds, i.e. where national regional aid 
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has not been authorized but where the Community inter-
venes to promote regional development. In such areas, the 
Community can contribute towards infrastructure, training 
and agricultural measures but assistance for investment in 
industry and services is limited to approved schemes of low-
intensity aid for SMEs. Some would argue that in all areas 
where Community structural policy identifies a need there 
should be an automatic right to the full range of aid schemes. 
Here again, the problem has to be put into perspective. 
Firstly, the areas concerned are generally in the central 
regions of the Community and do not suffer from the most 
severe handicaps. Secondly, Community (i.e. ERDF) contri-
butions for investment in industry and services represent 
only a part, and often a small part, of the expenditure of 
the structural Funds in any region. Finally, ineligibility for 
national regional aid can be the result not only of the 
application of the State aid rules but also of decisions made 
by the Member State. 
From the above brief discussion it can be concluded that 
the integration of competition policy with other Community 
policies is, in general, adequate and that there is no reason 
to fear the occurrence of serious anomalies. 
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Chapter 7 
Current State aid policy 
7 .1. Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 discussed the legal background of State 
aid control and the established rules for its implementation. 
The aim of the present chapter is to bring the overview of 
competition policy up to date and examine some proposals 
for further improvements. Section 2 of this chapter outlines 
the Commission's priorities for action and the areas of policy 
which are currently under review, with particular reference 
to the completion of the internal market. Section 3 discusses 
some possible improvements in the application of the policy 
which go beyond those already envisaged by the Com-
m1ss1on. 
7 .2. The Commission's priorities 
In recent years, the Commission has progressively tightened 
up its control over State aids. 1 In large measure, this tighten-
ing of discipline is a necessary concomitant of the drive 
towards the completion of the internal market and of the 
projected creation of an economic and monetary union 
(EMU). 
The Commission's 1990 White Paper on industrial policy2 
notes the need for strict control to counter the danger that 
State aids will be used as a substitute for trade barriers which 
are being dismantled in the Community: 'As other forms of 
protectionism recede, the importance of State aids as an 
anti-competitive mechanism tends to grow.' 
Furthermore, the White Paper notes that State aids can 
hinder the achievement of the Community's objective of 
improving the relative living standards and competitiveness 
of the less-developed regions (the cohesion objective), since 
'large and well-developed Member States will always be able 
to outbid less-developed Member States on the periphery of 
the Community'. 
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Some observers, like Andel (1990), consider that until the late 1980s 
'the Commission was rather soft on subsidies'. 
Commission of the EC ( 1990). 
To counteract this problem, the Commission suggests, in 
particular, that 'the effectiveness of the Community's policies 
to promote greater cohesion could be improved by some 
progressive reduction in aid intensities in the central and 
more prosperous regions'. 
The Cecchini Report3 observes, moreover, that an energetic 
competition policy is necessary if the full potential, in terms 
of economic efficiency, of the single market is to be realized, 
while the report 'One market, one money'4 expresses the 
view that 'with EMU the need to restrict State subsidies is 
much increased'. 
Thus the desire for stricter control of State aids is under-
pinned not only by pure competition policy considerations 
but also by concern for economic efficiency and cohesion. 
Gilchrist and Deacon ( 1990) summarize the issues in the 
following way: 
'Without a firm and comprehensive aid policy there can 
therefore be no real internal market. Such a policy is in the 
interest of Member States. The poorer ones do not have the 
resources to compete with richer members. For the latter to 
compete in granting aid would amount to a beggar-my-
neighbour policy. This is a negative-sum game, and costly 
in terms of budget and inflation.' 
What steps is the Commission taking to respond to this 
challenge? 
Firstly,5 it has defined three urgent requirements for enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of control. These are: 
(a) the review of existing schemes in accordance with 
Article 93(1) EEC, 
(b) improving the quality of information on the impact of 
schemes, 
(c) limiting the overall volume of aid granted. 
Secondly, it has identified several types of aid which, because 
of the sums involved and their special potential to distort 
competition, merit particularly close attention. These are: 
(d) general investment aid schemes, 
(e) capital injections into publicly-owned enterprises and 
the acquisition of minority holdings in other companies 
by public authorities, 
European Economy (1988), Part A. 
European Economy (1990), Chapter 3. 
See Brittan ( 1989). 
(f) interventionist industrial policy aids to support national 
champions, 
(g) export aids. 
(a) Review of existing schemes 
Article 93(1) EEC requires the Commission, in cooperation 
with the Member States, to 'keep under constant review all 
systems of aid existing in those States'. Until recently this 
task was carried out rather sporadically because of the heavy 
workload imposed by the examination of new aid cases. 
Resources have now been freed for reviewing existing 
schemes by streamlining the procedures for dealing with 
cases of minor importance (the large number of cases involv-
ing low-intensity aid schemes for SMEs and small changes 
to existing schemes). 
The Commission's surveys showed that the bulk of the aid 
that is being granted by Member States is accounted for by 
existing schemes, many of which were approved by the 
Commission a long time ago. The re-examination of these 
schemes is thus essential not only because they constitute a 
large volume of expenditure but also because the circum-
stances which may initially have justified their existence may 
well have changed over the succeeding years. Furthermore, 
attitudes towards State aids, including that of the Com-
mission, have evolved since the early 1980s and there are, 
indeed, some approved schemes which now seem difficult to 
reconcile with the Community rules in any circumstances. 
For the reasons set out below, particular attention is being 
paid to reviewing general investment aid schemes. Since the 
beginning of 1990, the Commission has made recommen-
dations concerning seven such schemes. 
As a result of these recommendations, the Dutch Govern-
ment has already terminated a scheme with an annual budget 
of ECU 26 million and the Belgian Government has agreed 
that, from mid-1991, it will no longer give general investment 
grants under the Economic Expansion Law of 1959, for 
which the budget in 1990 was ECU 96 million. For its part, 
the United Kingdom Government has reached an agreement 
with the Commission whereby every proposal to grant aid 
under the discretionary powers of Article 8 of the Industrial 
Development Act must be notified individually to the Com-
mission. 
A proposal has been addressed to France requiring, inter 
alia, the cessation of certain restructuring aids granted out-
side assisted areas and the prior notification of others (expen-
diture in 1986-89 totalling ECU 317 million). The Com-
mission has also proposed winding up the Italian Special 
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Fund for Technological Innovation, which had a budget of 
ECU 325 million in 1989, and ending aid under Luxem-
bourg's Economic Expansion Law. Finally, the Dutch 
Government has been asked to abolish a scheme for provid-
ing State guarantees for general investment purposes at a 
net cost to the State in the period 1981-89 of about ECU 
50 million. 
The Commission has also recently taken steps to limit aids 
under other types of existing schemes, including four re-
gional aid schemes. In one French case, the Commission has 
proposed ending the eligibility of several areas which do not 
meet its criteria. In another case, the Spanish Government 
has been asked to reduce the maximum rate of aid given in 
one area. 
Should any Member State fail to comply with such pro-
posals, the Commission can set in motion the procedure 
foreseen in Article 93(2) leading, if necessary, to a binding 
final decision. 
In order to ensure that in future all schemes are regularly 
reviewed, the Commission proposes to limit the period of 
validity of its decisions approving new aid schemes. Their 
continuation after the expiry of that period will then require 
re-notification and a new Commission approval. 
(b) Information 
In order to be better able to assess the potential impact 
of new aid schemes or changes to existing schemes, the 
Commission is drawing up proposals for a standardized 
form of notification designed to elicit essential information, 
such as the budgetary provision and the estimated number 
of recipients as well as the precise conditions of eligibility. 
Furthermore, the Member States are to be asked to explain 
why the scheme should be considered compatible with the 
EEC Treaty. Such standardized forms should also help to 
reduce delays in reaching a decision resulting from the need 
for the Commission to ask for further information. 
To improve the monitoring of existing schemes, the Com-
mission is likely to introduce a generalized system of annual 
reports. Annual reports are commonly required by recent 
Commission decisions approving aids, but older schemes 
outside the 'sensitive' sectors (shipbuilding, motor vehicles, 
etc.) are often not subject to such a condition. It is suggested 
that these reports should contain data on the regional and 
sectoral distribution of aid. These data would enable the 
Commission to assess the extent to which non-regional aid 
systems may be interfering with regional policy objectives 
and whether there is an undue concentration of aid in any 
sector. In addition, it would be desirable to be able to 
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identify individual large recipients of aid. The latter infor-
mation would have to be treated as confidential by the 
Commission but is vital for a full appreciation of the trade-
distortion effects of a scheme. In this context, it is worth 
noting that the 1 300 largest Community manufacturing 
firms account for two-thirds of the turnover in the sector 
and probably even more of the intra-Community trade. 
(c) The overall volume of aid 
Brittan (1989) states 'I believe it is necessary to examine the 
overall volume of ~id'. This objective is to a large extent 
achieved by the Commission's two surveys. However, the 
means by which the Commission can limit the overall vol-
ume, as opposed to reacting to individual schemes, remain 
unclear. The Economic Policy Committee is currently exam-
ining a proposed opinion aimed at a regular review of the 
levels of aid and on agreement by Member States to reduce 
them. Beyond encouraging this initiative, the main role of 
the Commission would seem to lie in giving greater import-
ance to assessing the volume of aid under each scheme in 
relation to the needs which the scheme addresses. 
In this respect, the problem of poorer regions and countries 
being outbid by the richer ones is particularly relevant. Since 
the resources of the former are very limited, the fact that 
they are permitted to offer higher rates of investment aid 
(up to 75% in some cases) is often not decisive in attracting 
new activities. They are usually obliged to choose between 
giving much less than the maximum aid rate or assisting 
many fewer projects. 6 Thus, a prosperous region where only 
a low aid intensity is allowed may often succeed in attracting 
investment that would otherwise have gone to a less-de-
veloped area, simply because it has the budgetary resources 
to finance a large number of projects. 
( d) General investment aid schemes 
These are schemes without specific sectoral or regional objec-
tives. Because the granting of aid is discretionary, they are 
subject to the State aid rules. As most of them were approved 
many years ago, for reasons which now seem difficult to 
understand, they are the subject of intensive review under 
the provisions of Article 93(1) EEC, as noted above. 
The effects of such schemes can be especially distortive 
when the award of aid is biased towards certain sectors. 
Furthermore, they can hinder the achievement of Com-
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For example, the theoretically acceptable maximum for regional aid in 
Greece is 75% NGE but the actual maximum is 50% gross. 
munity objectives by diverting investment away from pri-
ority areas. 
The need to eliminate or substantially modify such schemes 
is made all the greater by the large and increasing volumes 
of aid involved. 
(e) Capital injections, public enterprises and State holdings 
The rules governing aid to public enterprises and the acqui-
sition of minority State holdings, including the 'commercial 
investor criterion' (see Chapter 5, Section 2(c)) are fairly well 
defined, if not always easy to apply. However, the major 
problem remains, in spite of the Commission's directives on 
the subject, a lack of transparency. It is still the case that 
some major aids to public enterprises only come to light as 
a result of press reports.7 In carrying out the surveys, the 
Commission's services found a considerable volume of capi-
tal injections which seemed to include aid elements but which 
had never been notified. 
The Commission is therefore working on ways of greatly 
improving the quality of information in this area. 
(f) National champions 
Some Member States are still committed to interventionist 
industrial policies in what they regard as 'strategic sectors'. 
Such policies are often designed to provide aid to so-called 
'national champions' - well-known large companies. If 
every Member State is allowed to maintain artificially its 
own national champion in each 'strategic sector', the com-
pletion of the internal market will not yield the intended 
improvements in economic efficiency. 
For this reason, Brittan ( 1989) proposes a strict check on 
aid to such firms. 
(g) Export aids 
The elimination of all aid for intra-Community exports -
or at least all overt aid - is now complete. Until now the 
Commission has not attempted to tackle aids for exports to 
non-member countries, although the Member States are 
bound by OECD and GA TT agreements. 
Gilchrist and Deacon (1990) quote the purchase in 1988 of Alfa Romeo 
by Fiat, which was found to involve aid. 
Article 112 of the EEC Treaty provides for progressive har-
monization of systems of aid for exports to third countries, 
'to the extent necessary to ensure that competition between 
undertakings of the Community is not distorted' but this 
harmonization has not taken place. Article 112 does not 
seem to prevent the application of the other State aid pro-
visions of the Treaty and, consequently, the Commission is 
now looking into the possibility of using the latter provisions 
to control these aids. 
It is clear that these aids can distort intra-Community com-
petition since firms from different Member States compete 
on the same extra-Community markets and because any aid 
can improve a firm's ability to compete on the domestic 
market. The Commission has started its review of these aids 
by asking Member States to notify their existing schemes 
and provide information on the exporters who are their main 
beneficiaries. 
7.3. Proposals for furiher action 
It is clear that the control of State aids has been tightened 
up considerably over the last two years and that this process 
is continuing. However, there are still some areas, such as 
export aids, where the Commission has yet to complete its 
examination of the possibilities for exerting stricter control. 
In some other fields, where intra-Community competition 
was previously almost unknown, the need for control may 
make itself felt with increasing force as progress is made 
towards the completion of the internal market. 
For example, public utilities, and in particular telecommuni-
cations, electricity and gas supply are being opened up to 
intra-Community competition, but there is as yet no definite 
policy on aids to these undertakings. 
The formulation of such a policy is complicated by the 
possibility that Article 90(2) EEC might be applicable in 
some cases (see Section 2 of Chapter 5). However, some 
control over State aids to these undertakings is necessary for 
the creation of an internal market in the sectors concerned. 
Moreover, the results of a lack of control can spill over 
into other sectors. For example, suppose that an electricity 
supplier has considerable excess capacity. With low marginal 
costs, the supplier will be willing to offer electricity at a low 
price in order to increase consumption and make use of the 
excess capacity. Such a decision would be commercially 
justifiable and would not, in principle, constitute the grant-
ing of State aid. However, if the excess capacity has been 
built up thanks to financial assistance from the government, 
then firms benefiting from the low electricity prices are in 
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effect receiving an indirect subsidy from the State, which 
should be subject to Community control. 
In other fields, some critics argue that the Commission's 
practice falls short of its declared intentions. This criticism 
is often directed towards the treatment of rescue and restruc-
turing aids. Rescue aids can be a means of delaying essential 
rationalization and should therefore only be granted when 
there is a convincing restructuring plan, which is also an 
essential condition for allowing aid for the restructuring 
measures themselves. However, Gilchrist and Deacon 
(1990)8 remark that: 
'In practically all cases of rescue of major ailing companies, 
whatever the industrial sector, the Commission has approved 
all, or the major part of the aid.' 
Clearly, such cases are complicated by short-term factors, 
particularly social and political considerations and it would 
be wrong to suppose that the Commission's task in these 
cases is easy. Nevertheless, the expectation that, if necessary, 
rescue aid will be forthcoming can lead firms to postpone 
making necessary adjustments instead of acting promptly at 
a time when the social, economic and political problems can 
be minimized. 
Another area for concern relates to the privatization of 
public enterprises. Such privatization frequently occurs by 
selling not on the open market but by private agreement. In 
such cases, it is the Commission's task to check whether the 
price paid corresponds to the true value of the firm. If the 
price is lower, then the purchaser receives an aid from the 
State which gives him a definite competitive advantage. The 
valuation of a firm is an extremely complex task and can 
never be exact, since it is largely dependent on expected 
future profits. However, in forming its opinion about the 
value of privatized firms, the Commission tends to rely 
almost entirely on information provided by the Member 
State. In some major cases, at least, it would seem advisable 
to obtain a second opinion from an independent source, 
even though such a valuation may be quite costly and time-
consuming. It might be worth considering the possibility of 
asking Member States to inform the Commission as soon 
as the decision on the principle of privatization is made, 
with a view to the joint appointment of an independent 
consultant. The valuation made by this consultant would 
Joseph Gilchrist and David Deacon are senior officials in the Com-
mission's Directorate-General for Competition with great experience of 
State aid policy. The views expressed in the paper quoted here, although 
not necessarily representing the official position of the Commission, are 
therefore of considerable interest. 
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guide both the Member State in its negotiations with pur-
chasers and the Commission in its examination of the ulti-
mate transaction. 
An interesting contribution from outside the Community 
institutions towards the debate on State aids is to be found 
in a recent report by a committee of the Dutch Social and 
Economic Council9 which makes several further proposals 
for improving the control of State aids. On the general legal 
and procedural framework, the committee proposes that the 
Commission should be given clear powers to investigate 
suspected aid cases by examining the records of public autho-
rities and also, in extreme cases,. the books of firms which 
may have benefited from aid. The report also notes that the 
Commission normally only publishes detailed information 
on aids which are the subject of investigation under the 
procedure laid down in Article 93(2) EEC. It recommends 
that more information should be published concerning aids 
which the Commission has approved without initiating this 
procedure and that there should be improvements in the 
legal right of interested parties to appeal against approval 
decisions. 10 
On export aids, the report suggests in particular that Mem-
ber States should end the practice of linking overseas devel-
opment aid to orders for their own products and services 
since this practice serves to disguise aid for domestic firms 
as aid for underdeveloped countries. 
Sociaal-Economische Raad (1991). 
10 Gilchrist and Deacon (1990) make similar recommendations. 
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The report's recommendations on R&D aids include a more 
precise definition of what is meant by the concept of 'near-
ness to the market-place', so as to reduce the possibility of 
disguising productive activity as R&D. The committee also 
proposes that the Commission should control the award of 
research contracts by public authorities and the transfer of 
R&D results at less than cost from public research bodies 
to undertakings. 
Gilchrist and Deacon (1990) take a much more radical 
line on aid for R&D. They suggest that such aid is often 
unnecessary for the achievement of the Community's goals, 
since 'most R&D aid is probably spent on projects that 
would go ahead anyway'. Furthermore, they argue that R& 
D resources are in inelastic supply in the short and medium 
term, so that aided projects may simply crowd out unaided 
ones without any overall benefit to the Community. They 
conclude that the money would be better spent on a general 
reduction in corporate taxes. As a second-best solution, they 
suggest general tax relief for R&D expenditure, without any 
conditions as to the nature of the projects undertaken. 
Finally, Gilchrist and Deacon suggest that the Commission 
should concentrate much more of its efforts on overseeing 
the aids given to the Community's 1 500 largest firms, since 
aid to these firms is likely to have a disproportionate impact 
on trade and competition. They discuss the possibility of an 
outright ban on all aid to such firms except that granted 
under approved regional and R&D schemes. However, they 
conclude that such a ban might be too rigid and might 
require new legal powers, which the Council is unlikely to 
grant. 
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Chapter 8 
The international dimension 
8.1. Introduction 
The liberalization of trade has in principle been recognized 
as a major source of potential welfare improvements due 
to a specialization of production guided by comparative 
advantages, but also to a greater variety of goods available 
to consumers, faster dissipation of technical progress and 
greater dynamism induced by international competitive 
pressures. 
Thus after the Second World War global, regional and 
bilateral efforts to create and strengthen a liberal trade 
system never ceased. But whereas trade liberalization almost 
always creates a potential for global welfare improvement, 
the size and the distribution of the gains depend on many 
factors and can be affected by government intervention. On 
the one hand governments may be induced to use 'strategic 
trade policy' to divert gains to the domestic economy or just 
to powerful domestic producers. On the other hand, as 
opening to trade implies losses in some sectors, governments 
are permanently under pressure to provide relief in the form 
of, for example, quotas to restrict imports quantitatively, 
voluntary export restraint agreements, countervailing or 
anti-dumping duties, non-tariff barriers in the form of dom-
estic technical standards or domestic public procurement, or 
by means of subsidies. These pressures are difficult to resist 
in particular if foreign governments or enterprises are per-
ceived as using unfair trading practices.1 Thus trade lib-
eralization is inextricably linked to the creation of a system 
of credible surveillance of national policies to assure a 'level 
playing field'. Otherwise there is the permanent threat that 
the potential gains from trade may evaporate under a bar-
rage of trade interventions and counter-interventions. 
In recognition of this link efforts to liberalize trade have been 
accompanied by attempts to supervise national interventions 
which may affect trade. The form and extent of such super-
vision depend on the willingness of the parties involved to 
trade off the potential gains from free trade against the 
implied reduction of national sovereignty. 
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Even if an export subsidy may actually improve the welfare of the 
importing country - see Chapter 3.3. 
8.2. Specific international agreements 
Only the European Community has developed a comprehen-
sive internal competition policy disciplining certain activities 
by national governments or enterprises and transferring an 
important part of policy authority to the supranational 
leve!.2 Vis-a-vis foreign trading partners the Member States 
have ceded their national powers over anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy policies to the European Community. 
Community procedures3 follow current GA TT practice (see 
below). They allow an EC industry which is affected by 
subsidized or dumped imports to seek measures to redress 
the injury, such as for example price undertakings or 
countervailing duties. The administrative responsibility is 
divided between the Commission, the Council and the Mem-
ber States. The Commission investigates and determines 
whether there is sufficient evidence of a subsidy or of dump-
ing, of material injury and of a causal link between them, 
to justify initiating a proceeding. It may impose provisional 
anti-dumping duties for up to six months. Only the Council 
can, based on a Commission proposal, order the imposition 
of definitive duties. Member States are closely associated 
with the proceedings in the context of the Advisory Commit-
tee which is consulted by the Commission. Finally, appeals 
may be filed against decisions made in the course of the 
proceedings with the Court of Justice. 
Other international agreements rely on different combi-
nations of monitoring and disciplining, defining some nor-
mative criteria for potentially trade-distorting policies, limit-
ing recourse to countervailing interventions and providing 
for dispute settlement mechanisms. 
The US-Canada Free Trade Agreement4 for example, which 
entered into force on I January 1989 and which has the 
objective of establishing a free trade area between the two 
countries within 10 years, has so far only created a bi-
national structure for resolving disputes arising out of each 
country's application of its own countervailing duty laws 
and established a working group to seek to develop a system 
of rules dealing with unfair pricing and subsidization. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) plays an important role in the discussion of 
the theory and practice of subsidy policies of the indus-
trialized countries. Its Industry Committee has for many 
4 
See Chapters 5 to 7. 
Currently based upon Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 
1988 and Commission Decision 2177 /84/ECSC for coal and steel. 
Hufbauer (1989). 
years compiled information on national subsidy programmes 
and is trying to provide a classification according to their 
economic impacts. Full transparency and agreement on 
norms for national subsidy policies have not yet been 
achieved. But the OECD countries have reached an under-
standing on the minimum interest rates which should be 
applied for national export credits;5 these minimum rates 
are calculated and published by the OECD bi-annually for 
the main international currencies. 
The European Free Trade Association (EFT A) has defined 
general principles under which government aids are allowed 
and the conditions under which tpey contradict the spirit of 
their agreement (Article 13 of the Stockholm Convention). 
The EFT A Council periodically issues interpretations of 
these principles. Since 1987 member countries are required 
to notify the Secretariat on planned aid measures; once a 
year the countries must also report on past aid measures. 
On the basis of this information the Secretariat prepares its 
annual report to the Council on government aids within 
EFT A, but it has no resources to monitor and verify the 
information it receives. The measures are surveyed by the 
Association's Committee of Trade Experts, consisting of 
representatives from member States. There is no effective 
enforcement mechanism of Article 13: the EFT A Council 
may issue a recommendation which is, however, non-bind-
ing; at most, it can authorize a member State to take the 
counter-measures available through GA TT proceedings. 
The sparse surveillance of subsidies in EFT A may be due 
to the limited importance of intra-EFT A trade for EFT A 
members: in 1987 only 14 % ofEFTA exports were destined 
for other EFT A nations; by contrast, some 59 % were di-
rected to the European Community. The creation of a Euro-
pean economic space between the EC and the EFT A will 
certainly imply stronger surveillance of EFT A subsidies. 
Under discussion is a 'two-pillar' model: the EFT A would 
set up a surveillance of domestic subsidies identical to EC 
rules and procedures. This would enable the EC to abandon 
the possibility of applying countervailing duties. Differences 
between the EC and EFT A on the application of the rules 
would be settled by consultation with a joint court as final 
arbiter. 
8.3. The existing GATT subsidy rules 
The broadest attempt to introduce international surveillance 
over trade-distorting government interventions is under-
taken within the framework of the General Agreement on 
It is, however, somewhat odd to achieve an 'understanding' on limits 
to export subsidies which the GA IT signatories have agreed to abolish 
altogether (see Chapter 8.3). 
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Tariffs and Trade (GA TT). It establishes at the same time 
a certain discipline on unilateral measures against imports 
and on subsidies. Article VI permits the imposition of 
countervailing duties (CVDs) to offset 'any bounty or sub-
sidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, 
on the manufacture, production or export of such product', 
but only after material injury to domestic industry has been 
established and not in excess of the subsidy. Article XVI 
requires notification of all trade-relevant subsidies and, in 
case of serious prejudice, consultation among the parties 
concerned. Furthermore, from 1958 the signatories should 
seek to avoid the use of export subsidies for primary products 
and shall cease export subsidies for non-primary products. 
Subsequently a list was agreed upon of practices defined as 
export subsidies. Article XXIII provides in principle the 
possibility to authorize counter-measures if a signatory fails 
to carry out its obligations. Thus the GA TT cannot directly 
intervene in the policy of a signatory - contrary to the EC 
policy on State aids; it can only attempt to enforce its rules 
on subsidies by means of authorizing counter-measures. 
Experience indicated that better interpretation of these gen-
eral provisions was required to make them workable. A 
'subsidies Code' was negotiated on the interpretation and 
application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII during the Tokyo 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1974-79). In June 
1989 there were 25 signatories to the Code including the 
USA, the EC and Japan. 
The Code does not establish rules which are different from 
the basic GA TT articles, but it attempts to make them more 
precise and to improve the links between them:6 with regard 
to subsidies it underlines the prohibition of export subsidies 
except for agricultural products7 and recommends restraint 
in the use of domestic subsidies that adversely affect the 
imerest of other members. If a country can establish that 
any subsidy caused material injury to a domestic industry in 
its domestic market it may unilaterally impose countervailing 
duties but is bound to follow certain procedures ('track 1 '); 
the Code provides general guidelines for such procedures, 
regulates the type of compensatory measures that can be 
imposed, sets forth broad criteria for the determination of 
adverse trade effects and calls for consultation among the 
parties. An alternative approach ('track 2') is multilateral: 
if a signatory considers any subsidy to be inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Code, it can invoke a dispute settlement 
procedure; at the end the Committee of the signatories may 
Without achieving full consistency: it may still be that a subsidy is legal 
under the Code - because it is 'domestic' - and the countervailing 
duty against that subsidy is legal as well - because of injury to a 
domestic industry (Finger (1987), p. 154). 
Including forestry and fishery. 
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authorize appropriate counter-measures. But the dispute 
settlement is based on consensus which can be blocked by the 
losing party. Special provisions are granted for developing 
countries. 
The Code's main success has been the clarification of pro-
cedures for countervailing duties. It is still plagued, however, 
by the unresolved fundamental difference between the USA 
in particular and other countries on the legitimacy of dom-
estic subsidies and of unilateral counter-measures: 'to the 
United States, the Code is an instrument to control subsidies. 
To the rest of the world, it is an instrument to control 
US countervailing duties'. 8 The economic argument for a 
differentiated treatment of domestic subsidies is that some 
subsidies may be distortion-correcting in cases of market 
failure and not distort efficient trade flows;9 a countervailing 
measure against such subsidies would therefore not be justi-
fied. But in practice it may be difficult to fine-tune subsidies 
sufficiently to ensure that the correcting effects outweigh the 
distorting effects. 
The fundamental difference manifests itself in different in-
terpretations of the provisions of the Code, e.g. on definition 
and measurement of a subsidy, definition of primary and 
non-primary products (for example the cases of wheat flour 
and pasta), the definition of domestic industry or the deter-
mination of injury, which led to many trade frictions and 
disputes before the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. 
8.4. Subsidies in the Uruguay Round 
The Code was therefore put to review at the ongoing Urug-
uay Round of GA TT negotiations with the objective set in 
the Punta Del Este declaration of improving GA TT disci-
plines relating to all subsidies and countervailing measures 
that affect international trade. The controversial question of 
subsidies in agriculture was referred to a separate negotiating 
group; the discussion in other groups, in particular on anti-
dumping, but also on services and trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs), also overlap to some extent with the 
negotiations on the subsidies Code. 
Several countries have submitted contributions to the nego-
tiations on subsidies. The proposal of the United States of 
America underlines its desire to broaden the category of 
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Messerlin (1986), p. 16. 
For details see Chapter 3. 
prohibited subsidies and to facilitate the use of 
countervailing duties. It suggests a 'traffic light' proposal 
distinguishing between a prohibited 'red light' category of 
subsidies, actionable 'yellow light' subsidies and permitted 
'green light' subsidies. The 'red light' category is to cover 
not only export subsidies in the broadest sense, but also all 
domestic subsidies exceeding a certain percentage of a firm's 
total sales; against such subsidies the importing country 
should be able to impose CVDs without having to establish 
injury. 'Green light' should be given only to general govern-
ment measures, e.g. provision of infrastructure. Subsidies in 
between should not be permitted or prohibited outright, but 
should be actionable if material injury can be established. 
The position of the European Community submitted in 
November 1989 applies a similar distinction between pro-
hibited subsidies, non-prohibited but actionable subsidies 
and non-actionable government interventions. But it sug-
gests that the existing approach to consider only export 
subsidies on products other than certain primary products 
as prohibited per se should be continued, and the injury test 
should still be required for a countervailing duty. It stresses 
that the current code establishes that domestic subsidies are 
per se legitimate instruments of social and economic policy 
and may only be subject to counter-measures if their negative 
effect on trade interests of other countries has been demon-
strated; it suggests more precise criteria for judging whether 
a government measure is in fact a subsidy, whether it is 
specific and how to establish a negative trade effect. Further-
more, certain subsidies which do not significantly affect 
international trade should not be actionable at all: subsidies 
which do not exceed a certain percentage of sales (a de 
minimis threshold of x% ad valorem), regional aids to com-
pensate for locational disadvantages, aid for generally avail-
able research and development, environmental aid, aid for 
energy savings, temporary aid for structural adjustment and 
aid improving security and diversification of energy supply. 
In May 1990 Mr Cartland of Hong Kong, the chairman of 
the Subsidies Negotiation Group, tabled a draft text re-
flecting the different submissions and some of his own ideas. 
It follows the 'traffic light' approach. 
It limits the category of 'prohibited subsidies' to the current 
illustrative list of export subsidies, possibly with some 
amendments, subsidies contingent on export performance 
and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic rather than 
imported goods as inputs (e.g. local content requirements); 
if the Subsidy Committee found a national subsidy to fall in 
this category, other signatories could take counter-measures. 
Other subsidies would be considered 'actionable' if they 
caused adverse effects to other signatories, in particular if 
they caused injury to a domestic industry or caused serious 
prejudice, the latter being presumed if the overall rate of 
subsidization exceeded x% ad valorem, was contingent on 
trade performance or was granted to firms exporting x% or 
more of their production; the country granting the subsidy 
could rebut this presumption. This attempt to give content 
to the term 'serious prejudice' is the key new feature of the 
Cartland draft. If the Subsidies Committee finds adverse 
effects, counter-measures may be authorized. 
'Non-actionable' are to be those subsidies which are either 
generally available or meet all of the following four criteria: 
the subsidy is for the purpose of regional development, 
pre-competitive R&D, environmental protection or worker 
adjustment assistance; the subsidy is limited in time and 
degressive; it is notified in advance and no signatory can 
demonstrate adverse effects. Furthermore, if a non-action-
able subsidy in the second subcategory causes serious or 
Chapter 8 - The international dimension 
long-lasting adverse effects the affected signatory could still 
resort to the remedy procedures for actionable subsidies. 
The Cartland draft has so far met with considerable oppo-
sition from both the USA and the EC which had not been 
overcome when the Uruguay Round was adjourned in De-
cember 1990, mainly due to the lack of agreement on agricul-
tural subsidies. If that specific problem can be resolved, there 
may be two possible outcomes to successfully conclude the 
negotiations of the Subsidies Group: an intermediate pack-
age with fewer categories of subsidies on the green list 
and a rather high threshold for the assumption of 'serious 
prejudice' or at least a 'mini-deal' where both the green list 
and the quantitative threshold for 'serious prejudice' would 
be dropped, but other elements of the draft (more precise 
definitions and procedures) could still provide some im-
provement. Both outcomes would be superior to the main-
tenance of the status quo, which would imply continuing 
tensions arising from the vagueness of existing rules and 
from the possibility of unilateral interpretations. 
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A - Provisions of the ECSC Treaty 
Article 4 
The following are recognized as incompatible with the com-
mon market for coal and steel and shall accordingly be 
abolished and prohibited within the Community, as provided 
in this Treaty: 
(a) import and export duties, or charges having equivalent 
effect, and quantitative restrictions on the movement of 
products; 
(b) measures or practices which discriminate between pro-
ducers, between purchasers or between consumers, es-
pecially in prices and delivery terms or transport rates 
and conditions, and measures or pratices which interfere 
with the purchaser's free choice of supplier; 
(c) subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges 
imposed by States, in any form whatsoever; 
(d) restrictive practices which tend towards the sharing or 
exploiting of markets. 
Article 54 
The High Authority may facilitate the carrying out of invest-
ment programmes by granting loans to undertakings or by 
guaranteeing other loans which they may contract. 
With the unanimous assent of the Council, the High Autho-
rity may by the same means assist the financing of works 
and installations which contribute directly and primarily to 
increasing the production, reducing the production costs or 
facilitating the marketing of products within its jurisdiction. 
In order to encourage coordinated development of invest-
ment, the High Authority may, in accordance with 
Article 47, require undertakings to inform it of individual 
programmes in advance, either by a special request addressed 
to the undertaking concerned or by a decision stating what 
kind and scale of programme must be communicated. 
The High Authority may, after giving the parties concerned 
full opportunity to submit their comments, deliver a reas-
oned opinion on such programmes within the framework of 
the general objectives provided for in Article 46. If appli-
cation is made by the undertaking concerned, the High 
Authority must deliver a reasoned opinion. The High Autho-
rity shall notify the opinion to the undertaking concerned 
and shall bring the opinion to the attention of its Govern-
ment. Lists of such opinions shall be published. 
If the High Authority finds that the financing of a pro-
gramme or the operation of the installations therein planned 
would involve subsidies, aids, protection or discrimination 
contrary to this Treaty, the adverse opinion delivered by it 
on these grounds shall have the force of a decision within 
the meaning of Article 14 and the effect of prohibiting the 
undertaking concerned from drawing on resources other 
than its own funds to carry out the programme. 
The High Authority may impose on undertakings which 
disregard the prohibition referred to in the preceding para-
graph fines not exceeding the amounts improperly devoted 
to carrying out the programme in question. 
Article 67 
I. Any action by a Member State which is liable to have 
appreciable repercussions on conditions of competition in 
the coal or the steel industry shall be brought to the know-
ledge of the High Authority by the Government concerned. 
2. If the action is liable, by substantially increasing differ-
ences in production costs otherwise than through changes 
in productivity, to provoke a serious disequilibrium, the 
High Authority, after consulting the Consultative Commit-
tee and the Council, may take the following steps: 
- if the action taken by that State is having harmful effects 
on the coal or steel uridertakings within the jurisdiction 
of that State, the High Authority may authorize it to 
grant aid to these undertakings, the amount, conditions 
and duration of which shall be determined in agreement 
with the High Authority. The same shall apply in the 
case of any change in wages and working conditions 
which would have the same effects, even if not resulting 
from any action by that State; 
- if the action taken by that State is having harmful effects 
on the coal or steel undertakings within the jurisdiction 
of other Member States, the High Authority shall make 
a recommendation to that State with a view to remedying 
these effects by such measures as that State may consider 
most compatible with its own economic equilibrium. 
3. If the action taken by that State reduces differences in 
production costs by allowing special benefits to or improsing 
special charges on the coal or steel undertakings within its 
jurisdiction in comparison with the other industries in the 
same country, the High Authority is empowered to make 
the necessary recommendations to that State after consulting 
the Consultative Committee and the Council. 
83 
Part I - Fair competition in the internal market: Community State aid policy 
Article 95 
In all cases not provided for in this Treaty where it becomes 
apparent that a decision or recommendation of the High 
Authority is necessary to attain, within the common market 
in coal and steel and in accordance with Article 5, one of 
the objectives of the Community set out in Articles 2, 3 and 
4, the decision may be taken or the recommendation made 
with the unanimous assent of the Council and after the 
Consultative Committee has been consulted. 
Any decision so taken or recommendation so made shall 
determine what penalties, if any, may be imposed. 
If, after the end of the transitional period provided in the 
Convention on the Transitional Provisions, unforeseen diffi-
culties emerging in the light of experience in the application 
of this Treaty, or fundamental economic or technical changes 
directly affecting the common market in coal and steel, make 
it necessary to adapt the rules for the High Authority's 
84 
exercise of its powers, appropriate amendments may be 
made; they must not, however, conflict with the provisions 
of Articles 2, 3 and 4 or interfere with the relationship 
between the powers of the High Authority and those of the 
other institutions of the Community. 
These amendments shall be proposed jointly by the High 
Authority and the Council, acting by a ten-twelfths majority 
of its members, and shall the submitted to the Court for its 
opinion. In considering them, the Court shall have full power 
to assess all points of fact and of law. If as a result of such 
consideration it finds the proposals compatible with the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph, they shall be for-
warded to the European Parliament and shall enter into 
force of approved by a majority of three-quarters of the 
votes cast and two-thirds of the members of the European 
Parliament. 1 
Fourth paragraph as amended by Article 13 of the Act of Accession of 
Spain and Portugal. 
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B - Provisions of the EEC Treaty 
Article 42 
The provisions of the Chapter relating to rules on compe-
tition shall apply to production of and trade in agricultural 
products only to the extent determined by the Council within 
the framework of Article 43(2) and (3) and in accordance 
with the procedure laid down therein, account being taken 
of the objectives set out in Article 39. 
The Council may, in particular, authorize the granting of 
aid: 
(a) for the protection of enterprises handicapped by struc-
tural or natural conditions; 
(b) within the framework of economic development pro-
grammes. 
Article 77 
Aids shall be compatible with this Treaty if they meet the 
needs of coordination of transport or if they represent reim-
bursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent 
in the concept of a public service. 
Article 90 
I. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Mem-
ber States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any 
measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in 
particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and 
Articles 85 to 94. 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest or having the character of a rev-
enue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules con-
tained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on compe-
tition, in so far as the application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular 
tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not 
be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the 
interests of the Community. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the pro-
visions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address 
appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. 
Article 92 
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the common market. 
2. The following shall be compatible with the common 
market: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual con-
sumers, provided that such aid is granted without dis-
crimination related to the origin of the products con-
cerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany affected by the division of 
Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to 
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by 
that division. 
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with 
the common market: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there 
is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project 
of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid 
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest. However, the aids 
granted to shipbuilding as of I January 1957 shall, in so 
far as they serve only to compensate for the absence of 
customs protection, be progressively reduced under the 
same conditions as apply to the elimination of customs 
duties, subject to the provisions of this Treaty concerning 
common commercial policy towards third countries; 
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by 
decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on 
a proposal from the Commission. 
Article 93 
1. The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member 
States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing 
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in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate 
measures required by the progressive development or by the 
functioning of the common market. 
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit 
their comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by 
a State or through State resources is not compatible with 
the common market having regard to Article 92, or that 
such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State 
conce~ed shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of 
time to be determined by the Commission. 
If the State concerned does not comply with this decision 
within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other 
interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of 
Articles 169 and 170, refer the matter to the Court of Justice 
direct. 
On application by a Member State, the Council, may, acting 
unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or 
intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with 
the common market, in derogation from the provisions of 
Article 92 or from the regulations provided for in Article 94, 
if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. 
If, as regards the aid in question, the Commission has already 
initiated the procedure provided for in the first subparagraph 
of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has 
made its application to the Council shall have the effect of 
suspending that procedure until the Council has made its 
attitude known. 
If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known 
within three months of the said application being made, the 
Commission shall give its decision on the case. 
3. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to 
enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or 
alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible 
with the common market having regard to Article 92, it 
shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in 
paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its 
proposed measures into effect until this procedure has re-
sulted in a final decision. 
Article 94 
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a pro-
posal from the Commission, make any appropriate regu-
lations for the application of Articles 92 and 93 and may in 
particular determine the conditions in which Article 93(3) 
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shall apply and the categories of aid exempted from this 
procedure. 
Article 101 
Where the Commission finds that a difference between the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States is distorting the conditions of 
competition in the common market and that the resultant 
distortion needs to be eliminated, it shall consult the Member 
States concerned. 
If such consultation does not result in an agreement eliminat-
ing the distortion in question, the Council shall, on a pro-
posal from the Commission, acting unanimously during the 
first stage and by a qualified majority thereafter, issue the 
necessary directives. The Commission and the Council may 
take any other appropriate measures provided for in this 
Treaty. 
Article 102 
1. Where there is reason to fear that the adoption or amend-
ment ofa provision laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action may cause distortion within the meaning of 
Article IOI, a Member State desiring to proceed therewith 
shall consult the Commission. After consulting the Member 
States, the Commission shall recommend to the States con-
cerned such measures as may be appropriate to avoid the 
distortion in question. 
2. If a State desiring to introduce or amend its own pro-
visions does not comply with the recommendation addressed 
to it by the Commission, other Member States shall not be 
required, in pursuance of Article IOI, to amend their own 
provisions in order to eliminate such distortion. If the Mem-
ber State which has ignored the recommendation of the 
Commission causes distortion detrimental only to itself, the 
provisions of Article IOI shall not apply. 
Article 112 
I. Without prejudice to obligations undertaken by them 
within the framework of other international organizations, 
Member States shall, before the end of the transitional 
period, progressively harmonize the systems whereby they 
grant aid for exports to third countries, to the extent necess-
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ary to ensure that competition between undertakings of the 
Community is not distorted. 
On a proposal from the Commission, the Council, shall, 
acting unanimously until the end of the second stage and by 
a qualified majority thereafter, issue any directives needed 
for this purpose. 
2. The preceding provisions shall not apply to such draw-
back of customs duties or charges having equivalent effect 
nor to such repayment of indirect taxation including turn-
over taxes, excise duties and other indirect taxes as is allowed 
when goods are exported from a Member State to a third 
country, in so far as such drawback or repayment does not 
exceed the amount imposed, directly or indirectly, on the 
products exported. 
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C - Transparency of financial 
relations between 
Member States 
and public undertakings 
Commission Directive 80/723/EEC1 of 25 June 
1980 on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Econ-
omic Community, and in particular Article 90 (3) thereof, 
Whereas public undertakings play a substantial role in the 
national economy of the Member States; 
Whereas the Treaty in no way prejudices the rules governing 
the system of property ownership in Member States and 
equal treatment of private and public undertakings must 
therefore be ensured; 
Whereas the Treaty requires the Commission to ensure that 
Member States do not grant undertakings, public or private, 
aids incompatible with the common market; 
Whereas, however, the complexity of the financial relations 
between national public authorities and public undertakings 
tends to hinder the performance of this duty; 
Whereas a fair and effective application of the aid rules in 
the Treaty to both public and private undertakings will be 
possible only if these financial relations are made trans-
parent; 
Whereas such transparency applied to public undertakings 
should enable a clear distinction to be made between the 
role of the State as public authority and its role as proprietor; 
Whereas Article 90 (I) confers certain obligations on the 
Member States in respect of public undertakings; whereas 
Article 90 (3) requires the Commission to ensure that these 
obligations are respected, and provides it with the requisite 
OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. 
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means to this end; whereas this entails defining the con-
ditions for achieving transparency; 
Whereas it should be made clear what is to be understood 
by the terms 'public authorities' and 'public undertakings'; 
Whereas public authorities may exercise a dominant influ-
ence on the behaviour of public undertakings not only where 
they are the proprietor or have a majority participation 
but also by virtue of powers they hold in management or 
supervisory bodies as a result either of the rules governing 
the undertaking or of the manner in which the shareholdings 
are distributed; 
Whereas the provision of public funds to public undertakings 
may take place either directly or indirectly; whereas trans-
parency must be achieved irrespective of the manner in which 
such provision of public funds is made; whereas it may also 
be necessary to ensure that adequate information is made 
available as regards the reasons for such provision of public 
funds and their actual use; 
Whereas Member States may through their public undertak-
ings seek ends other than commercial ones; whereas in some 
cases public undertakings are compensated by the State for 
financial burdens assumed by them as a result; whereas 
transparency should also be ensured in the case of such 
compensation; 
Whereas certain undertakings should be excluded from the 
application of this Directive by virtue either of the nature 
of their activities or of the size of their turnover; whereas 
this applies to certain activities which stand outside the 
sphere of competition or which are already covered by speci-
fic Community measures which ensure adequate trans-
parency, to public undertakings belonging to sectors of ac-
tivity for which distinct provision should be made, and to 
those whose business is not conducted on such a scale as to 
justify the administrative burden of ensuring transparency; 
Whereas this Directive is without prejudice to other pro-
visions of the Treaty, notably Articles 90 (2), 93 and 223; 
Whereas, the undertakings in question being in competition 
with other undertakings, information acquired should be 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy; 
Whereas this Directive must be applied in close cooperation 
with the Member States, and where necessary be revised in 
the light of experience, 
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HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
The Member States shall ensure that financial relations 
between public authorities and public undertakings are 
transparent as provided in this Directive, so that the follow-
ing emerge clearly; 
(a) public funds made available directly by public authorities 
to the public undertakings concerned; 
(b) public funds made available by public authorities 
through the intermediary of public undertakings or financial 
institutions; 
(c) the use to which these public funds are actually put. 
Article 2 
For the purpose of this Directive: 
- 'public authorities' means: 
the State and regional or local authorities, 
- 'public undertakings' means: 
any undertaking over which the public authorities may 
exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by 
virtue of their ownership of it, their financial partici-
pation therein, or the rules which govern it. 
A dominant influence on the part of the public authorities 
shall be presumed when these authorities, directly or in-
directly in relation to an undertaking: 
(a) hold the major part of the undertaking's subscribed 
capital; 
or 
(b) control the maJonty of the votes attaching to shares 
issued by the undertakings; 
or 
(c) can appoint more than half of the members of the under-
taking's administrative, managerial or supervisory body. 
Article 3 
The transparency referred to in Article I shall apply in 
particular to the following aspects of financial relations 
between public authorities and public undertakings: 
(a) the setting-off of operating losses, 
(b) the provision of capital, 
(c) non-refundable grants, or loans on privileged terms, 
(d) the granting of financial advantages by forgoing profits 
or the recovery of sums due, 
(e) the foregoing of a normal return on public funds used, 
(f) compensation for financial burdens imposed by the pub-
lic authorities. 
Article 4 
This Directive shall not apply to financial relations between 
the public authorities and 
(a) public undertakings, as regards services the supply of 
which is not liable to affect trade between Member States 
to an appreciable extent; 
(b) public undertakings, as regards activities carried on in 
any of the following areas: 
- water and energy, including in the case of nuclear energy 
the production and enrichment of uranium, the re-pro-
cessing of irradiated fuels and the preparation of ma-
terials containing plutonium, 
- posts and telecommunications, 
- transport; 
(c) public credit institutions; 
(d) public undertakings whose turnover excluding taxes has 
not reached a total of ECU 40 million during the two 
financial years preceding that in which the funds referred to 
in Article I are made available or used. 
Article 5 
1. Member States shall ensure that information concerning 
the financial relations referred to in Article I be kept at the 
disposal of the Commission for five years from the end of 
the financial year in which the public funds were made 
available to the public undertakings concerned. However, 
where the same funds are used during a later financial 
year, the five-year time-limit shall run from the end of that 
financial year. 
2. Member States shall, where the Commission considers it 
necessary so to request, supply to it the information referred 
to in paragraph 1, together with any necessary background 
information, notably the objectives pursued. 
Article 6 
l. The Commission shall not disclose such information sup-
plied to it pursuant to Article 5 (2) as is of a kind covered 
by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
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2. Paragraph I shall not prevent publication of general 
information of surveys which do not contain information 
relating to particular public undertakings to which this Di-
rective applies. 
Article 7 
The Commission shall regularly inform the Member States 
of the results of the operation of this Directive. 
Article 8 
Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply 
with the Directive by 31 December 1981. They shall inform 
the Commission thereof. 
Article 9 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 25 June 1988. 
Commission Directive 85/413/EEC1 of 24 July 
1985 amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the 
transparency of financial relations between Mem-
ber States and public undertakings 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Econ-
omic Community, and in particular Article 90 (3) thereof, 
Whereas Article 4 (b) and (c) of Commission Directive 
80/723/EECZ excludes from its scope public undertakings 
carrying on activities in the sectors of water and energy, 
posts and telecommunications, transport and public credit 
institutions; 
Whereas public undertakings operating in these sectors play 
an important role in the economies of the Member States; 
whereas the need for transparency of financial relations 
between the Member States and public undertakings in cer-
tain sectors previously excluded has proved greater than 
90 
OJ L 229, 28.8.1985. 
OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. 
before in view of developments in the competitive situation 
in the sectors concerned and the progress made towards 
closer economic integration; 
Whereas equal treatment of public and private undertakings 
must also be ensured in these sectors; whereas in particular 
transparency of financial relations between the Member 
States and public undertakings in these sectors must be 
established for the same reasons and to the same extent as 
for the undertakings covered by Directive 88/723/EEC; 
Whereas the Commission is required by the Treaty to ensure 
that Member States do not grant undertakings, whether 
public or private, in the said sectors aids incompatible with 
the common market; 
Whereas the Commission advised the Member States when 
notifying Directive 80/723/EEC to them that the exclusion 
of these sectors was only temporary; 
Whereas by virtue of Article 232 (I) of the EEC Treaty the 
provisions of that Treaty shall not affect those of the ECSC 
Treaty; whereas the ECSC Treaty contains special provisions 
governing the obligations of Member States as far as public 
undertakings and aid are concerned; whereas Article 90 of 
the EEC Treaty is therefore inapplicable to public undertak-
ings carrying on activities coming under the ECSC Treaty; 
Whereas by virtue of Article 232 (2) of the EEC Treaty the 
provisions of that Treaty shall not derogate from those of 
the Euratom Treaty, but whereas the latter does not contain 
any special provisions on public undertakings or aid; 
whereas Article 90 of the EEC Treaty therefore applies to 
the nuclear energy field; 
Whereas the transparency of the Member States' financial 
relations with public undertakings in the rail, road and 
inland waterway transport sectors is already regulated to a 
considerable extent by legislation enacted by the Council; 
whereas this Directive is without prejudice to that legislation; 
Whereas Directive 80/723/EEC contains provisions, particu-
larly in Articles 3 and 5, which may facilitate the Com-
mission's task in meeting the obligations it has assumed 
under the said Council legislation, in particular as regards 
the preparation of periodical reports on the performance of 
those public undertakings; 
Whereas the scope of Directive 80/723/EEC should therefore 
be extened to cover all the transport sector; 
Whereas Member States' financial relations with credit insti-
tutions belonging to the public sector are also covered by 
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this Directive; whereas, however, the Directive should not 
apply to Member States' relations with central banks which 
are responsible for the conduct of monetary policy; 
Whereas public authorities often deposit short-term funds 
with public credit institutions on normal commercial terms; 
whereas such deposits do not confer special advantages on 
the credit institutions and should therefore not be covered 
by the Directive; 
Whereas the economic importance of credit institutions does 
not depend on their turnover but on their balance-sheet 
total; whereas the threshold laid down in Article 4 (d) of 
Directive 80/723/EEC should therefore be set as far as credit 
institutions are concerned by reference to that criterion, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Article 4 of Directive 80/723/EEC is hereby replaced by the 
following: 
'Article 4 
This Directive shall not apply to financial relations between 
the public authorities and: 
(a) public undertakings, as regards services the supply of 
which is not liable to affect trade between Member States 
to an appreciable extent; 
(b) central banks and the Institut Monetaire Luxembour-
geois; 
(c) public credit institutions, as regards deposits of public 
funds placed with them by public authorities on normal 
commercial terms; 
(d) public undertakings whose total turnover before tax over 
the period of the two financial years preceding that in which 
the funds referred to in Article I are made available or used 
has been less than ECU 40 million. However, for public 
credit institutions the corresponding threshold shall be a 
balance-sheet total of ECU 800 million'. 
Article 2 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply 
with this Directive by I January I 986. They shall inform the 
Commission thereof. 
Article 3 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 24 July 1985. 
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D - Regional aid 
Commission communicationJ on the method for 
the application of Article 92(3) (a) and (c) to 
regional aid 
On 21 December 1978 the Commission informed the Mem-
ber States of the principles which in accordance with the 
powers vested in the Commission by Article 92 et seq. of the 
EEC Treaty, it would apply to regional aid systems in force 
or to be established in the regions of the Community. These 
principles were set out in the form of a communication 
which was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities.2 This communication partly redefined the 
principles of coordination already established3 and amended 
and supplemented the methods for their implementation, 
including the common method of evaluation of the intensity 
of aid. 
In its 1979 communication the Commission established a 
number of differentiated ceilings of aid intensity for various 
categories of region in order to avoid the bidding up of aid 
level in the wake of the removal of customs and trade 
barriers inside the common market. The very nature of 
regional aid requires that it be awarded selectively. Many 
regions in the Community do not need regional aid. Regions 
that are shown to need assistance should receive aid in 
proportion to the gravity of the regional imbalances they 
face. The ceilings set out in the communication are intended 
to act as maximum limits reflecting the nature and gravity 
of regional problems across the Community. Within these 
parameters the Member States notify proposed levels of 
regional aid to the Commission, often at lower levels, which 
subsequently approves or amends them in its decisions under 
Articles 92 and 93. 
Article 92(3) provides two distinct possibilities where the 
Commission may consider regional aid compatible with the 
common market - Articles 92(3) (a) and (c) which apply to 
different degrees of regional disadvantage. The Commission 
adopted a method for the application of Article 92(3) (c) in 
1983 and this method has been used for all the decisions 
which the Commission has taken since then. 
Only occasional use has been made of Article 92(3) (a) when 
approving national regional aid in the past. However, suc-
cessive enlargements of the Community have broadened the 
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range of its regional diversity and confirmed the need to 
develop new policy instruments for the control of regional 
aid. At the same time Article 130 of the Single European 
Act gives a new impetus to greater economic and social 
cohesion and provides that in particular the Community 
shall aim at reducing disparities between various regions and 
the backwardness of the least-favoured regions. In response 
to these needs the Commission has in 1983 adopted a method 
for the application of Article 92(3) (a) to national regional 
aid. 
In order to promote a greater understanding and trans-
parency of the decisions taken by the Commission under 
Articles 92 and 93 with respect to national regional aid 
systems, the Commission, with the support of the European 
Parliament, has decided to publish its methods of assessment 
which are described below. 
I. Method for the application of Article 
92(3) (a) to national regional aid 
Article 92(3) (a) provides that aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnor-
mally low or where there is serious underemployment may 
be considered compatible with the common market. 
1. Principles of method 
In applying Article 92(3) (a) the Commission bases its de-
cisions on a method of assessing the relative level of develop-
ment of different regions compared to the Community aver-
age. The method is based on the following principles: 
- the socio-economic situation of Article 92(3) (a) regions 
is assessed primarily by reference to per capita GDP/PPS 
using the Community index for the region; 
- regions are assessed on the basis of NUTS 1 level III 
geographical units; 
- the relative level of regional development is compared to 
the Community average; 
- regions to be classified as Article 92(3) (a) regions are 
those regions where a majority of the level III regions 
located in a level II region have a GDP/PPS threshold 
of 75 or lower thus indicating an abnormally low stan-
dard of living and serious underemployment. 
Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units. There are 822 NUTS 
level III regions in the Community of Twelve. 
Appendix - Selected documents concerning the control of State aids 
2. Choice of indicators 
The method uses GDP per capita measured in purchasing 
power standards (PPS), a measure based on a comparison 
of the prices in the Member States for the same sample of 
production and services. This provides a method of measur-
ing living standards which allows for differences in the cost 
of living between the regions of different Member States. 
Underemployment concerns all those who are not fully em-
ployed in some way. In general, where underemployment is 
great, productive output will tend to be low and as such will 
also be reflected in GDP data. For the areas concerned-pre-
dominantly rural areas with an underdeveloped industrial 
base or a limited level of service activities-unemployment 
statistics are not a satisfactory measure of underemploy-
ment. The general low level of technology in the industrial 
infrastructure and the unsophisticated range of service ac-
tivities lead to a relative emphasis on labour in the productive 
process. This can mask a significant level of underemploy-
ment which remains unrevealed by unemployment data. 
3. Geographical unit 
The basic geographical unit used in the analysis is the 
level III region. However, for the purposes of determining 
eligibility as a 92(3) (a) region, reference is made to the 
situation of the majority of level III regions in the larger 
Oevel II) region. This allows the situation of an individual 
level III region which differs sharply from the surrounding 
regions to be taken into account. If a relatively favourable 
region is located in an otherwise backward area, it can be 
included under 92(3) (a) provided a majority of the level III 
regions in the corresponding level II region satisfy the GDP/ 
PPS threshold requirement. On the other hand, however, a 
more disavantaged region will be excluded if this requirement 
is not satisfied. 
A list of the regions selected by this method is attached in 
Annex I. It can be seen that these regions lie mainly on the 
southern and western periphery of the Community. 
4. Exceptional regions 
In addition to the regions selected by the above method, two 
further regions have been added to the list in order to take 
account of their exceptional situations. One is Northern 
Ireland because of its particularly difficult situation. The 
other is Teruel which, although adjacent to other more 
developed regions, is one of the most underdeveloped regions 
in Spain, is very sparsely populated, has a high level of 
dependence on agriculture and neighbours other 92(3) (a) 
regions. 
5. Aid ceilings 
The 1979 principles of coordination set 75% net grant equiv-
alent of initial investment as the highest permissible aid 
intensity. It has therefore been decided to fix 75% net grant 
equivalent as the ceiling on aid intensity which will apply 
in 92(3) (a) areas. 
The principles of coordination I provide that ceilings of aid 
intensity must be adapted according to the kind, intensity 
or urgency of the regional problems. Whilst all 92(3) (a) 
regions have severe regional problems relative to a Com-
munity standard, significant disparities in living standards 
and underemployment may exist between regions inside the 
same Member State. 
Consequently, the Commission will use its discretionary 
power to require a regional differentiation in aid intensity 
below 75% NGE. As such the relevant ceiling of aid intensity 
for a regional aid system will be the maximum notified by 
the Member State to the Commission in accordance with 
Article 93(3) and approved by the Commission when making 
its subsequent decision under Articles 92 and 93. 
6. The range of aid instruments required to promote re-
gional development in Article 92( 3) ( a) areas 
Regional aid in the Community can be broadly divided into 
two categories: aid linked to initial investment or job 
creation and that of a continuing character, designed to 
overcome particular or permanent disadvantages (operating 
aid). 
Given the severe disadvantages of 92(3) (a) regions, aid 
linked to initial investment may not always be suitable or 
sufficient to attract investment into the region or to allow 
indigenous economic activity to develop. Companies located 
in these regions typically face additional cost burdens be-
cause of location and infrastructure deficiencies which can 
permanently hamper their competitiveness. Under certain 
conditions, some operating aid can bring a positive benefit 
to the poorest parts of the Community. Firstly, some regions 
may experience such serious cost and infrastructural disad-
vantages that even the maintenance of existing investment 
is extremely difficult. In the early stages of development, 
OJ C 31, 3.2.1979. 
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maintenance of existing investment, perhaps on a short to 
medium-term basis, can form a sine qua non for the attraction 
of new investment which will help in turn to develop the 
region. In many Article 92(3) (a) regions, a broadly based 
industrial structure does not yet exist. Most of the companies 
are very small, they operate in traditional sectors and will 
not expand without an outside stimulus. In such difficult 
environments, it may be justified to permit certain types of 
assistance such as marketing aid in order to enable com-
panies in these regions to participate effectively in the Com-
munity'.; internal market, both as producers and consumers. 
Without them, the opportunities offered by the internal 
market may remain out of reach. Secondly, some regions 
may suffer from such severe structural disadvantages, for 
example, those caused by remote location, that they are 
almost insuperable. As a practical example, island regions 
in peripheral locations can suffer a permanent cost disadvan-
tage with respect to trade because of the burden of additional 
transportation expenses. The same holds true for communi-
cation costs. Operating aid of this type can foster closer links 
between the least-developed regions and the central regions, 
thereby promoting overall economic integration in the Com-
munity. In recognition of the special difficulties of these 
regions, the Commission may, by way of derogation, author-
ize certain operating aid in Article 92(3) (a) regions under 
the following conditions: 
- that the aid is limited in time and designed to overcome 
the structural handicaps of enterprises located in 
Article 92(3) (a) regions; 
- that aid be designed to promote a durable and balanced 
development of economic activity and not give rise to a 
sectoral overcapacity at the Community level such that 
the resulting Community sectoral problem produced is 
more serious than the original regional problem; in this 
context a sectoral approach is required and in particular 
the Community rules, directives and guidelines appli-
cable to certain industrial (steel, shipbuilding, synthetic 
fibres, textiles and clothing) and agricultural sectors, and 
those concerning certain industrial enterprises involving 
the transformation of agricultural products are to be 
observed; 
- that such aid is not granted in violation of the specific 
rules on aid granted to companies in difficulty; 
- that an annual report on their application is sent to 
the Commission, indicating total expenditure (or loss of 
revenue in the case of tax concessions and social security 
reductions) by type of aid and an indication of the sectors 
concerned; 
- that aid designed to promote exports to other Member 
States is excluded. 
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II. Method for the application of Article 
92(3) (c) to national regional aid 
Article 92(3) (c) provides that aid to facilitate the develop-
ment of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest, may be considered compatible with 
the common market. 
I. Principles of method 
In applying Article 92(3) (c), the Commission bases its de-
cisions on a method which allows the socio-economic situ-
ation of a region to be examined, both in its national and 
its Community context. This enables the Commission, in the 
Community interest, to verify that a significant regional 
disparity exists and, if so, to authorize the Member State 
concerned, irrespective of its level of economic development, 
to pursue a national regional policy. The Commission's 
decisions are based on the following principles: 
- regions are assessed on the basis of the NUTS level III 
geographical unit (in justified exceptional circumstances 
a smaller unit may be used); 
- in the first stage of analysis, the socio-economic situation 
of a region is assessed on the basis of two alternative 
criteria: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) or 
gross value added at factor cost (GV A) and structural 
unemployment; 
- a second stage of analysis considering other relevant 
indicators completes the first stage. 
2. First stage of analysis 
The socio-economic situation of a region is considered in 
relation to certain thresholds which are calculated in two 
steps. The first step relates to a minimum regional disparity 
in a national context whilst in the second step this minimum 
required disparity is adjusted to take account of the situation 
of those Member States which have a more favourable level 
of development in a Community context. 
Since aid can only be accepted when it facilitates the develop-
ment of certain economic areas, this requires a certain back-
wardness of the region within the Member State, that is to 
say a minimum negative regional disparity in the national 
context notwithstanding the relative situation of the Member 
State within the Community. This minimum regional dispar-
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ity in the national context is considered to be satisfied for 
the region, if: 
- income as measured by per capita GDP/GVA (gross 
domestic product/gross value added) is at least 15% 
below the Member State average; 
and/or 
- structural unemployment is at least 10% above the Mem-
ber State average. 
This is achieved if the GDP/GVA index for the region is 
not above a basic threshold of 85 and/or if the structural 
unemployment index is not below a basic threshold of 110. 
In each case the index for the Member State equals 100. 
A relatively more flexible threshold for structural unemploy-
ment has been fixed to take into account the important need 
to reduce unemployment. 
At the same time aid can only be accepted when it does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest. Since it is against the common interest 
to increase the existing differences between regions and the 
backwardness of less-favoured areas, the Commission has 
determined that for aid to be granted to regions in Member 
States for which the indicator shows a more favourable 
situation than the Community average, the national regional 
disparities of such regions must be correspondingly greater. 
It is therefore necessary to establish the relative position of 
the Member States within the Community. In measuring 
this position, two European indices are calculated for each 
Member State. They express the Member State's position 
with respect to income and to structural unemployment as a 
percentage of the corresponding Community average. These 
indices are calculated as average values over a five-year 
period and are updated annually. in the second step the 
Eu~opean index is used to adjust the respective basic thres-
hold for each Member State which is better off than the 
Community average, according to its relative position within 
the Community, by applying the following formula: 
(b 
. h h Id basic threshold x I 00 ) 
as1c t res o + . 
European mdex 
: 2 = modified threshold 
Since the situation of each region is examined in the first 
place in the national context, the construction of the formula 
attenuates the impact of the European index. The better the 
situation of a Member State compared with the Community 
average, the more important must be the disparity of a 
region within the national context in order to justify the 
award of aid. 
The thresholds in force on I November 1987 are shown 
in Annex II. Annex III contains a list of regions currently 
approved for regional aid under Article 92(3) (c) together 
with the maximum intensities approved by the Commission 
for those regions. 
In order to avoid the situation where the structural unem-
ployment threshold becomes too rigorous, a maximum re-
quired disparity corresponding to an index of 145 is fixed. 
This facilitates the award of aid in regions with a very 
difficult unemployment situation in a national context even 
though the same situation may not be so unfavourable in 
a Community context. Given the smaller variation in the 
threshold for GDP/GVA it has not been necessary to estab-
lish a maximum required disparity. 
3. Second stage of analysis 
The first stage of analysis outlined above permits a basic 
examination of the socio-economic situation of a region in 
its national and Community context in terms of unemploy-
ment and income levels. However, many other economic 
indicators can also be used to bring into more precise focus 
the socio-economic situation of a particular region. There-
fore, meeting the relevant threshold in the first stage does 
not automatically qualify a region to receive State aid. The 
first basic stage of analysis must be complemented by a 
second stage which allows other relevant indicators based 
on available Community and national statistical data to be 
taken into account. These other relevant indicators may 
include the trend and structure of unemployment, the devel-
opment of employment, net migration, demographic press-
ure. population density, activity rates, productivity, the 
structure of economic activity (in particular the importance 
of declining sectors), investment, geographic situation and 
topography and infrastructure. In some circumstances, and 
especially for regions which are at the margin of the thresh-
olds applied in the first stage of analysis, it is possible that 
the second stage may reveal an adequate justification for 
regional aid even in regions which do not fully satisfy the 
thresholds established in the course of the first stage. 
4. Ceilings of aid intensity 
Differentiated ceilings of aid intensity are established in 
accordance with the principle fixed at point 9 (iv) of the 
coordination principles. 1 This provides that aid intensity 
must be adapted according to the kind, intensity or urgency 
of regional problems, as has been envisaged by the different 
ceilings fixed under point 2 of the coordination principles 
(20, 25 and 30 %). 
In practice the ceilings approved by the Commission when 
taking Article 92 and 93 decisions are often lower, and 
frequently significantly lower, than the above maxima. 
OJ C 31, 3.2.1979. 
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ANNEX I Sardinia Nuoro 
Oristano 
Caglia,ri 
Sassari 
List of Article 92 (3) (a) regions Abruzzi Teramo L'Aquila 
Pescara 
Chieti 
GREECE SPAIN Extremadura Badajoz 
IRELAND All of Member Caceres 
State 
Andalucia Granada 
PORTUGAL Cordoba 
Jaen 
FRANCE Overseas depart- Guadeloupe Sevilla 
ments Guyane Almeria 
Martinique Malaga 
Reunion Cadiz 
Huelva 
ITALY Calabria Reggio di Calabria Castilla- Albacete 
Cosenza La Mancha Cuenca 
Catanzaro Toledo Ciudad Real 
Basilica ta Potenza Guadalajara 
Matera Galicia Orense 
Sicilia Agrigento Pontevedra 
Enna Lugo 
Palermo La Coruiia 
Messina Castilla and Leon Zamora Trapani Avila Cal tanissetta 
Catania Salamanca 
Ragusa Soria Leon Siracusa Palencia 
Puglia Brindisi Valladolid 
Lecce Segovia 
Fogga Burgos 
Bari Murcia Taranto 
Campania Napoli Canarias Las Palmas 
Benevento Tenerife 
Avellino Teruel 
Salemo 
Caserta Ceuta and Melilla 
Molise Campobasso UNITED Northern Ireland 
Isemia KINGDOM 
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ANNEX II 
Thresholds used by the Commission on 1 October 1987 
GDP/GVA Structural 
per capita unemployment 
Belgium 82 llO 
France 77 118 
Netherlands 79 110 
Denmark 73 121 
Federal Republic of Germany 74 136 
United Kingdom 83 llO 
Italy 85 116 
Ireland 85 110 
Luxembourg 77 145 
Greece 85 128 
Spain 85 llO 
Portugal 85 125 
ANNEX III 
Regions approved for regional aid under Article 92 (3) (c) on 
1 October 1987 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated aid intensity ceilings are 
given in gross terms in France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands and in net terms in Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
I. FRANCE 
A. Aid intensity limited to 25 % or FF 50 OOO per job created 
Creuse, Canta!, Aude, Lozere, Pyrenees-Orientales, Haute-
Corse, Corse du Sud. Parts of Ardennes, Nord, Pas-de-
Calais, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Moselle, Vosges, Bas-
Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Loire-Atlantique, Cotes-du-Nord, Finis-
tere, Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, Charante-Maritime, Pyrene-
es-Atlantiques, Ariege, A veyron, Lot, Tarn, Correze, Haute-
Vienne, Ardeche, Loire, Allier, Haute-Loire, Puy-de-Dome, 
Gard, Herault. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 17% or FF 35 OOO per job created 
Calvados, Manche, Maine-et-Loire, Mayenne, Vendee, Cha-
rente, Deux-Sevres, Vienne, Dordogne, Landes, Lot-et-Ga-
ronne, Gers, Hautes-Pyrenees, Tarn-et-Garonne. Parts of 
Ardennes, Haute-Marne, Aisne, Somme, Seine-Maritime, 
Cher, Indre, Orne, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Meurthe-et-Mo-
selle, Meuse, Moselle, Vosges, Haut-Rhin, Haute-Saone, 
Loire-Atlantique, Cotes-du-Nord, Finistere, Ille-et-Vilaine, 
Morbihan, Charente-Maritime, Gironde, Pyrenees-Atlan-
tiques, Ariege, Aveyron, Haute-Garonne, Lot, Tarn, 
Correze, Haute-Vienne, Ardeche, Loire, Allier, Haute-Loire, 
Puy-de-Dome, Gard, Herault, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var. 
2. ITALY 1 
(until 3 I December 1987) 
A. Aid intensity limited to 15 % 
Parts of Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Lazio. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 8 % 
Parts of Piemonte, Valle d' Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Giulia, Emilia-
Romagna. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 7 % 
Parts of Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Piemonte, Valle 
d'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Vento, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna. 
3. THE NETHERLANDS 
A. Aid intensity limited to 20 % net 
Nijmegen, Zuidoost-Drenthe, Delfzijl. Parts of Oost-Gro-
ningen, Zuid-Limburg. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 25 % 
Overig Groningen, Twente, Helmond, Lelystad, Tilburg, 
Den Bosch, Maastricht, Valkenburg, Sittard. Parts of Oost-
Groningen, Noord-Friesland, Zuidoost-Friesland. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 15 % 
Arnhem, Zuidwest-Friesland. Parts of Noord-Limburg, 
Noord-Friesland, Zuidoost-Friesland, Noord-Overijsel. 
With effect from I January 1988, nearly all regional aid in centre-north 
Italy has been withdrawn. 
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4. BELGIUM 
A. Aid intensity limited to 20 % or ECU 3 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 25 % 
Hasselt, Maaseik, Tongeren, Liege, Charleroi, Mons. Parts 
of Soignies, Thuin. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 15 % or ECU 2 500 per job created 
witl. a maximum of 20 % 
Turnhout, Diksmuide, Veurne, leper, Bastogne, Marche-en-
Famenne, Neufchateau, Dinant, Philippeville, Arlon, Vir-
ton. Parts ofThuin, Huy, Verviers, Namur. 
5. LUXEMBOURG 
A. Aid intensity limited to 25 % 
Parts of Esch-sur-Alzette, Capellen. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 20 % 
Parts of Esch-sur-Alzette, Capellen. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 17.5% 
Luxembourg, Grevenmacher, Wiltz, Clervaux. 
6. UNITED KINGDOM 
A. Aid intensity limited to 75 % or ECU 10 OOO per job 
created (for enterprises with no more than 10 employees 
and where fixed investment does not exceed ECU 600 OOO) 
Shetland Islands, Orkney Islands, Thurso, Wick, Sutherland, 
Invergordon and Dingwall, Skye and Wester Ross, Inver-
ness, Forres and Upper Moray, Badenoch, Lochaber, West-
ern Isles, Oban, Islay/Mid Argyll, Dunoon and Bute, 
Campbel town. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 30 % or ECU 5 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 40 % 
England: 
Liverpool, Widnes and Runcorn, Wigan and St Helens, 
Wirral and Chester, Workington, Bishop Auckland, Hartle-
pool, Middlesbrough, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, South Tyne-
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side, Stockton-on-Tees, Sunderland, Rotherham and Mex-
borough, Scunthorpe, Whitby, Corby, Falmouth, Helston, 
Newquay, Penzance and St Ives, Redruth and Camborne. 
Scotland: 
Arbroath, Bathgate, Cumnock and Sanquhar, Dumbarton, 
Dundee, Glasgow, Greenock, Irvine, Kilmarnock, Lanark-
shire. 
Wales: 
Aberdare, Cardigan, Ebbw Vale and Abergavenny, Flint 
and Rhyl, Holyhead, Lampeter and Aberaeron, Merthyr 
and Rhymney, Neath and Port Talbot, Pontypridd and 
Rhondda, South Pembrokeshire, Wrexham. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 20 % or ECU 3 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 25 % 
England: 
Accrington and Rossendale, Blackburn, Bolton and Bury. 
Parts of Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Darlington, 
Durham, Morpeth and Ashington, Barnsley, Bradford, 
Doncaster, Grimsby, Hull, Sheffield, Birmingham, Coventry 
and Hinckley, Dudley and Sandwell, Kidderminster, Telford 
and Bridgnorth, Walsall, Wolverhampton, Gainsborough, 
Bodmin and Liskeard, Bude, Cinderford and Ross-on-Wye, 
Plymouth. 
Scotland: 
Ayr, Alloa, Badenoch, Campbeltown, Dunfermline, Dun-
non and Bute, Falkirk, Forres, Girvan, Invergordon and 
Dingwall, Kirkcaldy, Lochaber, Newton Stewart, Skye and 
Wester Ross, Stewartry, Stranraer, Sutherland, Western 
Isles, Wick. 
Wales: 
Bangor and Caernarfon, Bridgend, Cardiff, Fishguard, Hav-
erfordwest, Llanelli, Newport, Pontypool and Cwmbran, 
Porthmadog and Ffestiniog, Pwllheli, Swansea. 
D. Aid intensity limited to 11 % where aid does not exceed 
ECU 100000 
Inner urban areas of Hackney, Islington, Lambeth, Brent, 
Hammersmith and Fulham, Leeds, Leicester, Nottingham, 
Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Burnley, Ealing, Greenwich, 
Haringey, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark. 
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E. Aid intensity limited to 7.5 % or ECU 3 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 11 % 
Administrative districts of Ceredigion, Meirionnydd, Breck-
nock, Montgomery, Radnor. 
7. DENMARK 
A. Aid intensity limited to 25 % or ECU 4 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 30 % 
Bornholm, Fa:rnerne, Sams0 and other Islands. Parts of 
Viborg, Nordjylland. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 20 % or ECU 2 500 per job created 
with a maximum of 25 % 
Parts of S0nderjylland, Lolland, Fyn, Langeland. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 17 % or ECU 3 OOO per job created 
with a maximum of 22 % 
Parts of Nordjylland, Viborg, Ringk0bing, Ribe, S0nderjyl-
land, Arhus. 
8. SPAIN 
A. Aid intensity limited to 45 % 
Parts of Madrid, Asturias. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 30 % 
Cantabria. Parts of Alicante, Castellon, Valencia, Asturias, 
Zaragoza, Vizcaya, Aiava. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 20 % 
Guipuzcoa. Parts of Zaragoza, Vizcaya, Aiava, Huesca, 
Navarra, Barcelona. 
9. GERMANY!, 2 
A. Aid intensity limited to 23 % 
Amberg, Schwandorf. 
The Zonenrandgebiet, Berlin (West) and the Lander regional schemes 
are not included in this list. 
With effect from 1 January 1988. 
B. Aid intensity limited to 18 % 
Heide-Meldorf, Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven, Wilhemshaven, 
Emden-Leer, Ammerland-Cloppenburg, Oldenburg, Mep-
pen, Nordhorn, Lingen, Detmold-Lemgo, Steinfurt, Ahaus, 
Bocholt, Kleve-Emmerich, Recklinghausen, Brilon, Alsfeld-
Ziegenhain, Daun, Idar-Oberstein, Cochem-Zell, Trier, 
Bitburg-Priim, Saarbriicken, Rothenburg o. d. T., Pirma-
sens, Nordfriesland, Straubing, Passau. Parts of Landau/ 
Pfalz. 
C. Aid intensity limited to 15 % 
Stade-Bremervorde, Syke, Unterweser, Bremer, Rotenburg/ 
Wiimme, Fallingbostel, Grafschaft Diepholz-V echta, Nien-
burg-Schaumburg, Hameln, Coesfeld, Duisburg-Ob-
erhausen, Bochum, Dortmund-Liidinghausen, Soest, Bad 
Kreuznach, Alzey-Worms, Weil3enburg in Bayern, 
Neumarkt/Oberpfanz, Nordlingen, ltzehoe, Soltan, Holzm-
inden-Hoxter, Neustadt/Saale, Bamberg, Weiden/Oberpfalz, 
Regensburg. Parts of Osnabriick. 
D. Aid intensity limited to 12 % 
Flensburg-Schleswig, Liineburg, Deggendorf. 
Commission communication on the method of 
application of Article 92 (3) (a) to regional aid 1 
(90/C 163/05) 
Change in application of method 
In a previous communication2 the Commission has already 
described its method for the application of Article 92 (3) (a) 
to national regional aid. The basic geographical unit used 
in the analysis is the (NUTS) level III region. However, for 
the purposes of determining eligibility as an Article 92 (3) 
(a) region, reference is made to the situation of the majority 
of level III regions in the larger, level II region. The reasons 
for this approach are explained under point I (3) of the 
communication. 
The Commission has decided to maintain the level III region 
as the appropriate geographical unit for aid assessment 
purposes. However, for determining eligibility under Article 
92 (3) (a), reference will now be made to the situation of the 
level II region as a whole in which the level III region is 
located. Furthermore, when regions are assessed by using 
the per capita GDP/PPS indicator, the corresponding index 
will be averaged over a minimum period of three years based 
on the last three years, where possible. 
OJ C 163, 4.7.1990. 
OJ C 212, 12.8.1988, p. 2. 
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E - Sectoral policies 
Commission Decision No 2064/86/ECSC1 of 30 
June 1986 establishing Community rules for State 
aid to the coal industry 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty estal:>lishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community, and in particular the first paragraph 
of Article 95 thereof, 
Having consulted the Consultative Committee and the Euro-
pean Parliament and with the unanimous assent of the 
Council, 
Whereas: 
I. Structural changes on the international and Community 
energy markets have been forcing the coal industry to make 
exceptional rationalization and restructuring efforts since 
the early 1960s. To the competition from crude oil and 
natural gas has been added the growing pressure from coal 
imported from outside the Community. As a result, many 
coal undertakings are in financial difficulties and require 
State aid. 
Since 1964, the High Authority/Commission has on a num-
ber of occasions laid down rules2 designed to reconcile State 
aid to the coal industry with the objectives of the ECSC 
Treaty. Each new set of aid rules has been designed to take 
account of developments in the economy in general, and 
developments on the energy market and the coal market in 
the Community in particular. 
All the Decisions in question laid down objectives and prin-
ciples guaranteeing that State aid was in the common inter-
est, was limited to what was strictly necessary in terms of 
volume and duration, and did not disturb the functioning 
of the common market. They also obliged Member States 
to obtain prior authorization from the High Authority/ 
Commission before granting aid. 
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II. Both the economy in general and the particular con-
ditions on the energy and coals markets in the Community 
have altered significantly since Decision No 528/76/ECSC 
was adopted. 
Energy prices in general have risen following the steep rise 
in oil prices. On the energy supply side, this has given rise 
to adjustment measures resulting in new production capacity 
for all energy sources throughout the world. On the energy 
demand/consumption side, considerable efforts have been 
made to save energy. The efforts to find substitutes have 
been particularly effective in the power station sector where 
heating oil has been replaced by coal to some extent. The 
changes in the behaviour of energy users have changed the 
direction of the trend on the Community's coal market, 
since the constantly falling trend in coal consumption in the 
Community in the years leading up to the first oil crisis has 
now levelled off, apart from a few short-term fluctuations, 
at a level of around 300 million tonnes (EUR 10). 
The coal industry in the Community has scarcely benefited 
from this development. On the contrary, between 1975 and 
1985 production in the Community dropped from 257 
million tonnes to 201 million tonnes (partly as a result of 
the coalminers' strike in the United Kingdom), while coal 
imports from outside the Community more than doubled 
from 41 million tonnes to 86 million tonnes. 
Although the competitive position of the Community's coal 
industry vis-a-vis oils and gas improved considerably as 
a result of the steep increase in oil prices, further strong 
competition in the shape of coal imports from outside the 
Community with which it cannot compete fully has come 
on to the scene. The geological conditions for the production 
of coal are more favourable in the United States, Australia, 
Canada and South Africa, etc. and so, despite the lengthy 
transport entailed, producers in those countries can enjoy 
competitive advantages which the Community's coal indus-
try cannot offset unless further restructuring is undertaken. 
The opportunities for rationalization in the coal industry in 
the Community are limited because of the unfavourable 
geological conditions. Despite considerable investment and 
the closure of 120 or so pits, productivity has only risen by 
1.5 % on a year-to-year basis on average for the Community 
as a whole in the last 10 years. Even though the US dollar, 
the decisive currency where international coal prices are 
concerned, rose in value against other currencies until 1984, 
the competitive position of Community coal vis-a-vis im-
ported coal did not improve. Moreover, the dollar exchange 
rate has dropped consideraby since 1985. Consequently, the 
financial situation of Community coal undertakings has 
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steadily deteriorated in the last 10 years. Their losses and 
the aid required has risen appreciably. In I 984 the aid 
granted to them totalled ECU 4 OOO million and in 1985 it 
amounted to ECU 3 OOO million. 
As a result of the fall in oil prices since the end of I 985, 
falling world market prices for coal and the reduction in the 
rate of the dollar, it is unlikely that the Community's coal 
industry will become fully competitive again in the years 
ahead. 
In view of this situation on the energy and coal markets, it 
is necessary to adapt to the foreseeable demand and to make 
this branch of industry competitive again by restructuring, 
modernizing and rationalizing it in an ordered and socially 
acceptable fashion. This will demand more financial re-
sources than the undertakings themselves can provide. Nor 
does the ECSC have at its disposal the resources needed in 
order to bridge this gap. Nevertheless, the restructuring 
efforts must not be abandoned, as otherwise the attainment 
of the general objectives set out in the second paragraph of 
Article 2 of the ECSC Treaty and the specific objectives set 
out in Article 3 (c), (d), (e) and (g) would be jeopardized. 
Moreover, this could result in serious disturbances affecting 
the mining areas in the Community concerned by the restruc-
turing process. 
The Community is therefore once again confronted with a 
situation for which no provision is made in the Treaty 
but concerning which action must nevertheless be taken. 
Consequently, recourse must be had to the first paragraph 
of Article 95 of the Treaty in order to enable the Community 
to continue to pursue the objectives set out in the opening 
articles of the Treaty and, to this end, to establish new 
Community rules for State aid to the coal industry. 
Ill. Such recourse to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the 
Treaty must fit into the general context of the Community's 
energy policy. On a proposal from the Commission, the 
Council is in the process of adopting new Community energy 
policy objectives for I 995 which envisage that the solid 
fuels producing industry (including the coal industry) in the 
Community should continue its restructuring efforts so as 
to become more competitive. In this context, it is considered 
desirable to maintain and, if possible, increase the market 
share of solid fuels. The creation of more secure supply 
conditions, inter a/ia by developing domestic energy sources 
in the Member States of the Community under satisfactory 
economic conditions, is an essential element of Community 
energy policy. For this reason Community coal production 
offers the advantage of rather greater security of supply and 
a degree of protection against extreme price swings on the 
world market. However, as the Commission has already 
stated, 1 in the long run these benefits as regards coal users 
and those employed in this branch of industry can only be 
achieved with a more competitive coal industry. 
In addition, Community policy in this sector must take into 
account the fact that the restructuring measures will affect 
the employment situation, and the provisions of the ECSC 
Treaty must therefore be used. 
On the basis of the coal policy guidelines set out in the 
preceding paragraphs, the Commission should examine State 
aid to the coal industry before it is granted, in order to 
ascertain whether it contributes to the achievement of the 
following aims: 
- improvement of competitiveness of the coal industry, 
which contributes to assuring a better security of supply; 
- creating new capacities provided that they are economi-
cally viable; 
- solving the social and regional problems to developments 
in the coal industry. 
In pursuit of these aims, it is essential that aid should not 
exceed what is absolutely necessary, and should not depart 
from the rules of the Treaty except where that is unavoidable 
in order to solve problems encountered in the Community, 
and that in particular indirect subsidies to industrial coal 
users should be avoided. 
IV. The Commission's approval of proposed State aid must 
be based on precise and full knowledge of the aid in question, 
and must take due account of the economic and social 
context. Consequently, the Member States should be re-
quired to provide the Commission regularly with full infor-
mation on the direct or indirect aid proposed to the coal 
production and marketing and to external trade in coal, and 
also on the reasons for and the scope of the proposed aid. 
The Member States must, in good time for the period I 987-
93, provide the Commission with a statement of intentions 
and objectives for the coal industry giving a clear indication 
of medium-term policy with regard to coal production. 
In assessing aid granted on the basis of this Decision, the 
Commission should also take into consideration all other 
financial aid to the coal industry. 
COM(85) 245 final. 
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V. Lastly, it is necessary to define the various forms of 
the aid for which advance approval can be given by the 
Commission, and to assign to them criteria corresponding 
to the aims of this Decision: 
(a) In view of the weak competitive position of and the 
losses made by coal undertakings in the Community, it 
would be necessary to close down a large proportion of pits 
in the short term if these losses ware not covered. In addition 
to supply problems, this would also give rise to considerable 
regional and employment problems. Consequently, aid to 
cover operating losses is admissible provided that it does not 
exceed the difference between the foreseeable average costs 
of coal production and the average returns achievable in 
the following calendar year. The financial imbalance of an 
untertaking may make it necessary to cover, in addition, 
losses wich the undertaking actually incurred in the previous 
two years, provided that evidence is produced that failure 
to cover the losses would have consequences incompatible 
with the aims of this Decision. 
(b) In order to guarantee sales of Community coal and coke 
to the steel industry, special aid may be granted, provided 
that it does not exceed the extent necessary to keep such 
coal competitive. 
As not all areas in the Community actually face competition 
from coal and coke from outside the Community, and hence 
certain coal producers are unable to align their prices for 
sales of coal and coke to the steel industry pursuant to 
Article 60 (2) (b) of the Treaty, the aims of this Decision 
can only be achieved if the undertakings in question are 
allowed to grant reductions on their list prices (fictitious 
alignment) even though there is no actual competition at 
the place of consumption, provided that long-term supply 
contracts are concluded. 
(c) The coal industry can only become more competitive if 
existing capacity is rationalized and new economically viable 
capacity is created. This will require investment, and aid 
towards the financing of such investment is admissible pro-
vided that it does not exceed I O % of the investment expendi-
ture. 
(d) In order to maintain the productivity of the coal indus-
try, expenditure will be needed on the maintenance of a 
skilled underground workforce. In order to finance such 
expenditure, aid may be authorized provided that it is 
granted in the context of existing schemes. 
(e) State aid to finance social security benefits by way of 
compensation for anomalous burdens on the coal industry 
resulting from the decline in coal production may be con-
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sidered compatible with the common market provided that 
they bring the ratio between the burder per mineworker in 
employment and the benefits per person in receipt of benefit 
into line with the corresponding ratio in other industries. 
(f) As a result of the decline in coal production in recent 
decades, the undertakings are confronted with various kinds 
of anomalous high burdens. State aid, to finance such bur-
dens with a view to covering them in whole or in part, may 
be considered compatible with the common market provided 
that supervision of such aid by the Commission is guaranteed 
and the relevant categories of such inherited liabilities are 
defined. 
VI. The proper implementation of this Decision must be 
ensured through provisions which enable the Commission 
to exercise its power of approval. The Commission may 
make its approval subject to any appropriate conditions, 
carry out all necessary checks subsequently, and withdraw 
its approval if it is no longer justified. The Commission must 
also be in a position to object to aid granted to undertakings 
which apply artificially low prices. Consequently, provision 
should also be made for the possibility of suspending this 
Decision in the event of serious supply and market disturb-
ances or a change in the basic economic conditions which 
led to its adoption. The Commission will report to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Consultative 
Committee each year on the application of this Decision. 
In view of the changes at present occuring in the conditions 
on the Community's coal and energy markets, it is appropri-
ate that the period of validity of this Decision should be 
seven-and-a-half years, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Section I 
Framework and general objectives 
Article 1 
I. All aid to the coal industry, whether specific or general, 
financed by Member States or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever, may be considered Community aid 
and therefore compatible with the proper functioning of the 
common market only if it conforms to the general objectives 
and criteria set out in Articles 2 to 8. Such aid shall be put 
into effect only in accordance with the procedures estab-
lished in this Decision. 
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2. The concept of aid includes aid granted by central, re-
gional or local authorities and any aid elements contained 
in the financing measures taken by Member States in respect 
of the coal undertakings which they directly or indirectly 
control and which cannot be regarded as the provision of 
risk capital according to standard company practice in a 
market economy. 
Article 2 
I. Aid granted to the coal industry may be considered com-
patible with the proper functionipg of the common market 
provided that it helps to achieve at least one of the following 
objectives: 
- improvement of the competitiveness of the coal industry, 
which contributes to assuring a better security of supply; 
- creating new capacities provided that they are economi-
cally viable; 
- solving the social and regional problems related to devel-
opments in the coal industry. 
2. Any measures concerning the grant of aid referred to in 
Articles 3 to 8 shall be without prejudice of the criteria which 
are specific to them and defined by the same Articles; they 
shall also be appraised having regard to their suitability in 
relation to the objectives set out in paragraph I above. 
Section II 
Member States' aid 
Deficit grant aid 
Article 3 
I. Aid covering operating losses may be considered compat-
ible with the common market provided that it does not 
exceed, for each tonne produced and for each individual coal 
region or undertaking, the difference between foreseeable 
average costs and the foreseeable average returns in the 
following financial year (coal production year). 
Member States shall, without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 9, submit to the Commission all details for the 
calculation of costs and returns per tonne. 
2. In its examination of such aid, the Commission shall 
include, in its calculation of production costs per tonne, 
normal depreciation and effective interest charges on capital 
borrowed. If the Commission finds that the difference be-
tween the average costs of coal production and the average 
returns achievable is due to changes in the situation of coal 
undertakings which are out of keeping with satisfactory 
economic conditions, it may fix a maximum amount for aid 
covering losses. 
3. The reduction in costs resulting from the grant of aid in 
accordance with Articles 4 to 8 must be allowed for in 
calculating the production costs or operating losses of pits. 
4. In those exceptional cases where the financial balance of 
an undertaking is seriously threatened by past losses which 
have not been covered, aid which goes beyond that permitted 
in paragraph I may be considered compatible with the com-
mon market provided that it is limited to covering a pre-
viously uncovered difference between the production costs 
incurred and the returns on the coal produced during a 
period not exceeding the two preceding financial years. In 
such a case, Member States shall, without prejudice to the 
provisions of Article 9, supply the Commission with: 
- documentary evidence covering the points referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 for the period during which the losses 
were incurred; 
- information regarding the extent to which such losses 
have in the mean time been reduced as a result of aid as 
defined in Article I (2). 
Sales aid 
Article 4 
Aid for supplying coal and coke to the Community's iron 
and steel industry may be considered compatible with the 
common market provided that it does not exceed the rebates 
referred to in Article 12. 
Investment aid 
Article 5 
I. Investment aid may be considered compatible with the 
common market provided that: 
- it covers no more than 50 % of the costs of the invest-
ment; 
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- such investment has been notified to the Commission as 
required by High Authority Decision No 22/66,1 
amended by Decision No 2237 /73/ECSC2 or by any 
subsequent decision; 
- the Commission has delivered a favourable opinion on 
the project so notified. 
2. The aid referred to in paragraph 1 may be granted for 
investment programmes or for individual investment pro-
jects. 
3. In the case of investment programmes, Member States 
shall, without prejudice to Article 9, inform the Commission 
at least once a year, in respect of each individual project in 
the programme which it has been decided to carry out, of 
the amount of investment expenditure assigned to it and the 
amount of aid involved. 
4. Where the proposed aid concerns investments which have 
already benefited from measures taken under Articles 54 
and 55 of the ECSC Treaty, the amount of such benefits 
shall be shown separately for each project. 
Aid for underground staff 
Article 6 
1. Aid granted under ex1stmg schemes to maintain the 
underground labour force in deep mines may be considered 
compatible with the common market. 
2. The aid referred to in paragraph 1 must be of a specific 
character which enables it to be calculated separately in 
relation to aid granted under the provisions of Articles 3 to 
5. 
Financing of social grants in the coal industry 
Article 7 
I. State aid to finance social grant schemes specific to the 
coal industry may be considered compatible with the com-
mon market provided that, for coal undertakings, it brings 
the ratio between the burden per mineworker in employment 
and the benefits per person in receipt of benefit into line 
with the corresponding ratio in other industries. 
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2. The Governments of the Member States shall, without 
prejudice to Article 9, submit to the Commission the 
necessary basic data and details of the calculation of the 
ratios between the burdens and benefits referred to in 
paragraph I. 
Inherited liabilities 
Article 8 
I. State aid to coal undertakings to cover the costs arising 
from the restructuring of the coal industry which are not 
related to current production (inherited liabilities) may be 
considered compatible with the common market provided 
that it does not exceed such costs. Such aid may be used to 
cover: 
- the costs incurred only by undertakings which are carry-
ing out or have carried out restructuring; 
- the costs incurred by several undertakings. 
2. Categories of costs arising from the restructuring of the 
coal industry are defined in Annex I to this Decision. 
3. The aid may be granted as a lump sum and shall not 
exceed the actual amount of the inherited liabilities. 
4. Member States shall · submit to the Commission the 
necessary basic data and the details of the calculation of the 
ratio between the actual total inherited liabilities of the 
undertakings and the proposed measure. 
Section III 
Notification, appraisal and authorization procedures 
Article 9 
I. All Member States which intend to grant aid to coal 
undertakings in 1986, shall, by October 1986, provide the 
Commission with: 
(i) a statement of intentions and objectives for the industry 
for the period 1987-93; 
(ii) the information specified in paragraph 2. 
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2. If, in any subsequent financial year, a Member State seeks 
authorization of measures in accordance with Article 10, it 
shall provide the Commission, at least three months before 
the measuers enter into force and separately for each coal-
field or coal undertaking, with information in all measures 
which the State in question proposes to take in the following 
year in order to give direct or indirect support to the coal 
industry. The relevant detailed information to be supplied, 
which will be used in the analysis of the situation by the 
Commission, is specified in Annex 2 to this Decision. 
3. If a Member State intends to take further financial 
measures in addition to measures already notified or to 
modify existing measures during the financial year, it must 
inform the Commission thereof so that the latter can 
express an opinion in accordance with the procedures 
defined in Article I 0. 
4. Member States shall notify the Commission not later 
than 30 June of each year of the amounts of aid actually 
paid in the preceding financial year. 
Article JO 
I. As regards the direct aid in respect of current production 
referred to in Articles 3 to 6, Member States shall put the 
proposed measures into effect only with the approval of the 
Commission, acting pursuant to the objectives set out in 
Article 2 and the criteria laid down in the abovementioned 
articles, and subject to the conditions laid down by the 
Commission. The Commission shall inform the Member 
States concerned of its decision. 
2. In so far as they are governed by the Treaties, the Com-
mission shall give its opinion on all other aid and measures 
that are also referred to in this Decision in accordance with 
the procedures and rules of the Treaties. 
3. In its examination of the amount of planned aid, the 
Commission shall take account, to the extent to which that 
is compatible with the objectives of this Decision, of any 
other aid previously granted, regardless of its objectives. 
4. In assessing the measures and programmes submitted to 
it as regards the closure of particularly unprofitable pits or 
the creating of new capacities in the light of the objective 
laid down in Article 2, the Commission shall take account 
of the special situation of individual coalfields or Member 
States. 
5. If, from the date of receipt of the notification of the 
proposed measures pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 of this 
Article, a period of three months elapses without the Com-
mission having taken a decision, the proposed measures 
may be implemented provided that the Member State has 
informed the Commission of its intention beforehand. 
However, the above period shall be reduced to two months 
from the date of receipt of the notification of measures 
proposed pursuant to Article 9 (3). 
Section IV 
Pricing provisions 
Article 11 
1. The Commission shall ensure that aid does not lead to 
discrimination, within the meaning of the ECSC Treaty, as 
between Community buyers or users of coal or coke. 
2. In order to ensure that direct aid in respect of current 
production which it authorizes is used exclusively for the 
purposes set out in Articles 3 to 6, the Commission may, in 
the case of undertakings in receipt of aid, limit or modify 
the right of alignment provided for in Article 60 of the 
ECSC Treaty and require such undertakings to comply with 
minimum prices. Any infringements shall be dealt with under 
Article 64 of the ECSC Treaty. 
3. The Commission may carry out any appropriate checks 
on undertakings. 
4. The Commission shall revoke approval of aid or shall 
amend the terms of approval if it finds that the aid no longer 
fulfils the conditions imposed by Articles 3 to 6 of this 
Decision or that the actual consequences of such aid or the 
use to which it is put are contrary to the conditions required 
for approving the grant thereof. 
Article 12 
1. (a) Where there is no actual competition from coal or 
coke from non-member countries at the point of consump-
tion, coal undertakings shall be authorized, where necessary, 
to grant rebates on their list prices or production costs, for 
deliveries of coking coal, blast-furnace coke and coal for 
injection blast-furnaces for the iron and steel industry of the 
Community under long-term contract. 
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(b) The rebates allowed under subparagraph (a) above shall 
not cause the delivered prices of Community coal and coke 
to work out lower than those which would be charged for 
coal from non-member countries and coke made from non-
member-country coking coal. 
2. The delivered prices of coking coal from non-member 
countries referred to in parapraph l (b) shall be calculated 
from the prices cif Community ports for comparable trans-
actions. For this purpose the Commission shall fix guide cif 
prices. 
3. The delivered prices of blast-furnace coke referred to in 
paragraph l (b) shall be calculated from the cif prices for 
coking coal from non-member countries referred to in para-
graph 2 in such a way as to cover in full the net coking costs 
of the supplying coking plants. 
Section V 
General and final provisions 
Article 13 
In deciding whether the financial measures proposed by 
Member States are compatible with the common market, 
the Commission shall give due consideration to any aid 
which may be granted under Commission Decisions Nos 
759/84/ECSC1 and 3612/85/ECSC.2 
Article 14 
The Commission shall report annually to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Consultative Committee on 
the application of this Decision. 
Article 15 
The Commission shall, after consulting with the Council, 
take all the measures necessary to implement this Decision. 
Article 16 
I. This Decision shall enter into force on I July 1986. 
However, Articles 4 and 12 shall apply from I January 1987. 
I OJ L 80, 24.3.1984. 
2 OJ L 344, 27.12.1985. 
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This Decision shall expire on 31 December 1993. 
2. The Commission shall submit by the end of 1990 a report 
to the Council on the experiences and problems encountered 
in applying this Decision. It may propose in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in the first paragraph of Article 
95 of the ECSC Treay any modification which may be 
appropriate. 
This Decision shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 30 June 1986. 
ANNEX I 
Definition of the costs referred to in Article 8(2) 
/. Costs arising only for undertakings which are carrying out 
or have carried out restructuring 
limited to the following: 
(a) costs of social grants incurred through pensioning of 
workers before they reach the legal retiring age; 
(b) other exceptional expenditure for workers made redun-
dant because of restructuring; 
(c) the payment of pensions and allowances outside the 
statutory insurance scheme to workers made redundant be-
cause of restructuring, and to those who were entitled to 
such payments before the restructuring; 
(d) free coal deliveries to workers made redundant because 
of restructuring and to those who were entitled to such coal 
before the restructuring; 
(e) residual charges arising out of tax provisions; 
(f) additional safety work that has to be carried out under-
ground as a result of restructuring; 
(g) subsidence or similar damage attributable to areas which 
were previously mined; 
(h) residual charges in respect of payments to bodies dealing 
with water supply and disposal of waste water; 
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(i) other residual charges in respect of water supply and 
disposal of waste water; 
(j) residual costs in respect of sickness insurance scheme 
contributions on behalf of former mineworkers; 
(k) exceptional material loss caused by the restructuring of 
the industry where cover for these losses is vital to the 
continuing existence of the undertaking. 
II. Costs arising from several undertakings 
(a) increases in the contributions needed to cover social 
security obligations outside the statutory insurance scheme 
where such increases result from a reduction, due to restruc-
turing, in the number of those liable to pay contributions; 
(b) expenditure caused by restructuring, in respect of water 
supply and disposal of waste water; 
(c) increases in payments to bodies dealing with water sup-
ply and disposal of waste where these increases are attribu-
table to a reduction, following restructuring, in the pro-
duction of coal on which the levy must be paid. 
ANNEX2 
Information to be supplied to the Commission pursuant to 
Article 9 
This information will include details of: 
(a) capital contributions, the cancellation of liabilities vis-a-
vis public authorities and the granting of credit guarantees; 
(b) any other measures linked to the production or market-
ing of, and external trade in, coal even if they do not directly 
impose a burden on public budgets, which give an economic 
advantage to coal undertakings; 
(c) in the case of measures relating to social grants in the 
coal industry: 
(i) the legal and administrative prov1s10n in force or 
changes in existing provisions which have already been 
notified; 
(ii) the total amount of social grants, broken down by 
category, paid during the preceding financial year to 
workers and former workers in the coal industry and to 
their dependants, the number of rec1p1ents of these 
grants and the corresponding information for the gen-
eral system : 
(iii) the various resources drawn upon and the corresponding 
amounts allocated for the financing of the grants re-
ferred to in (c) (ii); 
(d) in the case of measures designed to cover inherited 
liabilities of coal undertakings: 
(i) the type of liabilities to be covered; 
(ii) the probable amount of the liabilities for the year in 
which aid is granted; 
(iii) the extent to which undertakings have incorporated in-
herited liabilities into the costs of current production or 
have built up special financial reserves to cover such 
liabilities themselves; 
(e) the reasons for, and the scope of, the various measures, 
together with all further information for their assessment in 
accordance with the Decision; 
(t) available information on proposed closures of pits or 
parts thereof, the consequences for the workforce and for 
the regions concerned, and re-employment of redundant 
workers in connection, where applicable, with regional devel-
opment programmes. 
Commission Decision No 322/89/ECSC1 of 
1 February 1989 establishing Community rules 
for aid to the steel industry 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community, and in particular the first and second 
paragraphs of Article 95 thereof, 
Having consulted the Consultative Committee and with the 
unanimous assent of the Council, 
OJ L 38, 10.2.1989. 
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Whereas: 
I. After a period of comprehensive aid-granting during 1981 
to 19852 assisting the restructuring of the Community steel 
industry, Commission Decision No 3484/85/ECSC3 estab-
lished rules under which aid could be granted to the industry 
only for a few purposes and to a very limited extent during 
the period I January 1986 until 31 December 1988. 
The cessation of the quota system by mid-1988 and the 
continuing presence of excess production capacities for most 
product categories makes it of particular importance to 
pursue a strict aid policy, comprising both specific and non-
specific aid, and the close monitoring of State assistance 
of any form to the steel industry, in order to assure that 
competition conditions are being determined by normal mar-
ket forces. 
Nevertheless, the reasons for permitting limited aid for the 
sector, provided for by Decision No 3484/85/ECSC, princi-
pally still remain. 
The Community thus finds itself faced with a situation 
not specifically provided for in the ECSC Treaty and yet 
requiring action. In these circumstances, recourse must be 
had to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty, 
so as to enable the Community to pursue the objectives set 
out in the initial Articles thereof. 
It is emphasized that any subsidies in any form whatsoever 
and whether specific or non-specific, which Member States 
might grant to their steel industries, other than aid expressly 
provided for and duly authorized under this Decision, is 
prohibited under Article 4 (c) of the Treaty. 
II. It would be unjustified, and would be treating the indus-
try differently from other industries, to deny the Community 
steel industry aid for research and development or for bring-
ing plants into line with new environmental standards. Aid 
for these purposes which is in the public interest and satisfies 
the conditions laid down in this Decision should be available 
to the steel industry, just as similar aid is permitted to other 
industries under Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty. 
The overcapacity that still persists in a number of product 
categories also justifies the authorization of aid to accelerate 
the closure of inefficient plants which, if kept in service even 
temporarily, could depress the market to the detriment of 
2 Commission Decision No 2320/81/ECSC (OJ L 228, 13.8.1981, p. 14), 
as amended by Decision No 1018/85/ECSC (OJ L 110, 23.4.1985, p. 5). 
OJ L 340, 18.12.1985, p. I. 
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all firms in the sector, and to encourage the least competitive 
firms to cease production entirely. 
Having in a recent span of years been offered the opportunity 
with the assistance of a suitable framework of aid rules to 
put their technical and financial structure in a competitive 
state, there is no justification for allowing any further op-
erating or investment aid to the Community's steel undertak-
ings. This is even more the case since the evolution of the 
financial position of steel undertakings has generally been 
very satisfactory. 
As the special provisions on aid to the steel industries in the 
Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal expire by end-
1988 and end-1990 respectively, this Decision is immediately 
applicable to Spain while it is without prejudice to the 
provisions contained in the Act of Accession of Portugal 
until 1 January 1991 when it also becomes fully applicable 
to that Member State. 
To avoid discrimination due to the variety of forms which 
State aid may take, transfers of State resources to public or 
private steel firms, in the form of acquisitions of sharehold-
ings or provisions of capital or similar financing, must be 
subject to the same procedures as aid so that the Commission 
can determine whether such operations involve an aid el-
ement. This will be the case where the financial transfer is 
not a genuine provision of risk capital according to usual 
investment practice in a market economy. The compatibility 
of any such aid elements .with the Treaty must be assessed 
by the Commission in the light of the criteria laid down in 
this Decision. For this purpose, all such financial transfers 
must be notified to the Commission and may not be im-
plemented if before the end of the standstill period laid down 
in Article 6 (5) the Commission determines that they contain 
aid elements and initiates the procedure provided for in 
Article 6 (4). 
To ensure the orderly functioning of the common market 
for an appropriate period, during which the steel industry 
finds again normal market conditions, this Decision should 
apply until 31 December 1991, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 
I. Aid to the steel industry, whether specific or non-
specific, financed by Member States or their regional or 
local authorities or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever may be deemed Community aid and therefore 
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compatible with the orderly functioning of the common 
market only if it satisfies the provisions of Articles 2 to 5. 
2. The term 'aid' also covers the aid elements contained in 
transfers of State resources by Member States, regional or 
local authorities or other bodies to steel undertakings in 
the form of acquisitions of shareholdings or provisions of 
capital or similar financing (such as bonds convertible into 
shares, or loans the interest on which is at least partly 
dependent on the undertaking's financial performance) 
which cannot be regarded as a genuine provision of risk 
capital according to usual investment practice in a market 
economy. 
3. Aid coming within the terms of this Decision may be 
granted only after the procedures laid down in Article 6 
have been followed and shall not be payable after 
31 December 1991. 
Article 2 
Aid for research and development 
1. Aid granted under general aid schemes to defray expendi-
ture by steel undertakings on research and development 
projects may be deemed compatible with the orderly func-
tioning of the common market provided that the research 
and/or development project has one of the following objec-
tives: 
- reduction in production costs, in particular through en-
ergy conservation or improvements in productivity, 
- improvements in the quality of products, 
- improvements in the performance of iron and steel prod-
ucts or extensions of the range of applications of steel, 
- improvements in the environment and in working con-
ditions (higher health and safety standards). 
2. The total amount of aid granted for this purpose may 
not exceed 35 % net grant equivalent of the eligible costs in 
the case of basic industrial research and 25 % in the case of 
applied research and development. 
3. Basic industrial research is defined as original theoretical 
or experimental work whose objective is to achieve a new 
or better understanding of the laws of science and technology 
as they apply to an industrial sector or the activities of a 
particular undertaking. 
4. The eligible costs shall be only those directly related 
to research and development, excluding those related to 
industrial applications or commercial exploitation of the 
results. 
Article 3 
Aid for environmental protection 
I. Aid granted to steel undertakings under general aid 
schemes for bringing into line with new statutory environ-
mental standards plants which entered into service at least 
two years before the introduction of the standards may 
be deemed compatible with the orderly functioning of the 
common market. 
2. The total amount of aid granted for this purpose may 
not exceed 15 % net grant equivalent of the investment costs 
directly related to the environmental measures concerned. 
Where the investment is associated with an increase in the 
capacity of the plant, the eligible costs shall be proportionate 
to the initial capacity of the plant. 
Article 4 
Aid for closures 
1. Aid towards the costs of payments to workers make 
redundant or accepting early retirement may be deemed 
compatible with the orderly functioning of the common 
market provided that: 
- the payments do not exceed those customary under the 
rules in force in the Member States on I October 1985 
and actually arise from the partial or total closure of 
steel plants that have been in regular production up to 
the time of notification of the aid and whose closure has 
not already been taken into account for the purposes 
of applying Commission Decisions Nos 257/80/ECSC,1 
2320/81/ECSC or 3484/85/ECSC or granting a favour-
able opinion under Article 54 of the ECSC Treaty; 
- the aid does not exceed 50 % of that portion of such 
payments which is not defrayed directly by the Member 
State or by the Community pursuant to Article 56 (I) (c) 
or (2) (b) of the ECSC Treaty but is payable by the 
undertaking concerned. 
OJ L 29, 6.2.1980. 
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2. Aid to steel undertakings which permaner,tly cease pro-
duction ECSC iron and steel products may be deemed com-
patible with the orderly functioning of the common market, 
provided that the undertakings: 
- became a legal entity before I October 1985; 
- have been regularly producing hot-rolled products up to 
the date of notification of the aid; 
- have not reorganized their production or plant structure 
since I October 1985; and 
- are not directly or indirectly controlled, within the mean-
ing of Decision No 24/54 of the High Authority, 1 by, 
and do not themselves directly or indirectly control, an 
undertaking that is itself a steel undertaking or controls 
other steel undertakings, 
and that the closure of their plants has not already been 
taken into account for the purposes of applying Decisions 
Nos 257/80/ECSC, 2320/81/ECSC or 3484/85/ECSC or 
granting a favourable opinion under Article 54 of the ECSC 
Treaty. 
The amount of aid may not exceed the higher of the follow-
ing two values, as determined by an independent consultant's 
report: 
- the discounted value of the contribution to fixed costs 
obtainable from the plants over a three-year period, less 
any advantages the aided firm derives from their closure; 
or 
- the residual book value of the plants (ignoring that 
portion of any revaluations since I January 1980 which 
exceeded the national inflation rate). 
Article 5 
Aid granted to steel undertakings for investment under gen-
eral regional aid schemes may be deemed compatible with 
the orderly functioning of the common market, provided 
that: 
- the aided investment does not lead to an increase in 
production capacity; and 
- the aided undertaking is located on the territory of a 
Member State which was not authorized to grant any 
aid under decisions Nos 257/80/ECSC or 2320/81/ECSC, 
OJoftheECSC9, ll.5.1954. 
110 
and which during the period of validity of these Decisions 
had already become a member of the Community. 
Article 6 
1. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to 
enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or 
alter aid of the types referred to in Articles 2 to 5. It shall 
likewise be informed of plans to grant aid to the steel 
industry under schemes on which it has already taken a 
decision under the EEC Treaty. The notifications of aid 
plans required by the Article must be lodged with the 
Commission by 30 June 1991 at the latest. 
2. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time 
for it to submit its comments, and by 30 June 1991 at the 
latest, of any plans for transfers of State resources, by 
Member States, regional or local authorities or other bodies 
to steel undertakings in the form of acquisitions of share-
holdings or provisions of capital or similar financing. 
The Commission shall determine whether the financial 
transfers involve aid elements within the meaning of 
Article I (2) and, if so, shall examine whether they are 
compatible with the common market under the provisions 
of Articles 2 to 5. 
3. The Commission shall seek the views of the Member 
States on plans for closure aid and other major aid pro-
posals notified to it before adopting a position on them. It 
shall inform the Member States of the position it has 
adopted on all aid proposals, specifying the form and 
volume of the aid. 
4. Where, after inviting interested parties to submit their 
comments, the Commission finds that aid in a given case 
is incompatible with the provisions of this Decision, it shall 
inform the Member State concerned of this decision. The 
Commission shall take such a decision not later than three 
months after receiving the information needed to assess 
the proposed aid. Article 88 of the ECSC Treaty shall apply 
in the event of a Member State's failing to comply with that 
decision. The planned measures falling within paragraph I 
or 2 may be put into effect only with the approval of and 
subject to any conditions laid down by the Commission. 
5. If the Commission fails to initiate the procedure pro-
vided for in paragraph 4 or otherwise to make its position 
known within two months of receiving notification of a 
proposal, the planned measures may be put into effect 
provided that the Member State first informs the Com-
mission of its intention to do so. 
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6. All individual awards of the types of aid referred to in 
Article 4 shall be notified to the Commission in accordance 
with the procedure provided for in paragraph 1. The Com-
mission also reserves the right to require that some or all 
individual awards of aid of the types referred to in 
Articles 2 and 3 be notified in accordance with paragraph 1. 
Article 7 
Member States shall supply the Commission twice a year 
with reports on the aid disbursed over the previous six 
months, the uses to which the aid was put and the results 
obtained over the same period. The reports shall include 
particulars of all financial operations carried out by the 
Member States or local or regional authorities in relation to 
publicly-owned steel undertakings. They must be supplied 
within two months following the end of each six-month 
period and be set out in a form determined by the Com-
mission. 
Article 8 
The Commission shall draw up regular reports on the im-
plementation of this Decision for the Council and, for infor-
mation, for the Parliament and the Consultative Committee. 
Article 9 
This Decision shall not apply until I January 1991 to Portu-
gal in which Member State aid will be governed until then 
by the Act of Accession. 
Article JO 
This Decision shall apply from I January 1989 until 
31 December 1991. 
This Decision shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, l February 1989. 
Motor vehicle industry 
Community framework on State aid to the 
motor vehicle industry1 
1. Necessity and scope of the measure 
The motor vehicle industry is of strategic industrial and 
employment importance to the Community. Its well-being 
has a vital impact on a whole range of upstream and down-
stream industries and services and estimates suggest that 
10 % of the Community's employment is dependent on it. 
Furthermore, many areas of Community policy such as the 
internal market, competition and commercial policy have a 
direct bearing on the sector. 
The motor vehicle industry is now, to a large extent, a world 
industry. In order to survive, manufacturers must compete 
and sell on world markets. The future viability of the Euro-
pean industry will be determined firstly by its competi-
tiveness and dynamism in the internal market. The Com-
mission can contribute to the healthy development of the 
sector and ensure that the companies adapt and adjust in 
time to changing market circumstances. 
The Commission's future aid policy must be geared to the 
process of creating a single market without internal frontiers 
by 1992. As market integration progresses, distortions of 
competition caused by the granting of aid are felt more 
and more keenly by competitors not receiving any aid. All 
manufacturers are entitled to a consistent approach compat-
ible with the Treaty. At the same time, the market integration 
process may provoke a growing tendency for Member States 
to provide aid to firms that are no longer able to stand up 
to fair competition in this more efficient market, so as to 
ensure their survival. Furthermore, over-reliance on State 
aid to solve problems of industrial adjustment vis-a-vis third 
country producers undermines competitiveness of the Com-
munity car manufacturing by hindering the economically 
healthy influence of market forces. 
In view of the growing sensitivity of competition in the 
motor vehicle sector as described above, the Commission 
decided to introduce a framework for State aid in the motor 
vehicle industry in the form of appropriate measures on the 
basis of Article 93 (I) of the EEC Treaty. These measures 
were examined by the Member States' representatives at a 
multilateral meeting. The objective of the framework is to 
establish full transparency of aid flows to the industry and 
I OJ C 123, 18.5.1989. 
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impose at the same time a stricter discipline to the granting 
of aids in order to assure that the competitiveness of the 
Community industry is not distorted by unfair competition. 
The Commission can operate an effective policy only if it is 
able to take a position on individual cases before the aid is 
paid. 
Therefore, the framework foresees the prior notification of 
all significant aid cases irrespective of their objective as well 
as an annual report of all aid payments. 
Having completed its examination, the Commission decided 
to propose to the Member States.under Article 93 (3) of the 
EEC Treaty that they notify in advance from I January 
1989, in accordance with the rules set out below, significant 
cases of aid to the motor vehicle sector. 
2. Rules of notification 
2.1. Definition of sector 
Under 'motor vehicle sector' is understood the manufacture 
and assembly of motor vehicles and manufacture of motor 
vehicle engines. 
Under 'motor vehicles' is understood passenger cars (vol-
ume, specialist and sports cars), vans, trucks, road tractors, 
buses, coaches and other commercial vehicles. 
Excluded hereof are racing cars, non-traffic cars (e.g. snow 
and golf cars), motorcycles, trailers, agricultural and forestry 
tractors, caravans, special purpose lorries and vans (e.g. fire 
engines, mobile work-shops), dumpers, work trucks (e.g. 
fork lifts, travel carriers, platform trucks) and military ve-
hicles. 
Under 'motor vehicle engines' is understood compression 
and spark engines for the above defined 'motor vehicles'. 
Excluded are all parts and accessories for both motor ve-
hicles and motor vehicle engines. 
However, if a motor vehicle manufacturer or its subsidiary 
obtains aid for the manufacture of parts or accessories, or if 
any aid is granted for the manufacture of parts or accessories 
under licence or patents of a vehicle manufacturer, or of its 
subsidiary, such aid should be notified a priori. 
2.2. Aids to be notified 
All aid measures to be granted by public authorities within 
the scope of an approved aid scheme to (an) undertaking(s) 
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operating in the motor vehicle sector as defined above, where 
the cost of the project to be aided exceeds ECU 12 million 
are subject to prior notification on the basis of Article 93 
(3) of the EEC Treaty. As regards aid to be granted outside 
the scope of an approved aid scheme, any such project, 
whatever its cost and aid intensity, is of course subject 
without exception to the obligation of notification pursuant 
to Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty. Where aid is not directly 
linked to a particular project, all proposed aid must be 
notified, even if paid under schemes already approved by 
the Commission. Member States shall inform the Com-
mission, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its com-
ments, of any plan to grant or alter aid. 
The Member States are requested to provide the Commission 
with an annual report which shall contain all aid payments 
under whatever form granted to all motor vehicle and motor 
vehicle engine producers during the year of reference. Aid 
payments which do not fulfil the threshold of prior notifi-
cation should also be included in the annual report. The 
report should reach the Commission at the end of the first 
quarter which follows the year of reference. For details on 
the various categories of aid to be notified or reported, see 
Annex II. 
2.3. Format of notification and of annual report 
The standard forms of notification and of annual reporting 
are presented in Annexes I and II. These forms should be 
addressed directly to the Directorate-General for Compe-
tition. 
2.4. Community instruments 
In view of the need to ensure that measures financed by the 
structural Funds or receiving assistance from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) or from another existing financial 
instrument are in keeping with the provisions of the Treaty 
on State aid, the Commission will monitor all applications 
and approvals for assistance under Community instruments 
and ensure coherence with the present guidelines. 
2.5. Date of introduction and validity 
The appropriate measures shall enter into force on I January 
1989. All aid projects, which have not yet received a final 
approval by the competent public authority by 31 December 
1988, shall be subject to prior notification from I January 
1989 onwards. The appropriate measures shall be valid for 
two years. The Commission shall at the end of this period 
review the utility and the scope of the framework. 
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3. Guidelines for appreciation of aid cases 
The purpose of having prior notification of all aid to the 
motor vehicle sector is to allow the Commission to verify 
more directly the compatibility of the aid in this sector with 
the competition rules of the Treaty. 
Evaluation of aid has to take account of general economic 
and industrial factors as well as sector and company-specific 
considerations together with regional and social factors. 
However, the Commission is not seeking to impose an indus-
trial policy strategy on the sector; such decisions are best 
left to the industry and the market itself. In view both of 
the important volume of aid granted in the past and the 
improved overall situation of Community producers, the aim 
of the Commission in the sector is to ensure that Community 
motor vehicle manufacturers operate in the future in a cli-
m2te of fair competition, thus removing the trade distortions 
resulting from aid within the internal market and creating a 
generally competitive environment which will promote the 
industry's productivity and competitiveness. 
The criteria which will guide the Commission in its future 
assessment of aid cases will vary according to the objectives 
pursued by the aid in question. However, in all cases, it will 
be necessary to ensure that aid granted is in proportion to 
the problems it seeks to solve. For the various aid objectives 
the main assessment criteria of the Commission shall be as 
follows: 
RESCUE AND RESTRUCTURING AID 
In principle, rescue and restructuring aid should only be 
approved in exceptional circumstances. The aid must be 
linked to a satisfactory restructuring plan, and only granted 
where it can be demonstrated that the Community interest 
is best served by keeping a manufacturer in business and by 
re-establishing its viability. It will be necessary to ensure that 
the aid will not allow a beneficiary to increase its market 
share at the expense of its unaided competitors. In cases 
where certain companies still have excess capacity, e.g. in 
the commercial vehicle sector, the Commission may require 
reductions in capacity in order to contribute to the overall 
recovery of the sector. 
REGIONAL AID 
One of the main types of aid benefiting this sector is regional 
aid for new implantations and capacity extensions as well 
as for an engagement in an activity involving a fundamental 
change in the product or production process of an existing 
establishment (by means of rationalization, restructuring or 
modernization). The Commission acknowledges the valuable 
contribution to regional developments which can be made 
by the implantation of new motor vehicle and component 
production facilities and/or the expansion of such existing 
activities in disadvantaged regions. For this reason the Com-
mission has a generally positive attitude towards investment 
aid granted in order to help overcome structural handicaps 
in disadvantaged parts of the Community. This aid is usually 
granted automatically in accordance with modalities pre-
viously approved by the Commission. By requiring prior 
notification of such aids in future, the Commission should 
give itself an opportunity to assess the regional development 
benefits (i.e. the promotion of a lasting development of 
the region by creating viable jobs, linkages into local and 
Community economy) against possible adverse effects on 
the sector as a whole (such as the creation of important 
overcapacity). Such an evaluation does not seek to deny the 
central importance of regional aid for the achievement of 
cohesion within the Community but rather to ensure that 
other aspects of Community interest such as the development 
of the Community's industry are also taken into account. 
INVESTMENT AID FOR INNOVATION, 
MODERNIZATION OR RATIONALIZATION 
In the context of a genuine internal market for motor ve-
hicles, competition between producers will become even 
more intense and the distortive impact of aid will be greater. 
Therefore, the Commission will take a strict attitude towards 
aid for modernization and innovation. These are activities 
to be undertaken by the companies themselves and normally 
financed from their own resources or by commercial loans 
as part of their normal company operation in a competitive 
market environment. Aid for fundamental rationalization 
will have to be carefully examined in order to verify that it 
brings about a necessary, radical change in the structure 
and organization of the company's activities and that the 
financing required goes beyond that which companies should 
normally be expected to finance from own resources. Simi-
larly, proposed aid for innovation will be examined in order 
to determine whether it really relates to the introduction of 
genuinely innovative products or processes at Community 
level. 
AID FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Commission will continue to have a positive attitude 
towards aid for pre-competitive R&D. However, the Com-
mission will ensure, in keeping with its 'Framework on State 
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aid for R&D', I at the same time that a clear distinction is 
established between genuine research and development and 
the introduction of new technologies inherent to production 
investment (modernization). 
AID FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
ENERGY SA YING 
The development ofless polluting and energy-saving vehicles 
is a s!ar.dard requirement for the industry, partly imposed 
by Community legislation, and should thus be financed from 
the company's own resources. Aid for general pollution 
control, e.g. granted under the terms of the environmental 
aid framework, may still be acceptable under the existing aid 
schemes. Such cases will have to be examined individually. 
AID FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
LINKED TO INVESTMENTS 
The Commission has a generally positive attitude towards 
training, retraining and reconversion programmes. Aid pro-
posed for such purposes will have to be examined in order 
to ensure that it does not simply alleviate the cost burden 
which companies would normally have to bear, in particular 
that they do not undermine the present guidelines. 
Therefore, within the scope of the framework, the Com-
mission intends to carefully examine aid for company-
specific vocational training measures which are prompted 
by, and thus directly linked to, investments. The Commission 
will ensure that: 
I OJ C 83, 11.4.1986. 
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- such aid does not exceed a reasonable intensity, whenever 
linked with production investments, 
- the vocational training measures involved in the project 
correspond to genuinely qualitative changes in the re-
quired qualifications of the labour force and relate to a 
significant proportion of the workers, so that it can be 
assumed that these measures are intended to safeguard 
employment and develop new employment possibilities 
for persons at risk of unemployment. 
Vocational training measures specific to one or all companies 
prompted by investments which do not fulfil these above-
mentioned criteria are to be considered as part of the invest-
ment, and submitted to the criteria regarding the different 
forms of investment aids as set out above. 
Vocational training measures which are related to workers 
being retrained for continued employment in the company 
which are not linked to investment and which are intended 
to safeguard employment and develop new employment 
possibilities for persons at risk of unemployment in the 
framework of restructuring can be considered compatible. 
OPERA TING AID 
As operating aid has a direct and ongoing distortive effect 
in a sensitive sector such as motor vehicles, it should not be 
authorized, even in disa!ivantaged regions. No new op-
erating aid will be authorized in this sector and the Com-
mission will propose, on the basis of Article 93 (1) of the 
EEC Treaty, the progressive disappearance of existing op-
erating aid to those Member States which currently grand 
such aid. 
Part II 
The ecu and its role in the process 
towards monetary union 
This study was prepared by Andre Louw. 
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Introduction 
The name 'ecu' means different things to different people. 
For some, it is the acronym for European currency unit. For 
others, it is the name of a medieval French coin. But for all 
it has become the household name for a monetary unit that 
in barely 10 years' time has developed into a major currency 
on the international markets. 
The ecu began its existence in March 1979 as the central 
unit of the European Monetary System. It soon expanded 
outside its official setting. Adopted by the private markets, 
the ecu successfully developed into a monetary unit pos-
sessing all the functional characteristics of a currency and 
being used as such in international financial and commercial 
transactions. 
This paper is conceived as an introduction to the ecu,to its 
market performance, its qualities and weaknesses, its ulti-
mate goal and, in particular, to the role it could and should 
play in the process leading towards the final stage of 
Europe's monetary integration process. 
I - Basic notions 
1. Definition of the ecu 
The ecu is the European currency unit as defined by Com-
munity legislation, enacted in the framework of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) set up at the end of 
1978. 
This legislation, i.e. a regulation issued by the Council of 
Ministers of the European Communities, 1 defines the ecu as 
a currency basket composed of specific amounts of each 
of the currencies of the Member States of the European 
Communities. These amounts are presently the following: 
Belgian franc 
Danish krone 
Deutsch mark 
Greek drachma 
Portuguese escudo 
French franc 
Dutch guilder 
Irish pound 
Luxembourg franc 
Italian lira 
Spanish peseta 
Pound sterling 
See Annexes I, 2, 3a and 3b. 
(BFR): 
(DKR): 
(DM): 
(DR): 
(ESC): 
(FF): 
(HFL): 
(IRL): 
(LFR): 
(LIT): 
(PTA): 
(UKL): 
3,301 
0,1976 
0,6242 
1,440 
1,393 
1,332 
0,2198 
0,008552 
0,130 
151,8 
6,885 
0,08784 
Basic notions 
2. Value 
Theoretically, the value (or rate) of the ecu in terms of any 
of its component currencies is equal to the sum of the 
following elements : the physical amount by which that cur-
rency is represented in the ecu and, converted into that 
currency at the going exchange rate, the amounts of the 
other currencies in the ecu. Similarly, the ecu's value in 
dollars is equal to the sum of the dollar values of all the 
ecu's components. 
Each day, on the basis of the exchange market situation of 
2.15 p.m., the Commission of the European Communities 
calculates the rate of the ecu in terms of each of its com-
ponent currencies. The ecu rates of 13 other major currencies 
are also calculated. Being calculated only once a day, these 
rates will differ somewhat from the buying and selling rates 
quoted throughout the day by the commercial banks that 
are active in the ecu market. 
The Commission's rates are official in the sense that they 
apply to the uses of the ecu in the European Monetary 
System (EMS) and in other official Community areas. They 
are widely publicized.2 
3. Rules for the revision of the ecu's 
composition 
The amounts of the currencies in the ecu basket are not 
fixed once and forever. Two developments may lead to a 
revision of the ecu's composition: 
(a) The evolution of the weights of the currencies 
in the ecu 
The 'weight' of a currency in the ecu is the ratio, in percent-
age terms, between the number of units of that currency in 
the ecu and the value (rate) of the ecu in terms of that 
particular currency. Thus, for example, on 4 July 1991 the 
ecu was worth LIT I 528,70 and, since there are LIT 151,8 
in the ecu's basket, the lira's weight in the ecu on that day 
was 151,8: I 528,7 = 9,93%. 
Weights do change. They increase for a currency that 
appreciates against the other component currencies because 
the fixed factor (amount of that currency in the ecu) will 
increase relative to the variable factor (value of the ecu in 
that currency). The reverse happens in case of a depreciation. 
See Annex 4 for details on calculation method and publication. 
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The weights of the currencies in the ecu are subject to a five 
yearly re-examination which may lead to an actual revision 
of the ecu's composition if it is agreed that these weights 
have grown too much out of line with the underlying econ-
omic realities of the Member States involved. 
(b) The adhesion of new Member States 
Under its present rules, the Community grants new Member 
States the right to have their currencies incorporated in the 
ecu. Timing and modalities are settled in the Accession 
Treaties. 1 
II - The revisions of the ecu 
1. The September 1984 revision 
On 15 September 1984 the composition of the ecu was 
changed, following the first five-yearly re-examination. The 
change became effective on Monday, 17 September 1984. 
The decision to adjust the ecu's composition was taken 
because the weights had changed considerably. In 1979, the 
Deutschmark had a weight of 33 %. By mid-1984, it had 
risen to about 37 %. Over the same period, the weight of 
the lira dropped from 9,5 % to less than 8 % and the weight 
of the French franc also declined considerably. These 
changes reflected exchange-rate movements rather than 
shifts in relative economic importance. The Community 
authorities therefore decided to revise the ecu's composition 
in order to restore a closer relationship between the Member 
States' currency share in the ecu and their relative economic 
weight. 
On this occasion, and in accordance with the provisions of 
the Treaty of Accession, the Greek drachma was introduced 
in the ecu with a weight of 1,3 %. 
In deciding to revise the ecu's composition, consideration 
was given to the impact of the new weights on the ecu's 
interest rates. Indeed, by reducing the weights oflow interest-
rate currencies like the Deutschmark and the guilder and 
increasing those of higher interest-rate currencies such as the 
See Annex 5 for a more detailed explanation of the revision procedures. 
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lira and the French franc, the interest rate on the ecu was 
bound to rise. In fact, on the day of the change, the calcu-
lated2 short-term interest rate on the new ecu was about 0,8 
points higher than on the old one. However, the actual 
market rate increased from 9,45 % to 9,60 % only. This 
minimal rise was due to the pre-emptive increase in market 
rates that the financial intermediaries, which had correctly 
anticipated the ecu revision, had been initiating for some 
time. No noticeable interest-rate effect was felt on the long-
term ecu market. 
2. The September 1989 revision 
Five years later, in 1989, a second revision of the ecu's 
composition took place. As in 1984, it aimed at correcting 
the weight structure, though the shifts that had taken place 
in the currencies' weights were less pronounced than in the 
previous period. 
In consideration of the ever-growing importance of the ecu's 
development on the private markets a two stage procedure 
was adopted to implement the revision: on 19 June 1989 the 
Council of Finance Ministers agreed on the weights and 
announced that they were to come into force later in the 
year, i.e. on 21 September. This allowed the ecu market 
operators to prepare for a smoother transition from the old 
to the new ecu, especially in view of the uncertainties that 
surrounded the incorporation of the peseta and the escudo. 
If the effect on the interest-rate shift was reduced to a 
minimum, the new procedure did not succeed in avoiding a 
slow-down in ecu market activity during the run-up period 
to the actual revision, which also comprised the enlargement 
of the ecu basket to include the peseta and the escudo. 
Table I provides a more precise insight into the relevant 
data of the two revisions. It clearly shows the slow-down in 
weight-shifts in 1984-89 as compared to 1979-84. It also 
highlights that today's weights (July 1991) are still closely in 
line with those of the September 1989 revision. This is due 
to the absence of realignments in the EMS. If this stability 
record proves sustainable, the 1994 re-examination of the 
developments of the weights in the ecu is not likely to 
indicate a need for another revision. 
Calculated: weighted average of the interest rates quoted on the 
Euromoney markets for the component currencies. 
The 'official' ecu: central unit of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
Table 1 
Revisions of the ecu, 1984 and 1989: new composition and weights before and at revision 
Ecu co1!1ponent Initial composition New 1984 composition New 1989 composition Wcights1 
currcnoi:s and wcights 1 and weights 1 on revision and weights 1 on revision on 
day and on previous day clay and on previous day 
13.3.1979 14.9.1984 11.9.1984 20.9.1989 21.9.1989 4.7.1991 
BFR 3,66 (9,1) (8, l) 3,71 (8,2) (7,6) 3,301 (7,6) (7,8) 
DKR 0,217 (3,0) (2,7) 0,219 (2,7) (2,7) 0,1976 (2.45) (2,5) 
DM 0,828 (33,0) (36,9) 0,719 (32,0) (34,7) 0,6242 (30,1) (30,4) 
DR 1,15 ( 1,3) (0,6) 1,440 (0,8) (0,6) 
ESC 1,393 (0,8) (0,8) 
FF 1,15 (19,8) (16,7) 1,31 (19,0) (18,7) 1,332 (19,0) (19, 1) 
HFL 0,286 (10,5) ( 11,3) 0,256 (10, 1) (10,9) 0,2198 (9,4) (9,5) 
IRL 0,00759 ( 1, 1) (1,0) 0,00871 (1,2) ( 1,1) 0,008552 ( 1, 1) (I, 1) 
LFR 0,14 (0,4) (0,3) 0,14 (0,3) (0,3) 0,130 (0,3) (0,3) 
LIT 109,0 (9,5) (7,9) 140,0 (10,1) (9,4) 151,8 (10,15) (9,9) 
PTA 
UKL 0,0885 (13,6) ( 15, 1) 
I Weights given in parentheses. 
III - The 'official' ecu : central unit of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) 
The EMS, which started operating in March 1979, aims to 
stabilize the exchange rates within the Community with the 
ultimate objective of furthering price stability and economic 
growth. Indeed, the founders of the System held the view that 
in Europe's open economies - the foreign sector represents 
more than 50 % of GNP in some Member States - large 
currency fluctuations were a drag on growth and a stimulus 
to inflation. At present, all Member States participate in the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS, except Greece and 
Portugal. 
In this system, the ecu plays a central role : 
(a) The ecu is the numeraire for the central rates, also called 
parities, of the participating currencies in the EMS. By 
crossing the ecu parities, one derives for each of these 
currencies a set of bilateral parities. Intervention limits 
are then fixed at 2 t % on either side of the bilateral 
parities. For the pound sterling and the peseta this mar-
gin is 6 %. Each participating central bank undertakes 
0,0878 
6,885 (5,3) (5,3) 
(15,0) (13,0) 0,08784 (13,0) (12,6) 
to maintain its exchange rate against the other EMS 
currencies within these limits (see Table 2). 
If market forces push a currency to its upper or lower 
limit against another currency, then the central banks 
involved must take action (intervention, interest-rate 
moves, other measures) to the full extent necessary to 
keep the limits from being crossed. 
However, parity rates are not fixed once and forever; 
they can be adjusted or 'realigned' (see Table 3). The 
existing parities cannot be adjusted unilaterally by the 
country involved; it requires a unanimous decision of 
the Member States' Finance Ministers in a Community 
procedure involving also the central bank governors and 
the Commission. 
(b) The ecu is the denominator for the claims and liabilities 
that may arise between the central banks as a result of 
the latter's interventions in each other's currency. Indeed, 
when a limit is reached, the strong currency that needs 
to be sold on the markets against the weak one can be 
borrowed on a short-term basis from the issuing central 
bank. These credit operations are registered in ecus. 
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Table 2 
ERM: Bilateral central rates and intervention limits in force since 8 October 1990 
BFR 100 DKR 100 DMIOO PTA 100 FF 100 IRL I LIT I OOO HFL 100 UKLI ECU I 
Brussels + 2,25% 553,000 2 109,50 33,6930 628,970 56,5115 28,1930 I 872,15 64,6050 
BFR CR 100 540,723 2 062,55 31,7316 614,977 55,2545 27,5661 1830,54 60,8451 42,4032 
-2,25% 528,700 2 016,55 29,8850 601,295 54,0250 26,9530 I 789,85 57,3035 
Copenhagen +2,25% 18,9143 390,160 6,23100 116,320 10,4511 5,21400 346,240 11,9479 
DKR CR 18,4938 100 381,443 5,86837 113,732 10,2186 5,09803 338,537 11,2526 7,84195 
-2,25% 18,0831 373,000 5,52600 111,200 9,99130 4,98500 331,020 10,5976 
Frankfurt +2,25% 4,95900 26,8100 1,63300 30,4950 2,74000 1,36700 90,7700 3,13200 
OM CR 4,84837 26,2162 100 1,53847 29,8164 2,67894 1,33651 88,7526 2,95000 2,05586 
-2,25% 4,74000 25,6300 1,44900 29,1500 2,61900 1,30650 86,7800 2,77800 
Madrid +6% 334,619 I 809,40 6 901,70 2 057,80 184,892 92,2400 6 125,30 203,600 
PTA CR 315,143 I 704,05 6500,00 100 1938,06 174,131 86,8726 5 768,83 191,750 133,631 
-6% 296,802 I 604,90 6 121,70 I 825,30 163,997 81,8200 5 433,10 180,590 
Paris +2,25% 16,6310 89,9250 343,050 5,47850 100,000 9,18900 4,58450 304,440 10,5055 
FF CR 16,2608 87,9257 335,386 5,15981 100,000 8,98480 4,48247 297,661 9,89389 6,89509 
-2,25% 15,8990 85,9700 327,920 4,85950 100,000 8,78500 4,38300 291,040 9,31800 
Dublin +2,25% 1,85100 10,0087 38,1825 0,609772 11,3830 0,510246 33,8868 1,16920 
1RL CR 1,80981 9,78604 37,3281 0,574281 11,1299 0,498895 33,1293 1,10118 0,767417 
-2,25% 1,76950 9,56830 36,4964 0,540858 10,8825 0,487799 32,3939 1,03710 
Rome +2,25% 3 710,20 20 062,0 76 540,0 I 222,30 22817,0 2 050,03 67 912,0 2 343,62 
LIT CR 3 627,64 19 615,4 74821,7 1 151,11 ll 309,1 2004,43 1 OOO 66 405,3 2 207,25 1538,24 
-2,25% 3 546,90 19 179,0 73 157,1 I 084,10 21 813,0 I 959,84 64 928,0 2 078,79 
Amsterdam +2,25% 5,58700 30,2100 115,235 1,84050 34,3600 3,08700 1,54000 3,52950 
HFL CR 5,46286 29,5389 112,673 1,73345 33,5953 3,01848 1,50590 100 3,32389 2,31643 
-2,25% 5,34150 28,8825 110,1675 1,63250 32,8475 2,95100 1,47250 3,13050 
London +6% 1,74510 9,43610 35,9970 0,553740 10,7320 0,964240 0,481050 31,9450 
UKL CR 1,64352 8,88687 33,8984 0,521514 10,1073 0,908116 0,453053 30,0853 0,696904 
-6% 1,54790 8,36970 31,9280 0,491160 9,51910 0,855260 0,426690 28,3340 
Note: The drachma and the escudo do not participate i~ the exchange-rate mechanism; their notional central ecu rates are respectively 205,311 and 178,735. 
CR = Central rates. 
(c) The ecu is a reserve instrument. The European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF), 1 for which the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) acts as agent, has issued 
ecus to the EMS central banks against the deposit (on a 
revolving swap basis) of 20 % of their gold and 20 % of 
their dollar holdings. The total amount of ecu reserves 
issued stands presently (June 1991) at 48,5 billion. These 
ecus can be used to settle the ecu debts that originate 
from the borrowings of Community currencies for the 
support operations mentioned in (b) above. For the 
settlement of these debts, the ecu is 'legal tender', i.e. 
creditor central banks have agreed to accept full settle-
ment in ecus. Other payments in ecus between EEC 
central banks can only be made by mutual consent. 
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The EMCF was set up in 1973 as the forerunner of Europe's central 
bank in the framework of the previous currency stabilization scheme 
('snake'). This system was replaced by the EMS. 
The 'official' ecu circuit therefore consists of a small 
number of European central banks, 2 among which the 
ecu can be used as a means of payment, but to a limited 
extent so far. On this circuit the exchange rate used is 
the 'official' rate as calculated by the Commission (see 
Chapter 1.2 above), and the interest rate applicable is 
calculated as the weighted average of the interest rates 
on the most representative domestic money market 
instruments of the ecu's component currencies. 
In 1985, the official ecu circuit was opened to central banks of third 
countries and to international monetary institutions, provided they had 
been granted the status of 'other holder' by the EMCF. So far, the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) and the central banks of Austria, 
Switzerland, Malta and Norway have acquired this status. 
The 'official' ecu: central unit of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
Table 3 
Changes in ecu composition, central rates and weights 
BFR DKR OM DR 1 PTA FF IRL LIT HFL ESC 1 UKL2 
13.3.19793 3,80 0,217 0,828 1,15 0,00759 109 0,286 0,0885 
CR 39,4582 7,08592 2,51064 5,79831 0,662638 1148,18 2,72077 0,663247 
% 9,63 3,06 32,98 19,83 1,15 9,49 10,51 13,34 
24.9.1979 CR 39,8456 7,36594 2,48557 5,85522 0,669141 1159,42 2,74748 0,649821 
% 9,54 2,95 33,31 19,64 1,13 9,40 10,41 13,62 
30.11.1979 CR 39,7897 7,72336 2,48208 5,84700 0,668201 1157,79 2,74362 0,648910 
% 9,55 2,81 33,36 19,67 1,14 9,41 10,42 13,64 
23.3.1981 CR 40,7985 7,91917 2,54502 5,99526 0,685145 1262,92 2,81318 0,542122 
% 9,31 2,74 32,53 19,18 1,11 8,63 10,17 16,32 
5.10.1981 CR 40,7572 7,91117 2,40989 6,17443 0,684452 1300,67 2,66382 0,601048 
% 9,32 2,74 34,36 18,63 !,II 8,38 10,74 14,72 
22.2.1982 CR 44,6963 8,18382 2,41815 6,19564 0,686799 1305,13 2,67296 0,557037 
% 8,50 2,65 34,24 18,56 1,11 8,35 10,70 15,89 
14.6.1982 CR 44,9704 8,23400 2,33379 6,61387 0,691011 1350,27 2,57971 0,560453 
% 8,45 2,64 35,48 17,39 1,10 8,07 ll,09 15,79 
21.3.1983 CR 44,3662 8,04412 2,21515 6,79271 0,717050 1386,78 2,49587 0,629848 
% 8,57 2,70 37,38 16,93 1,06 7,86 11,46 14,05 
18.5.1983 CR 44,9008 8,14104 2,24184 6,87456 0,725690 1403,49 2,52595 0,587087 
% 8,46 2,67 36,93 16,73 1,05 7,77 11,32 15,07 
17.9.19844 3,85 0,219 0,719 1,15 1,31 0,00871 140 0,256 0,0878 
CR 44,9008 8,14104 2,24184 87,4813 6,87456 0,725690 1403,49 2,52595 0,585992 
% 8,57 2,69 32,07 1,31 19,06 1,20 9,98 10,13 14,98 
22.7.1985 CR 44,8320 8,12857 2,23840 100,719 6,86402 0,724578 1520,60 2,52208 0,555312 
% 8,59 2,69 32,12 1,14 19,09 1,20 9,21 10,15 15,81 
7.4.1986 CR 43,6761 7,91896 2,13834 135,659 6,96280 0,712956 1496,21 2,40935 0,630317 
% 8,81 2,77 33,62 0,85 18,81 1,22 9,36 10,63 13,93 
4.8.1986 CR 43,1139 7,81701 2,11083 137,049 6,87316 0,764976 1476,95 2,37833 0,679256 
% 8,93 2,80 34,06 0,84 19,06 1,14 9,48 10,76 12,93 
12.1.1987 CR 42,4582 7,85212 2.05853 150,792 6,90403 0,768411 1483,58 2,31943 0,739615 
% 9,07 2,79 34,93 0,76 18,97 1,13 9,44 11,04 11,87 
21.9.19895 3,431 0,1976 0,6242 1,440 6,885 1,332 0,008552 151,8 0,2198 1,393 0,08784 
CR 42.4582 7,85212 2,05853 150,792 133,804 6,90403 0,768411 1483,58 2,31943 172,085 0,728627 
% 8,08 2,52 30,32 0,95 5,15 19,29 1,11 10,23 9,48 0,81 12,06 
8.1.1990 CR 42,1679 7,79845 2,04446 187,934 132,889 6,85684 0,763159 1529,70 2,30358 177,743 0,728615 
% 8,14 2,53 30,53 0,77 5,18 19,43 1,12 9,92 9,54 0,78 12,06 
8.10.1990 CR 42,4032 7,84195 2,05586 205,311 133,631 6,89509 0,767417 1538,24 2,31643 178,735 0,696904 
% 8,09 2,52 30,36 0,70 5,15 19,32 1,11 9,87 9,49 0,78 12,60 
Notional central rates. 
Notional central rates until entry of sterling into the ERM on 8 October 1990. 
Ecu composition at the stan of the European Monetary System. 
4 Revised composition of the ecu and inclusion of the drachma. 
l Revised composition of the ecu and inclusion of the peseta and the escudo. The central rate of the peseta was fixed on 19 June 1989 when it entered the exchange rate mechanism. 
CR = Central rates. 
% = Percentage weights. 
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IV - The 'market' ecu : a major currency on 
the international exchange, money, and 
financial markets 
1. Anatomy of the ecu as a foreign currency 
The ecu is nowhere a 'national' currency as there is no 
'eculand', but on the international markets it has become a 
major 'foreign' currency. Indeed, European nationals, and 
others as well, can use the ecu for their international financial 
Table 4 
Exchange rates of the ecu 
BFR DKR DM DR PTA 
1979 40,1653 7,20793 2,51097 50,7569 91,973 
1980 40,5980 7,82736 2,52421 59,4178 99,702 
1981 41,2947 7,92256 2,51390 61,6230 102,676 
1982 44,7116 8,15687 2,37599 65,3419 107,558 
1983 45,4380 8,13189 2,27053 78,0884 127,503 
1984 45,4421 8,14648 2,23811 88,4154 126,569 
1985 44,9137 8.01877 2,22632 105,739 129,135 
1986 43,7979 7.93565 2,12819 137,425 137,456 
1987 43,0410 7,88472 2,07153 156,268 142,165 
1988 43,4285 7,95152 2,07440 167,576 137,601 
1989 43,3806 8,04929 2,07015 178,840 130,406 
1990 42,4257 7,85652 2,05209 201,412 129,411 
1991 
(Jan.-Aug.) 42,2812 7,90295 2,05399 222,801 128,096 
USD YEN SFR NKR SKR FMK 
1979 1,37047 300,461 2,27865 6,93700 5,87171 5,32202 
1980 1,39233 315,044 2,32777 6,86548 5,88097 5,17224 
1981 1,11645 245,379 2,18714 6,38700 5,63465 4,79298 
1982 0,97971 243,546 1,98634 6,31294 6,14336 4,70721 
1983 0,89022 211,354 1,86753 6,49113 6,82115 4,94819 
1984 0,78903 187,089 1,84753 6,41698 6,51098 4,72408 
1985 0,76309 180,559 1,85572 6,51104 6,52133 4,69423 
1986 0,98417 164,997 1,76086 7,27750 6,99567 4,97974 
1987 1,15444 166,598 1,71780 7,76498 7,31001 5,06517 
1988 1,18248 151,459 1,72822 7,70054 7,24192 4,94362 
1989 1,10175 151,938 1,80010 7,60381 7,09939 4,72301 
1990 1,27343 183,660 1,76218 7,94851 7,52051 4,85496 
1991 
(Jan.-Aug.) 1,23725 168,508 1,75922 8,01562 7,48908 4,91000 
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and commercial dealings in the same way as they would use 
the dollar or the Deutschmark. 
This is borne out by the facts : the ecu is bought and sold 
on the foreign exchange markets against most national cur-
rencies; banks use the ecu alongside other currencies for 
their international borrowing and lending operations; 
governments, international institutions, and a wide range of 
corporate businesses increasingly float ecu bonds on the 
international capital markets; and, finally, to some extent at 
least, exporters have started to invoice in ecus and importers 
to pay in ecus. 
( Yearly average) 
FF IRL LIT HFL ESC UKL 
5,82981 0,669446 1 138,43 2,74876 67,014 0,646304 
5,86896 0,675997 1 189,21 2,76027 69,552 0,598488 
6,03993 0,691021 1 263,18 2,77511 68,495 0,553111 
6,43117 0,689605 1 323,78 2,61391 78,007 0,560455 
6,77078 0,714956 1 349,92 2,53720 98,689 0,587014 
6,87166 0,725942 1 381,38 2,52335 115,680 0,590626 
6,79503 0,715168 1 447,99 2,51101 130,252 0,588977 
6,79976 0,733526 1 461.88 2,40090 147,088 0,671543 
6,92910 0,775448 i 494,91 2,33418 162,616 0,704571 
7,03644 0,775672 1 537,33 2,33479 170,059 0,664434 
7,02387 0,776818 1 510,47 2,33526 173,413 0,673302 
6,91412 0,767768 1 521,98 2,31212 181,108 0,713851 
6,97281 0,768948 1 532,09 2,31460 179,096 0,698480 
( Yearly a,erage) 
Os CAD AUD NZD SDR MTL TRL 
18,3095 1,60564 1,06058 
17,9686 1,62609 1,06869 
17,7151 1,33793 0,951677 1,31290 0,94548 
16,6991 1,20822 0,964741 1,30379 0,88448 
15,9689 1,09671 0,987346 1,33143 0,83253 
15,7349 1,02066 0,897143 1,38172 0,76777 
15,6428 1,04204 1,09208 1,52805 0,749042 
14,9643 1,36731 1,47800 1,88331 0,837563 
14,5710 1,53020 1,64733 1,94744 0,892137 
14,5861 1,45589 1,51397 1,80385 0,879875 
14,5695 1,30430 1,39279 1,84216 0,859756 0,395987 2 661,04 
14,4399 1,48540 1,63021 2,13185 0,937068 0,403632 3 329,06 
14,4530 1,42430 1,59589 2,11227 0,905845 0,399095 4 696,96 
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Spurred by these market developments, the monetary autho-
rities of the 12 Member States have, between 1981 and 1987, 
all granted their residents the right to use the ecu on the 
same terms and conditions as those applicable to foreign 
currencies. 
The ecu's story is unique in modern monetary history: 
market forces transforming a currency basket into a fully 
usable foreign currency. 
It is important to note that the ecu used by the markets is 
the ecu as defined by Community legislation, including the 
revisions made to its initial composition. Preserving the 
definitional link with the official ecu is vital for the develop-
ment of the market ecu as it ensures the unity and market-
ability of present and future ecu-denominated market instru-
ments. For their part, the Community authorities responsible 
for the ecu's definition have increasingly taken the market 
needs into consideration (see Chapter II above). 
Although linked by a common definition, the official ecu 
and market ecu are used on two completely separated cir-
cuits. The 'official' ecus are issued by an official monetary 
Table 5 
institution and only EEC central banks and other designated 
official holders can hold and use them. The 'market' ecus 
are created by the private sector and can be held and used 
by any market operator. 
The absence of central bank involvement in the management 
of the market ecu raises a number of questions about the 
way the ecu is created, how its exchange and interest rates 
are determined and about its usability as a means of payment 
considering that ecu notes and coins do not exist. 
These questions are best answered by going through the 
various steps of a concrete ecu transaction such as, for 
example, the purchase by a Dutch investor of an ecu bond 
issued on the international market by a French corporation. 
Such a bond is priced in ecus and has to be paid in ecus. 
How does the Dutch buyer acquire these ecus? Quite simply 
by addressing his bank and either buying ecus against his 
own or another currency, or obtaining a credit in ecus. Since 
ecu bank notes do not exist, the bank will deliver the ecus 
by crediting the customer's sight account in its books for 
the amount of the ecus bought or borrowed. 
Operations rates of the EMCF and interest rates and yields of ecu investments 
(%) 
EMCF Deposits Bonds 
I month 3 months 6 months I year < 5 years 5. 7 year:s > 7 years 
1987 6,77 7,00 7,10 7,16 7,27 7,85 8,24 8,51 
1988 6,71 6,67 6,88 7,05 7,18 7,70 7,89 8,18 
1989 9,25 9,10 9,30 9,41 9,49 8,86 8,70 8,76 
1990 10,52 10,07 10,32 10,55 10,69 10,83 10,42 10,37 
1990 
April 10,50 10,19 10,37 10,69 10,89 11,50 10,93 10,68 
May 10,50 10,03 10,22 10,47 10,66 11,04 10,60 10,54 
June 10,25 9,84 10,05 10,30 10,47 10,47 10,33 10,31 
July I0,25 9,77 10,08 10,27 10,42 10,27 I0,03 9,99 
August I0,50 9,90 I0,17 I0,40 I0,52 10,41 10,23 I0,27 
September 10,25 9,66 9,97 10,28 10,50 10,86 10,46 10,56 
October 10,25 9,59 9,86 10,02 10,28 10,90 10,42 I0,56 
November 10,50 9,64 9,94 I0,01 10,07 10,69 I0,20 10,36 
December 10,75 10,33 10,39 10,42 10,39 10,66 9,97 10,01 
1991 
January 10,75 10,11 10,41 10,48 10,52 10,55 9,99 10,02 
February 10,50 9,62 9,78 9,86 9,94 10,04 9,30 9,32 
March 10,25 9,28 9,30 9,33 9,34 9,70 9,20 9,19 
April 10,00 9,23 9,28 9,33 9,39 9,63 9,07 9,08 
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Acquiring ecu holdings in the form of sight deposits is not 
enough, however, to complete the purchase of the ecu bond. 
The Dutch buyer must also be able to transfer the ecu assets 
which he has with his bank to the bank in whose books the 
seller has his ecu account. In other words, he must be able 
to use the ecus in his sight account as a means of payment. 
Just like for any national 'bank' money, an ecu interbank 
clearing system exists that allows anybody to make and 
receive ecu payments world-wide. 
As can be seen, for the Dutch investor, this purchase of an 
ecu bond is not different from a similar transaction in any 
other foreign currency. 
However, in order to grasp the full extent of this achieve-
ment, clarification is needed on the following points. 
(a) Ecu creation and the ecu basket 
A bank creates ecu money (sight deposits) much in the same 
way as it creates domestic money: 'loans make deposits'. 
But there are differences. In creating the domestic money in 
this way, a bank does not run an exchange risk and it has 
the possibility, in case of liquidity need, to turn to a lender 
of last resort to monetize its short-term loan portfolio: the 
central bank. 
In creating ecus by a lending operation, a bank faces an 
exchange risk on its ecu loan portfolio as well as a liquidity 
problem when the borrower draws on his ecu account. It 
will cover itself by matching its ecu asset position (ecu loans) 
with an equivalent ecu liability (ecu borrowings). In other 
words, it will borrow the ecus that it lends. 
However, if this is possible for a single bank, it is not so for 
the whole of the banking sector in situations where the 
amount of ecu resources (deposits by non-banks) is less than 
the customers' demand for ecu credit. In the absence of a 
central bank as lender of last resort, a small number of 
banks have specialized in the role of intermediaries between 
the ecu and the ecu's component currencies: they volunteer 
to lend ecus to the banks in need of liquidity and, in turn, 
cover themselves in the basket of the ecu's components. 
Actually, it is the money markets of the component cur-
rencies of the ecu that provide the lender of last resort 
facilities to the ecu market. This link between the ecu and 
its basket and the commitment of a number of financial 
intermediaries in ensuring it, are essential to the depth, 
resilience and liquidity of the ecu market. Without this 
basket-recourse, ecu assets and ecu liabilities would have to 
be matched at all times ecu against ecu. This constraint 
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would have: fatally compromised the growth of the ecu 
market, if not its very existence. 
(b) The ecu's exchange and interest rates 
The ecu deposits that market operators buy, sell, transfer, 
borrow or lend are ecus; they are not baskets. However, 
since the ecu is defined as a basket of currencies, its exchange 
rate vis-a-vis its component currencies and third currencies 
should remain closely aligned to the basket's value in terms 
of these currencies. As to the ecu's interest rates, they should 
be equivalent to the weighted average of the interest rates on 
the basket's currencies in the international money markets. 
The 'equal' value between the ecu and its basket is effectively 
ensured by the 'last resort' financial intermediaries referred 
to above. 
The equivalence is not perfect as these intermediaries will 
fix their buying and selling rates of the ecu against the 
basket, as well as their bid and offered interest rates on the 
ecu, in function of the global situation of the ecu market. 
In other words, in a buyers' market, i.e. when a net demand 
for ecu deposits prevails, the ecu will behave like any strong 
currency: it will tend to appreciate against its basket while 
its interest rate will decrease. The reverse evolution will occur 
in a sellers' market. Competition between the 'basket makers' 
will ensure that the exchange and interest rate differentials 
between the ecu and its basket remain minimal (see Graph 
1 ). 
( c) The ecu clearing system 
The ecus held in sight accounts with banks can only be used 
efficiently (in terms of cost and speed) for making payments 
provided that a clearing system exists for processing the 
payment instruments used (payment orders, cheques, bank 
cards). Such systems exist in each country for the national 
currency. They are managed by, or operated under, the 
control of the central bank. 
For the ecu, a privately run international clearing system is 
in operation for payment orders related to bank accounts. 
It is managed by the Ecu Banking Association (EBA), in 
association with Swift (Society for World-wide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication) and the BIS (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements). 
The operating principle of a clearing system is simple: each 
participating bank (clearing bank) must carry out the pay-
ment orders received from the other clearing banks 
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GRAPH I: Differential between the market ecu and the ecu basket 
( Weekly averages) 
-1 
- Exchange rate - Interest rate 
25.9 20.11 22.1 19.3 14.5 9.7 3.9 29.10 24.12 18.2 15.4 10.6 5.8 
1989 1990 
Sou.ru : Commission services. 
i.e. credit the accounts of the beneficiaries in its books. Its 
own payment orders to other clearers in favour of benefici-
aries having an account with the latter are dealt with likewise. 
At the end of each day, these payment orders are netted and 
each clearing bank has only one amount to pay or to cash: 
the difference between the total amount of the payment 
orders received and of those sent out. 
More specifically, the ecu clearing system functions as fol-
lows : most banks use the Swift network for the transmission 
of their payment orders to other banks, whatever the cur-
rency. So do the ecu clearing banks. But when they send ecu 
payment orders, a copy is automatically made and stored in 
a computer installed at Swift's headquarters in Belgium. 
From the data thus collected, Swift calculates, in the after-
noon of each business day, the net debit or credit position 
in ecus of each clearing bank in relation to all the others. 
Each bank receives notification of its own balance, the BIS 
receiving the whole set. 
From then on the BIS takes over. Its role is twofold: it is 
the EBA's agent for the clearing and the banker of the 
clearing banks. As an agent, it keeps the record of the credit 
and debit positions and carries out the daily settlement 
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operations necessary to balance the accounts. As a banker 
it accepts ecu sight deposits from the clearing banks in its 
books. The amounts held in these accounts represent the 
countervalue of the ecu's component currencies that have 
been transferred by the clearing banks to the accounts held 
by the BIS with each of the central banks issuing these 
currencies. 
Although that had originally been the intention, the ecu 
sight deposits hardly serve to settle the clearing balances. 
Indeed, since the settlement operations have to be made 
'value same day', a depleted ecu account cannot be adjusted 
in time by a debtor bank in order to have the necessary funds 
for the settlement of its debt. Consequently, the settlement of 
the debit balances is funded by overnight borrowings : the 
banks with debit positions borrow ecus, repayable the next 
day, from the banks with credit positions. This raises no 
technical difficu lties as the ecu clearing system is a closed 
system, in which the sum of the debit balances is necessarily 
equal to that of the credit balances. But it implies, of course, 
an overnight credit risk for the creditor banks. 
N umbering seven at the beginning, there are at present 45 
clearing banks in the system, all located within the Com-
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munity although some, given the international character of 
the ecu market, are branches of Swiss, Japanese or American 
banks. Through correspondent accounts opened with the 
clearing banks, hundreds of other banks are also linked to 
the system. Ecu payments can thus be carried out world-
wide. 
The system currently processes about 6 OOO ecu payment 
orders per day for a global value ranging between ECU 40 
and 50 billion. These figures bear witness to the rapid growth 
of the different segments of the ecu market. 
( d) The absence of ecu coins and notes 
It is often argued that the ecu is not a real currency becal!se 
there are no coins and notes in ecus. 
It is true that the public intuitively identifies money with its 
physical representation in the form of coins and notes. All 
the more so since these 'moneys' are issued by the monetary 
authorities and endowed with legal tender status in the 
issuing country. Obviously, coins and notes are the 'real' 
thing! 
This being said, one should consider that the volume of 
coins and notes, in percentage of the total money volume 
(coins, notes, plus sight accounts with banks), is on the low 
side in most European countries. If it peaks at 64 % in 
Greece, it represents 35 % of the money supply in Germany 
and 16 % in France. It barely reaches 8 % in the UK. 
Considering these facts, the difference with the ecu, a 100 % 
bank money, is more a difference of degree than of sub-
stance. Another factor should also be considered: so far, the 
ecu is an international currency; it is nowhere a national 
currency. For international transactions, coins and notes are 
hardly used or useful. They are of course useful at the 
national level for the settlement of retail transactions. That 
means that the minting of ecu coins and the printing of notes 
will become relevant when the process towards EMU reaches 
its final stage and when national coins and notes are poised 
to be replaced by ecu coins and notes. 1 
2. The market development of the ecu: 
a general overview 
The market development of the ecu has been impressive, 
particularly in its financial uses. 
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In fact, ecu coins have been issued by Belgium, France, Ireland and 
Spain in denominations ranging from ECU I to ECU 100. However, 
the metal (silver or gold) content of these coins is worth much more 
than their face value. Consequently, they qualify as collector's items, 
not as money. 
Ecu syndicated loans made their first appearance in 1980 
and Eurobonds in ecus were launched in 1981 and totalled 
200 million that year. 
From then on, the volume of Eurobond issues in ecus in-
creased very rapidly. It reached a first peak in 1985 with a 
volume of ECU 9,4 billion. Moreover, in that year, the 
Italian Government started to issue ecu bonds on its dom-
estic market. After a slow-down in the two following years, 
the floating of Eurobonds in ecus regained its momentum 
and other countries - Greece, Ireland, Belgium, France and 
Spain - also proceeded to issue ecu bonds on their own 
markets. Taken together, these two types of bond issues 
reached a record volume of 25 billion in 1990. If anything, 
this record is set to be broken in 1991 as, for the first seven 
months of the year, the volume issued amounts already to 
24 billion. 
As a result of this rapid development, the ecu increased its 
market share in the Eurobond market from 4,8 % in 1988 
to 7,3 % in 1990 and 14,0 % in the first six months of 1991. 
For that period, it also became, next to the dollar, the second 
widest used currency for straight bond issues. 
Its volume set apart, other features also indicate that the 
ecu bond market is presently a mature market to be con-
sidered on par with the dollar, yen, Deutschmark and Swiss 
franc markets. 
Thus, the average size of the ecu bond issues increased from 
100 million in 1988 to 160 million in 1990. Benchmark issues 
exist for the quasi totality of the yield curve. 
Ample evidence is also available that the liquidity of the 
market is satisfactory. Indeed, for the sole month of 
February of this year the market absorbed a number of 
issues totalling 8,7 billion of which two issues were of 2,5 
billion each. 
Liquidity has also increased on the secondary market where 
turnover in ecu bonds reported by Cede) and Euroclear more 
than doubled last year. 
Finally, the depth and liquidity of the ecu market have 
also been enhanced by the launching of derivative financial 
instruments in ecus such as long-term and short-term inter-
est-rate futures by Liffe, London, and Matif, Paris, and the 
renewed attempt by Finnex, New York, to issue ecu/dollar 
futures and exchange option contracts. 
One particular aspect of the ecu bond market should be 
stressed: it is very much a sovereign issuers' market. Indeed, 
the governments and official bodies of the Member States 
and of third countries, as well as the Commission of the 
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European Communities and the European Investment Bank 
are very active market participants; they account together 
for about 50 % of the total volume of Eurobonds issued in 
1990. 
The presence of sovereign issuers in the ecu bond market 
has produced a shift in its investor base: originally supported 
by the retail investor, the market now appeals to an 
Table 6 
Main bond-type ecu ismJesl 
Year Euro-issues 
of 
payment EEC Non-EEC Total Italian 
CTEs 
1981 192 40 232 0 
1982 595 65 660 1200 
1983 815 I 100 I 915 600 
1984 2 274 I 295 3 569 I 300 
1985 5 301 4 161 9 462 2 500 
1986 4 226 2 614 6 840 1600 
1987 4 303 2 933 7 236 1 500 
1988 5 275 3 913 9 188 7 250 
1989 6 461 4 666 II 127 6 OOO 
1990 10 525 4 515 15 040 5 250 
I Issues recorded on payment date, excluding short-term securities. 
increasing extent to the institutional investor (see Tables 6 
and 7 for more detailed statistical information). 
In the short end of the market, the ecu also scored successes 
as the banks' borrowing and lending operations in ecu con-
tinued to grow at a rapid pace. Moreover, a particularly 
strong demand for ecu deposits by the non-bank sector 
/million ECU) 
National issues Total 
Greek Irish French Spanish Total 
bonds bonds OATs2 bonds 
0 0 0 0 0 232 
0 0 0 0 I 200 I 860 
0 0 0 0 600 2 515 
0 0 0 0 I 300 4 869 
0 0 0 0 2 500 II 962 
166 0 0 0 I 766 8 606 
218 100 0 0 I 818 9 054 
0 0 0 0 7 250 16 438 
I 538 0 I 652 0 9 190 20 317 
2 379 0 2 357 500 10 486 25 526 
2 The ECU I 500 million 10.0% 2001 OAT issued on 6 November 1990 is included under Euro-issues. 
Source: Eurostat (figures as at 31 January 1991). 
Table 7 
The ecu secondary market in 1991 - Fixed income bonds 
(million ECU) 
Cede! Euroclear Total % % 
ECU/total OM/total 
ECU DM Total ECU DM T0tal ECU DM Total 
January-March 
Eurobonds 78 731 8 238 644 67 643 4 826 266 991 146 374 4 834 505 634 28,95 0,96 
Others 26 547 61 178 199 137 37 554 160 831 314 513 64 IOI 222 009 513 650 12,48 43,22 
Total 105 278 61 186 437 781 105 197 165 657 581 504 210 475 226 843 I 019 284 20,65 22,26 
April-June 
Eurobonds 
(April/May) 41 666 49 146 315 37 247 4 376 215 459 78 913 4425 361 774 21,81 1,22 
Others 17 114 33 077 Ill 972 21 950 88 822 203 579 39 064 121 899 315 551 12,38 38,63 
Total 58 781 33 126 258 287 59 197 93 197 419 038 117 978 126 323 677 325 17,42 18,65 
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brought the ecu asset and liability position of the banking 
sector in near balance whereas, almost continuously up to 
now, a very sizeable excess asset position had prevailed (see 
Table 8). 
The Italian Government pursued its issue programme of ecu 
treasury notes initiated in 1987. The outstanding amount of 
Table 8 
Structure of the ecu banking market 
these notes, which have a one-year maturity, is presently 
(June) 4,7 billion. Early in 1989, the British Government 
also launched an issue programme of ecu treasury bills. Their 
maturities are one, three and six months which qualifies them 
more particularly as reserve instruments for central banks. 
The amount of outstanding ecu treasury bills is now (June) 
3,6 billion. 
(billion ECU) 1 
Assets of the banking sector vis-Cl-vis: Liabilities of the banking sector vis-tl-vis: 
87 IV 88 IV 89 IV 90 I 90 II 
Total 80,8 100,0 124,1 135,8 137,7 
Non-residents 59,3 73,3 92,4 100,7 104,9 
Residents 21,5 26,7 31,7 35,l 32,8 
Non-banking sector 21,5 24,5 31,2 32,4 34,5 
Non-residents 13,0 15,4 20,2 21,0 23,2 
Residents 8,5 9,1 11,0 11,4 11,3 
Banking sector 59,3 75,5 92,9 103,4 103,2 
Non-residents 46,3 57,9 72,2 79,7 81,7 
Residents 13,0 17,6 20,7 23,7 21,5 
Liabilities in the ecu's component 
currency 
Grand total 80,8 100,0 124,1 135,8 137,7 
I Amounts outstanding in billion ECU at the end of period. 
Source: ECU, No 16. 1991 based on BIS data. 
In sharp contrast to its very successful financial develop-
ment, the ecu's performance as an international commercial 
vehicle, that is to say, as a currency in which exports are 
priced, invoiced and paid remains disappointing. On aver-
age, less than I% of the EC countries' total exports are 
invoiced in ecu. The figures are somewhat higher in Portugal 
and Spain but close to zero in Germany. They are also 
somewhat better for the current-account transactions as 
these include the servicing payments on the financial trans-
actions in ecus (see Table 9). 
Some signs point to an incipient improvement. Indeed, a 
number of major international organizations have dis-
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90 III 90 IV 87 IV 88 IV 89 IV 90 I 90 II 90 III 90 IV 
144,8 142,7 66,5 85,9 112,1 129,2 134,7 144,3 141,3 
109,8 108,2 50,2 64,6 84,3 97,2 105,7 111,8 111,0 
35,0 34,5 16,3 21,3 27,8 32,0 29,0 32,5 30,3 
34,0 34,1 7,2 7,7 14,4 14,2 14,3 16,7 16,5 
23,7 23,6 4,1 4,5 8,2 8,8 8,6 10,0 10,1 
10,3 10,5 3,1 3,2 6,2 5,4 5,7 6,7 6,4 
110,8 108,6 59,3 78,2 97,7 115,0 120,4 127,6 124,8 
86,l 84,6 46,l 60,l 76,1 88,4 97,1 101,8 100,9 
24,7 24,0 13,2 18,l 21,6 26,6 23,3 25,8 23,9 
14,3 14,1 12,0 6,6 3,0 0,5 1,4 
144,8 142,7 80,8 100,0 124,1 135,8 137,7 144,8 142,7 
covered how they can use the ecu to their advantage. For 
example: since the beginning of last year Eurocontrol has 
replaced the dollar by the ecu as the currency in which it 
sets the fees which are charged to the airline companies for 
their use of European airspace. 
The European railway system has also turned to the ecu. 
The railroad companies routinely acquire reciprocal claims 
on each other as the fare for an international journey is paid 
in one country while the actual transportation is partly done 
by other railroad companies. 
The 'market' ecu: a major currency on the international exchange, money, and financial markets 
Table 9 
Share of the ecu in commercial trade and current account 
Country Period Goods Currcnl account I 
Exports Imports Receipts Payment 
Mio ECU % Mio ECU % Mio ECU 'I, Mio ECU 'lo 
BLEU 1986 248 0,4 50 0,1 2 461 2,4 1 459 1,5 
1987 132 0,2 53 0,1 2 197 2,1 1 391 1,3 
1988 189 0,4 71 0,1 2 699 2,0 1 492 1,2 
1989 247 0,3 180 0,2 3 422 2,4 2 309 1,7 
Jan.-June 1990 170 0,4 109 0,3 2 354 3,1 1 864 2,5 
DK 1987 9 0,0 9 0,1 89 0,3 245 0,7 
1988 18 0,1 12 0.1 134 0,3 338 1,0 
1989 23 0,1 11 0,1 154 0,4 401 1,0 
Jan.-Aug. 1990 33 0,2 II 0,1 143 0,5 404 1,3 
D 1986 n.a. n.a. 39 0,0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1987 n.a. n.a. 65 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1988 n.a. n.a. 133 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989 n.a. n.a. 216 0,1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Jan.-June 1990 n.a. n.a. 99 0,1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
GR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
E 1987 25 0,1 5 0,0 65 0,1 135 0,3 
1988 115 0,3 43 0,1 226 0,4 203 0,3 
1989 367 1,0 345 0,6 I 001 1,3 729 0,9 
Jan.-Sept. 1990 346 1,2 478 1,0 I 378 2,4 I 050 1,6 
F 1986 480 0,4 I 220 1,0 2 139 1,0 3 164 1,5 
1987 420 0,4 730 0,6 2 070 1,0 2 620 1,2 
1988 540 0,4 570 0,4 2 110 0,9 2 610 1,1 
1989 685 0,4 1 190 0,6 2 385 0,9 3 287 1,2 
Jan.-July 1990 375 0,4 710 0,7 1 654 1,2 2 001 1,3 
IRL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
I 1986 721 0,9 312 0,4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1987 998 1,1 305 0,3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1988 659 0,8 359 0,4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989 854 0,8 485 0,4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
NL 1986 1 025 1,3 5 1 500 1,5 238 0,2 
1987 405 0,5 19 0,0 854 0,8 207 0,2 
1988 468 0,6 52 0,1 972 0,8 232 0,2 
1989 859 0,9 517 0,6 I 607 1,3 902 0,7 
Jan.-Oct. 1990 525 0,7 441 0,6 1 296 1,2 624 0,8 
p 1986 33 0,4 11 0,1 56 0,4 100 0,9 
1987 58 0,7 18 0,2 107 0,7 97 0,8 
1988 285 2,6 70 0,5 397 2,1 177 1,0 
1989 532 3,0 356 1,7 782 2,9 523 2,5 
UK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
I Ecu-denominated current account flows mainly consist of interest receipts and payments. 
n.a. = not available. 
Source: EC central banks. 
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In 1990, 18 European railroad companies adopted the ecu 
as the currency in which their reciprocal claims and liabilities 
are periodically (every fortnight) netted and as the currency 
in which the balance due is paid. A step further has recently 
been taken by expressing the freight tariffs in ecus, but 
without imposing the ecu as the payment currency. 
The ecu is also used by some European multinationals as 
their internal accounting unit and, in some cases, as the 
common currency in which the intra-company trade is 
invoiced and paid. So far, however, few companies invoice 
their outside customers in ecus. 
3. The market ecu and its use by central banks 
Central banks are increasingly using the market ecu for the 
placement of their exchange reserves. At the end of 1990, 
ecu reserves held by the central banks of the industrialized 
countries (i.e. central banks reporting to the BIS) amounted 
to ECU 27 billion. This represented an increase of 60 % 
over 1989. The actual figure for all central banks is not 
known but is likely to be significantly higher. An important 
factor behind this development is the borrowing activity of 
the national authorities in the ecu market. To a large extent, 
they sell the proceeds of their bond and other note issues to 
their central banks. 
Ecu reserve holdings of central banks also vary according 
to their intervention policy on their exchange markets. This 
is particularly the case for the central banks that participate 
in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS. Indeed, next 
to the dollar and the Deutschmark, the ecu has become an 
important intervention instrument which ERM participants 
buy or sell against their own currency in view of the latter's 
stabilization within its fluctuation band. 
Another important development is the choice of the ecu as 
the exchange-rate 'peg' for the currencies of non-EC 
countries. In October 1990, Norway linked itself to the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS and pegged the krone 
to the ecu. It fixed the parity of the krone at NKR 7,994 
for ECU 1 and established fluctuation limits of + and 
- 2,25 % around that rate. These limits represent compul-
sory intervention rates for the Norwegian central bank. In 
other words, short of a parity change, the central bank is 
obliged to ensure that the exchange rate of the krone is kept 
within the fixed limits. In May and June of 1991 respectively, 
Sweden and Finland took the same step. There was a differ-
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ence though : Sweden fixed its fluctuation limits against the 
ecu at + and - 1,5 % around the ecu parity of the krone, 
Finland chose + and - 3 % for the markka. 
Three important aspects of this linkage should be stressed. 
In the first place, it is not construed as membership of the 
European Monetary System as such. Indeed, since July 1990, 
the EMS has become the first stage in the Community's 
monetary integration process. Consequently, only Member 
States can be institutionally part of the System and of its 
decision-making bodies. 
In the second place, in joining the exchange-rate mechanism 
of the EMS, these countries have done so by pegging their 
currency to the ecu. Apart from the political significance 
of opting for a pegging method that has a pronounced 
Community character, this decision also indicates that they 
view the ecu as a satisfactory anchor for their stability-
oriented monetary and exchange-rate policies. 
Finally, by becoming the exchange-rate anchor of an increas-
ing number of currencies, the role of the market ecu as 
an international reserve and intervention currency is being 
strongly stimulated. 
4. The use of the ecu by Community institutions 
The ecu has an important share in the financial transactions 
of the Community institutions. 
(a) Borrowing and lending activities 
The Commission, for account of the Community, is active 
on the international financial markets in back-to-back oper-
ations: borrowing funds for onlending to support develop-
ment programmes in Member States, or to Member States 
directly when they face balance of payments problems. For 
a growing part, these transactions are ecu-based. Moreover, 
the Commission is becoming increasingly involved in secur-
ing financial assistance to governments in Eastern Europe. 
These loans are denominated in ecus and generally disbursed 
in ecus. This was the case, for example, for the first tranches 
of the loans to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. 
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The Commission has also increased its presence on the ecu 
money market. The ceiling for total ecu holdings in the 
treasury of the European Coal and Steel Community is now 
1,5 billion. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has played a major 
role in the birth and the growth of the ecu's financial mar-
kets. Its capital is denominated in ecus and a majority of 
the Member States who are the shareholders of the Bank 
have chosen to pay in their capital share in ecus. The EIB 
borrows from the market to re-lend for development projects 
within the Community and in associated countries. At the 
end of October 1990 outstanding loans disbursed in ecu 
totalled ECU 8 billion, or 16,2 % of the total loan portfolio 
of the EIB, which operates in 17 different currencies. The 
ecu holds a similar share on the other side of the EIB's 
balance sheet where the outstanding amount of ecu-denomi-
nated issues came to ECU 6,5 billion or 14,3 % of the 
portfolio. 
In addition, the Bank has raised the ceiling of its commercial 
paper programme from ECU 200 million to ECU 700 
million. This programme was initiated last year to meet the 
Bank's needs for the financing of its ecu loans that are made 
on a floating interest rate basis. 
Finally, the ecu is an important component of the EIB's 
liquid resources. The volume of these resources has been 
fluctuating between ECU 150 and 700 million and includes 
the proceeds of short-term paper placed on the ecu money 
market with maturities of one, two, three or six months, the 
paper being constantly renewed on maturity. 
(b) The ecu in the Community budget 
The general budget of the Community is denominated in 
ecus. However, according to the present rules, the Member 
States discharge their contributions to the budget in their 
national currencies. Most budget outlays are still made in 
national currencies as well. 
An exception is the European Development Fund (EDF) 
which is not included in the general budget of the European 
Communities. Here Member States have the option to pay 
either in ecus or in their national currency. The majority 
pays in ecus. 
But in specific sectors of the general budget, progress is 
being achieved as well. Thus, following partial changes in 
the existing budget legislation, the share of the ecu in Com-
munity expenditures is increasing fast. Thus ecu payments 
related to the structural Funds' programmes (Regional 
Fund, Social Fund, Guidance Section of the Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund) are now being made in ecus. 
These payments amounted to about ECU 5 billion in 1990 
and are expected to reach ECU 10 billion in 1991. 
In late 1989, the Commission proposed to the Council to 
pay the Community staff salaries in ecus. This proposal is 
still under consideration. A decision is expected by the end 
of the year. 
V - The role of the ecu in the transition period 
towards economic and monetary union 
(EMU) 
1. The Community and EMU: a brief progress 
report 
For a long time already the European Community has been 
attracted by the idea of transforming the Common Market 
into an economic and monetary union. 
The first attempt goes back to December 1969 when the 
European Council (i.e. the Community's Heads of State 
or Government) decided to embark on the road towards 
economic and monetary union with the aim of achieving it 
by the end of the 1970s. A committee was set up, the 
'Werner Committee', named after the then Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg, to draft a blueprint. A stage-by-stage 
approach was proposed and the first stage - a reduction in 
the margins of fluctuation against the dollar (the 'snake') -
started in 1971. Moreover, the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was created as a forerunner of 
the future European central bank. 
This first attempt was short-lived. The oil crisis of 1973 and 
the differences in policy response by the Member States 
provoked the demise of the system which lost most of its 
major participants. It ended up being a Deutschmark zone 
composed, besides the Deutschmark, of the Benelux 
currencies and the Danish krone. 
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With the setting up of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) at the end of 1978 a new attempt was launched. 
This system started with a transitional stage that was to be 
superseded, two years later, by an institutional stage which 
would grant increased monetary powers to the EMCF and 
set the Community back on the road towards economic and 
monetary union. This institutional stage never took shape. 
In 1988, the European Council relaunched the process and 
instrm .. ted a committee presided over by Jacques Delors, 
President of the Commission, to study and propose the ways 
and means to realize, in stages, a European economic and 
monetary union (EMU). 
This third attempt is set to succeed. Indeed, an Intergovern-
mental Conference is presently under way to draft the 
amendments that must be made to the founding text (Rome 
Treaty) of the Community so as to incorporate in this text 
the provisions for economic and monetary union. After 
being adopted by the 12 governments and parliaments, the 
amended text will become the new Charter of the Com-
munity. The Conference is scheduled to finalize its work by 
the end of the year and the voting procedures in the various 
Member States will take another year. In short, by the end 
of 1992, the Community should be firmly and irrevocably 
embarked on the road towards EMU. 
Considering the past, why should the prospects for a success-
ful outcome look bright this time? 
Basically there are three reasons for optimism : 
(i) A first reason is the implementation of the single market. 
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This means that by the end of 1992, when all intra-
Community frontier formalities, non-tariff barriers and 
tax barriers will have been eliminated, trade in goods, 
services and capital between Member States should be 
put on the same footing as similar transactions within 
each of these Member States. 
However, such a market will fall short of being a truly 
single market as long as national currencies continue to 
exist. In that case, there will not be a single price for the 
consumer; nor will there be a single market for the 
producer. The uncertainties generated by possible ex-
change-rate fluctuations will interfere with the con-
sumer's choice and with the producer's investment 
decisions. And for all involved, significant costs will 
arise from the continued need to trade and deal in 
the Community currencies. All these factors will create 
obstacles to transactions between the Member States 
as compared to transactions within each Member 
State. In short, in order to have a truly single market 
of 340 million people - comparable to but larger 
than the US market - a single currency is necessary. 
It is the perception, at the highest political level, of 
the need to add a monetary dimension to the single 
market that has given renewed impetus to the process 
of economic and monetary union. 
(ii) A second factor is the success of the European Monetary 
System. Since January 1987, the System has functioned 
without any realignment of parities, apart from a minor 
adjustment to the Italian lira's central rate when it 
reduced its fluctuation margin from + /- 6 % to + / 
- 2,25 %. Proof has been administered that policy coor-
dination works among countries who agree on the prin-
ciple that price stability is an essential precondition for 
sustained and lasting economic growth. 
(iii) Finally, all national authorities (except the British so far) 
have become increasingly convinced that, in a closely 
integrated market, national monetary independence is 
more an illusion than a reality. Collective decision-
making is therefore increasingly viewed as the only possi-
bility to retain a say in the management of a Community 
which Europeans accept as a 'must' in an ever-growing 
number of areas of private and public life. It is, more-
over, the only way to secure the interests of the Com-
munity, and consequently of its members, in the world 
at large. 
On the ecu's role in EMU important decisions have already 
been taken even before the outcome of the Intergovern-
mental Conference. Indeed, at their Rome meeting, in 
October 1990, the European Council agreed (except for one 
dissenting opinion) that EMU should have a single currency 
('a strong and stable ecu') and that in the transition period 
towards EMU, the present ecu should be reinforced and 
further developed. 
2. An outline of the ecu's development m the 
transition period 
The ecu has become an important international currency. 
However, its breakthrough has mainly been in the area 
of financial transactions: Euro-issues, international bank 
credits, national ecu bond issues in Italy, France, Ireland, 
Spain and Greece, issues of ecu treasury bills in the United 
Kingdom and treasury notes in Italy, futures contracts, etc. 
The financial success of the ecu among European operators 
lies for many in its characteristics as a relatively stable 
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currency with an 'average' interest rate. This makes it an 
attractive currency to borrow by residents of high-interest-
rate countries and an equally attractive investment currency 
for residents of low-interest-rate countries. 
However, most ecu bond issues and other borrowings are 
'swap-driven', i.e. the borrowed ecus are exchanged for other 
currencies. In other words, the ecu is not directly used as a 
means of payment for the commercial transactions (purchase 
of equipment, imports, etc.) that the borrowings are 
supposed to finance. 
Here we touch on a crucial point: the ecu is rarely used as 
the currency for pricing, invoicing and payment in trans-
border trade within the Community. In fact, as mentioned 
before, in most Member States invoicing in ecus is less than 
1 % of the total value of their foreign trade. 
A take-off in the trade area is important for two mam 
reasons: 
(i) When the single market becomes a reality, competition 
between the various Community currencies will quite 
naturally increase. On the other hand, business firms for 
reasons of convenience and cost will reduce as much 
as they can the number of currencies used in their 
transborder transactions within that market. The emerg-
ence of a currency of a Member State as the dominant 
currency in the Community would not be a welcome 
development, neither from a political nor from a monet-
ary point of view. In order to preserve the balanced 
character of the integration process and to avoid com-
plicating monetary policy coordination between the 
Member States, the ecu should become the major cur-
rency used for pricing, invoicing and payment in the 
transborder trade within the Community. 
(ii) National currencies are not easily uprooted. By using 
the ecu alongside their national currency, European 
operators would familiarize themselves with the ecu's 
use and with the prospect that it will eventually replace 
the national currencies. In doing so, they would, for an 
increasing range of transactions, already benefit from 
the advantages of the ecu as the Community's common 
currency. 
A reciprocal link exists (see Section 3 below) between these 
two developments which would greatly help the intro-
duction, in the final stage, of the Community's single cur-
rency: an ecu which would have smoothly evolved from a 
common currency into the single currency. 
3. Action programme m support of the ecu's 
development 
Up to now, the ecu's use in transborder trade has not really 
taken off. It is, however, the domain in which the ecu should 
increasingly be used during the transition period in order to 
become Europe's common currency. This raises the question 
of how this development will actually be achieved. 
One option must be firmly ruled out : imposing the ecu. 
Apart from being politically unpalatable, this approach 
would also be operationally inefficient as reluctant recipients 
would surely dump the 'market' ecu onto the market. 
On the contrary, the aim should be to generate a spontaneous 
market response in favour of the ecu by reinforcing its 
qualities and by eliminating the obstacles that prevent the 
ecu from competing on equal terms with other foreign 
currencies and with its component currencies. 
Actions to that effect should be undertaken by the various 
sectors that have 'fathered' the ecu: the Community and 
the Commission, the national monetary authorities and the 
financial markets. 
(a) Reinforcing the qualities of the ecu 
The ecu derives its main quality from its 'basket' definition 
which gives it an 'average' character, both in terms of its 
exchange rate and of its interest rate. However, since eight 
of its 12 component currencies participate with 2 ! % mar-
gins in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS which has 
not registered any realignment since January 1987, the ecu's 
exchange rate is determined for 80 % by currencies that 
move closely in line with each other. As the peseta and the 
pound sterling recently joined the exchange-rate mechanism, 
though with 6 % margins, the ecu increasingly qualifies as 
a strong currency. Moreover, to the extent that the EMS 
currencies use their fluctuation potential as allowed by the 
2 ! % or 6 % margin, the ecu, as an average, will tend to be 
more stable in terms of its component currencies than these 
currencies are between each other. 1 
See Graph 2 which highlights the difference in the ecu's behaviour vis-
a-vis the narrow-band currencies in the periods March 1979 to end of 
1986 and January 1987 to June 1991. In the first period, the DM 
appreciated by more than 20 % against the ecu while the FF devalued 
by more than 15 %. In the second period, the highest appreciation 
against the ecu was 1,4 % registered by the BFR and LFR, the highest 
depreciation was 1,3 % by the FF. 
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GRAPH 2 : Evolution of the narrow-band currencies of the EMS ris-a-ris the ecu 
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The ecu's qualities as a strong and stable currency would be 
further enhanced by : 
(i) global progress in the convergence of policies and policy 
results within the Community. This would allow the 
EMS to enlarge participation in the exchange rate 
mechanism to all the Member States, to generalize the 
2 t % margins (or even reduce them) and to effectively 
phase out realignments; 
(ii) abandoning the revision of the ecu's composition. By 
doing so, a factor of uncertainty would be removed for 
market operators and the ecu would reinforce its strong 
currency bias as the weight gains of its stronger com-
ponents would no longer be scaled down. 
This solution to 'strengthen' the ecu is to be preferred to 
the 'hard ecu' proposals made by the British and Spanish 
authorities. The first one involves the creation of ecu money 
by a European Monetary Fund. This has been opposed, in 
particular by most central banks, because it amounts to 
the creation of a parallel currency. The second one, while 
maintaining the 'basket' definition of the ecu, introduces an 
additional, non-compatible determinant in the valuation of 
the ecu's exchange and interest rates and empowers the 
GRAPH 3: Euro-market interest-rate differentials Yis-a-ris the ecu 
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European central bank to manage these rates. This is likely 
to disturb the markets and the monetary policies of the 
Member States. 
Moreover, besides confirming in the new Treaty the ecu's 
vocation to become Europe's single currency, the Com-
munity authorities should also reassure the markets that the 
transition from the 'basket' ecu to an 'abstract' ecu issued 
by a European central bank will be smooth and without 
disrupting the continuity of the ecu's exchange and interest 
rates. 
(b) Eliminating the obstacles to the ecu's development 
The ecu is saddled with several handicaps that hamper its 
commercial development. They mainly relate to the 
following. 
(i) The absence of a national base 
The ecu is nowhere a national currency. This has two con-
sequences. Firstly, the ecu does not benefit, for the develop-
ment of its international commercial use, from the support 
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that other currencies derive from the existence of a large 
national market. The development of the dollar as a pricing, 
invoicing and payment currency for international trade (not 
only its own foreign trade but also trade between third 
countries) was based on the importance of the American 
market for the rest of the world. Another contributing factor 
was the choice, by a large number of countries, of the dollar 
as the exchange-rate peg for their currencies. The same 
factors have backed a similar development of the Deutsch-
mark at the European level. 
Secondly, the ecu is more expensive to use than a national 
currency. Indeed, where an exporter manages to invoice in 
his own currency, I it is the importer alone who assumes the 
cost of converting his currency into the exporter's currency. 
In choosing the ecu they both bear these costs to the full 
extent. 
The national authorities could remedy the ecu's competitive 
disadvantage by gradually opening their own national base 
to the ecu. 
In other words, they should progressively extend to the ecu 
- and to the ecu alone - the privileges that their own 
currency enjoys within the national boundaries.2 
For example, the national authorities should envisage, where 
appropriate, to eliminate VAT charges on ecu/national cur-
rency exchange operations and on ecu transfers; to allow the 
charging and payment of VAT in ecus for foreign trade 
invoices; to authorize business corporations to denominate 
their capital and to issue shares in ecus; to authorize the 
stock exchanges to list these shares in ecus; to permit 
insurance firms to offer their policies in ecus and to allow 
business corporations to make out their accounting and tax 
returns in ecus and to pay their taxes in ecus. 
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In Germany, about 80 % of exports are invoiced in DM. 
It is sometimes argued that the erga omnes principle, adopted by the 
Member States for the abolition of exchange controls and capital lib-
eralization, imposes that measures in favour of the ecu be extended to 
other currencies as well. This is simply not so. Indeed, the exchange 
control liberalization measures pertain to the international use of cur-
rencies, i.e. their use between residents of different countries. The 
measures in favour of the ecu mentioned here pertain to the use, in a 
given country (i.e. between its residents), of another currency (the ecu) 
alongside the national currency. This is a matter of domestic monetary 
order. 
The effect of these and other measures would be threefold. 
Firstly, the ecu would acquire a share of the 'national base' 
in the countries involved. This would contribute to the ecu's 
development as an invoicing and payment currency in intra-
Community trade. Indeed, ecu receipts by exporters of these 
countries could now directly be used domestically (i.e. with-
out conversion in the national currency). Secondly, initiat-
ives taken by one country would have a spill-over effect in 
other countries as operators there will be faced with stepped-
up demands to invoice or be invoiced in ecus. And thirdly, 
these initiatives would also give the residents of the countries 
involved the possibility to use the ecu between themselves. 
The ecu would become part of the national monetary land-
scape. 
(ii) Obstacles within the payment systems 
The existing ecu clearing system is a 'wholesale' system (low 
numbers, high value) that fits the international financial uses 
of the ecu. However, with the ecu's prospective development 
in the international commercial area and its increasing use 
within individual Member States, the need arises to 
'regionalize' the existing ecu clearing system by establishing 
links with the various national payment systems. Moreover, 
the 'retail' clearing systems (cheques, eurocheques, bank and 
credit cards) should be adapted so as to enable the residents 
of all EC countries to make ecu payments in their own 
country and throughout Europe (and beyond), speedily and 
at low cost. 
(iii) Ignorance and reticence 
The ecu is well known in the world's financial markets. But, 
it is still largely ignored by business firms, even in Europe. 
Some banks moreover display a certain reluctance in pro-
moting its commercial use. Indeed, it would, in the short 
term, lower their revenue on 'exchange' commissions as 
their customers would no longer deal in 12 currencies, as is 
currently the case, but only in one. This consideration did not 
affect the development of the ecu on the financial markets as 
it did not replace the existing range of financial instruments 
in the different currencies, but was an addition to it. All in all, 
there is an information gap to be filled as many commercial 
operators, in particular the small and medium-sized 
enterprises, could very well become interested in the ecu if 
only they were made to know it better. 
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VI - Conclusions 
The European Community is firmly set on the road towards 
economic and monetary union and the introduction in the 
end stage of a strong and stable ecu as the union's single 
currency. In the transition period towards EMU, the present 
market ecu should be further developed with particular 
emphasis on its role as a pricing, invoicing and payment 
currency for transhorder commercial transactions. 
The ecu's development is necessary to ensure the neutrality 
of the monetary integration process and to familiarize the 
markets with the ecu and with its advantages as a common 
currency. It would facilitate and possibly speed up the 
implementation of the final stage of EMU. 
In order to secure the ecu's development, its present defi-
nition should be reinforced and the obstacles progressively 
eliminated that prevent the ecu from competing on equal 
terms with the currencies that it is to replace at the end of 
the transition period. 
The decision-making power to make the appropriate amend-
ments to the ecu's legislative and regulatory framework rests 
plainly with the Community authorities, the Commission 
and the national authorities. 
In acting along these lines, an interplay between market 
forces and decisions by the authorities could be generated 
and a momentum created similar to the one that is proving 
so helpful in implementing the single market. 
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Annex 1 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78 of 
18 December 1978 changing the value of the 
unit of account used by the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund l 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 907/73 of 
3 April 1973 establishing a European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund,2 and in particular the last paragraph of Article 5 of 
the Statutes of the Fund, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Monetary Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Board of Governors of 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 
Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 907/73, in Article 5 of the 
Statutes of the Fund, requires the latter's operations in the 
currencies of the Member States to be expressed in a 
European monetary unit of account of a value of 0,88867088 
grams of fine gold; 
Whereas this definition no longer conforms with the rules 
in force in the international monetary system; 
Whereas, apart from cases in which the value of the 
European monetary unit of account is changed automati-
cally, the past paragraph of the said Article 5 provides that 
any other changes shall be decided on by the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after 
consulting the Monetary Committee and the Board of 
Governors of the Fund; 
I OJ L 379, 30.12.1978, p. I. 
2 OJ L 89, 5.4.1973, p. 2. 
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Whereas the establishment of a new European Monetary 
System, which was the subject of the resolution of the 
European Council meeting in Brussels on 4 and 5 December 
1978, provides for the use of an 'ecu' defined as a basket of 
Member States' currencies, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article I 
With effect from 1 January 1979, the Fund's operations shall 
be expressed in a unit of account known as the ecu which is 
defined as the sum of the following amounts of the currencies 
of the Member States 
German mark: 
Pound sterling: 
French franc: 
Italian lira: 
Dutch guilder: 
Belgian franc: 
Luxembourg franc: 
Danish krone: 
Irish pound: 
Article 2 
0,828 
0,0885 
1, 15 
109,00 
0,286 
3,66 
0,14 
0,217 
0,00759 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission after consulting the Monetary Committee and 
the Board of Governors of the Fund, shall determine the 
conditions under which the composition of the ecu may be 
changed. 
Article 3 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1979. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 18 December 1978. 
For the Council 
The President 
H. MA TTH0FER 
Annex 2 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2626/84 of 
15 September 1984 amending Article 1 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78 changing the value 
of the unit of account used by the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, 
Having regard to the Act concerning the conditions of 
accession of the Hellenic Republic and to the adjustments 
to the Treaties of 28 May 1979, 1 and in particular Annex 
VIII thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Monetary Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Board of Governors of 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 
Whereas Article I of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3180/ 
78 of 18 December 19782 defines the ecu as the sum of 
amounts of currencies of the Member States; 
Whereas Article 2(3) of the resolution of the European 
Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the 
European Monetary System stipulates that the weights of 
the currencies in the ecu shall be re-examined and if necessary 
revised within six months of the entry into force of the 
System and thereafter every five years or, on request, if the 
weight of any currency has changed by 25%; 
Whereas a re-examination has been carried out and the 
results indicate that a revision is appropriate; 
Whereas in accordance with Article 2(3) of the resolution of 
the European Council of 5 December 1978, the revision 
OJ L 291, 19.ll.l979, p. 17. 
OJ L 379, 30.12.1978, p. I. 
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should be made in line with underlying economic criteria 
and should not, by itself, modify the external value of the 
ecu; 
Whereas Annex VIII of the Act annexed to the Treaty 
of Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European 
Communities specifies that the drachma shall be included in 
the ecu before 31 December 1985 if, before that date, a 
revision of the ecu is undertaken; 
Whereas the Greek authorities have taken the necessary 
measures to ensure that the inclusion of the drachma in the 
ecu will take place in conditions which ensure the smooth 
functioning of the ecu market, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
With effect from 17 September 1984 the composition of the 
ecu as laid down in Article I of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3180/78 of 18 December 1978 is amended as follows: 
German mark: 
Pound sterling: 
French franc: 
Italian lire: 
Dutch guilder: 
Belgian Franc: 
Luxembourg franc: 
Danish krone: 
Irish pound: 
Greek drachma: 
Article 2 
0,719 
0,0878 
1,31 
140,00 
0,256 
3,71 
0,14 
0,219 
0,00871 
1,15 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 17 September 1984. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Dromoland Castle, 15 September 1984. 
For the Council 
The President 
A. DUKES 
143 
Annexes 
Annex 3a 
I 
( Acts whose publication is obligatory) 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1971/89 of 
19 June 1989 amending Article 1 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 3180/78 amending the value of the 
unit of account used by the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78, 1 
and in particular Article 2 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Monetary Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Board of Governors of 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 
Whereas Article I of Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78, as 
amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2626/84,2 defines the ecu 
as the sum of amounts of currencies of the Member States; 
Whereas Article 2(3) of the resolution of the European 
Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the 
European Monetary System stipulates that the weights of 
the currencies in the ecu shall be re-examined and if necessary 
revised within six months of the entry into force of the 
System and thereafter every five years or, on request, if the 
weight of any currency has changed by 25%; 
Whereas a re-examination has been carried out and indicates 
that a revision is appropriate; 
Whereas, in accordance with Article 2(3) of the said resol-
ution, the revision should be made in line with underlying 
economic criteria and will not, by itself, modify the external 
value of the ecu; 
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OJ L 379, 30.12.1978, p. I. 
OJ L 247, 16.9.1984, p. I. 
Whereas the Joint Declaration on the inclusion of the peseta 
and the escudo in the ecu, 3 annexed to the Treaty of 
Accession of Spain and Portugal, states that the decisions 
to include the peseta and the escudo must take into account 
the necessity of ensuring a stable development of the func-
tions and uses of the ecu and that either of these decisions 
could be made at the request of the new Member State 
concerned, after consultation with the Monetary Committee, 
on the occasion on the first five-year review of the weighting 
of the currencies within the ecu; 
Whereas the Spanish and Portuguese authorities have 
requested that their respective currencies be included in the 
ecu; 
Whereas the inclusion of the peseta and the escudo, in 
particular following the steps taken by the issuing authorities 
for these currencies, is compatible with the need to ensure a 
stable development of the functions and uses of the ecu; 
Whereas it is desirable that an interval of time should elapse 
between the decision on the new weights of the currencies 
in the ecu and the date on which this decision takes effect, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
With effect from 21 September 1989, the composition of the 
ecu as laid down in Article I of Regulation (EEC) No 3180/ 
78 will be determined by: 
(i) firstly, the following weights: 
German mark: 
Pound sterling: 
French franc: 
Italian lira: 
Dutch guilder: 
Belgian franc: 
Luxembourg franc: 
Danish krone: 
Irish pound: 
Greek drachma: 
Spanish peseta: 
Portuguese escudo: 
OJ L 302, 15.11.1985, p. 484. 
% 
30,1 
13,0 
19,0 
10,15 
9,4 
7,6 
0,3 
2,45 
1,1 
0,8 
5,3 
0,8 
(ii) secondly, the rates for the ecu derived by the Com-
mission from the rates of the dollar recorded by the central 
banks of the Member States on their respective exchange 
markets, on Wednesday 20 September 1989 at 14.15. 
The Commission shall be responsible for carrying out, on 
20 September 1989, the calculations required to determine 
the new national currency amounts corresponding to the 
weights set out in this Regulation. It shall ensure that the 
new composition is communicated to the monetary 
authorities and published in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities. 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 20 June 1989. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Luxembourg, 19 June 1989. 
For the Council 
The President 
C. SOLCHAGA CAT ALAN 
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Annex 3b 
Press release issued by the Commission on 20 September 
1989 and published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities (OJ C 241, 20.9.1989, p. 1) 
New composition of the ecu 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 1971/89 
amending the composition of the ecu, and based on the 
weights announced therein, the Commission hereby 
announces the new national currency amounts composing 
the ecu, to take effect from 21 September 1989, as follows: 
German mark: 
French franc: 
Pound sterling: 
Italian lira: 
Dutch guilder: 
Belgian franc: 
Luxembourg franc: 
Spanish peseta: 
Danish krone: 
Irish pound: 
Greek drachma: 
Portuguese escudo: 
0,6242 
1,332 
0,08784 
151,8 
0,2198 
3,301 
0,130 
6,885 
0,1976 
0,008552 
1,440 
1,393 
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Annex 4 
Procedure followed for calculating the ecu's 
exchange rates in terms of its component 
currencies and of other currencies 
The central banks of the Member States whose currencies 
are in the ecu record, at 2.15 p.m. each day, the rate of the 
Example: Calculation of ecu rates for 22 October 1990. 
USD rates on Currency 
22.I0.1990 components 
(USD I= ... ) of the ecu 
(I) (2) 
BFR/LFR 31,0675 3,4311 
DKR 5,7575 0,1976 
DM 1,5090 0,6242 
DR 152,0600 1,440 
ESC 133,2000 1,393 
FF 5,0530 1,332 
HFL 1,7009 0,2198 
IRL 1,7767 0,008552 
LIT 1130,5000 151,8 
PTA 94,8000 6,885 
UKL 1,9530 0,08784 
Ecu rate in dollars: ECU I = USD l,364817524 (Sum 3). 
1 Belgian and Luxembourg francs are taken together. 
2 Ecu rates are given with six significant figures. 
The Commission also calculates the rate of the ecu in a 
dozen other currencies, using for each of these their dollar 
rate at 2.15 p.m. 
The ecu rates calculated by the Commission are published 
daily, correct to six significant figures, in the 'C' edition of 
the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
They are put on the Reuters (FXEZ, FXEY) and Telerate 
(3285) screens. 
They are also made available through an automatic telex 
answering service. This service can be used as follows: 
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United States dollar against their own currency on their 
respective currency markets. The dollar rate was chosen as 
being the most representative currency rate in all financial 
centres. These rates are then forwarded through the National 
Bank of Belgium to the Commission, which uses them to 
calculate the 'official' ecu rate of the day, first in dollars and 
then in each of the currencies of the Member States. If an 
exchange market is closed, the central banks agree on a 
representative rate of the dollar against that currency. 
USD value of the Ecu rate in 
currency components each component 
of the ecu currency 
(ECU I= ... )2 
(3) = (2): (I) (4) = (Sum 3) x (I) 
0,1104369518 42,4015 
0,03432045158 7,85794 
0,4136514248 2,05951 
0,009469946074 207,534 
0,01045795796 181,794 
0,2636057787 6,89642 
0, 129225704 2,32142 
0,0151943384 0,768176 
0, 1342768686 1 542,93 
0,07262658228 129,385 
0,17155152 0,698831 
call telex number Brussels 23789 or 23794; 
give own telex code; 
type four times the letter C, which triggers the automatic 
answering system into operation. 
The ecu rates of the day are available from 3.30 p.m. onwards 
(Brussels time). 
Finally, the Statistical Office of the EC publishes them, 
together with other ecu statistics, in its monthly publication 
Ecu-EMS information. 
Annex 5 
Rules on changes in the ecu's composition 
(a) Re-examination and revision of the currency amounts 
in the ecu 
The procedure for re-examining the weights of the currencies 
in the ecu and, if necessary, to proceed with a revision of 
the ecu's composition is outlined in the resolution of the 
European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment 
of the European Monetary System. I 
(i) The weights of the currencies in the ecu: 
are re-examined every five years. The first five-yearly re-
examination took place in September 1984 and led to a 
revision of the ecu's composition. The next re-examin-
ation was scheduled in September 1989; 
are re-examined, on request, if the weight of a com-
ponent currency has changed by 25 % or more. 
(ii) A re-examination is not necessarily followed by an actual 
revision. Its purpose is to assess whether or not a revision 
is needed, considering the size of the discrepancy 
between the weights of the currencies in the ecu and the 
relative economic importance of the Member States. 
Indeed, economic criteria (relative GNP and intra-
European trade, shares in the financial support mechan-
ism) have been at the basis of the fixing of the initial as 
well as the new compositions of the ecu. In the course 
of time, exchange-rate developments may change the 
currencies' weights out of proportion to what might 
be indicated by the underlying economic criteria. An 
excessive discrepancy, diagnosed at a re-examination 
exercise, will therefore trigger a revision procedure of 
the ecu's composition. 
(iii) An actual revision has to be mutually accepted, which 
means : a unanimous decision by the Council of 
Ministers of the Community, on a proposal by the 
Commission and after consultation of the Monetary 
Committee and the Board of Governors of the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund. A revision aims at re-
establishing a satisfactory balance between the weight 
Article 2(3) of the Resolution states that 'The weights of currencies in 
the ecu will be re-examined and if necessary revised within six months 
of the entry into force of the System and thereafter every five years or, 
on request, if the weight of any currency has changed by 25 %'. Revisions 
have to be mutually accepted: they will, by themselves, not modify the 
external value of the ecu. They will be made in line with underlying 
economic criteria. 
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of the currencies in the ecu and the economic weight 
of the issuing countries, as indicated by the economic 
criteria. New weights are not automatically determined 
as the 'arithmetical' average of the different percentages 
supplied by these criteria; they result from an 'agreed' 
average. In this way, the primary aim of a revision, i.e. 
maintaining the ecu's representative character, does not 
preclude that consideration is also given to the need to 
avoid large-sized changes that could be detrimental to 
the development of the ecu on the markets. 
(iv) A revision of the ecu's composition is not to be com-
pared to a currency devaluation or revaluation that 
results in a sudden 'kink' in the market exchange rate 
of the currency involved. On the contrary, a revision is 
implemented in such a way that, on the day of the 
change, the value of the 'new' ecu is identical to that of 
the 'old' one. This is done by applying, on the day of 
the change, to the rates of the old ecu in terms of each 
of its component currencies, the new weights chosen for 
each of them in order to determine the new specific 
amounts of these currencies in the revised ecu. Any 
'kink' in ecu rates is thus avoided,2 though from the 
moment of revision onwards, the ecu's exchange rates 
will tend to ditTer over time from what they would have 
been under the old composition. 
(b) Incorporation of the currencies of new members 
Apart from being triggered by a re-examination, the ecu's 
composition will also change as the currencies of new mem-
bers of the Community are incorporated. Being both symbol 
and instrument of Europe's monetary integration process, 
each new Member State has the right to have its currency 
in the ecu. However, this right is not to be exercised auto-
matically; its timing and modalities are to be negotiated and 
are spelled out in the Accession Treaties. 
Thus for the Greek drachma, it was agreed in the Treaty to 
proceed with incorporation at the latest by 31 December 
1985 or, before that date, if the weights of the currencies in 
the ecu were to be revised. Such revision took place in 
September 1984 and, consequently, the drachma became a 
component of the ecu on that occasion. 
For the peseta and escudo, the Accession Treaties3 stated 
that the decision to incorporate the peseta and/ or escudo 
In the official texts, this is referred to as 'maintaining the external value 
of the ecu'. 
OJ L 484, 15.11.1985. 
147 
Annexes 
could be taken on the occasion of the next five-yearly 
re-examination of the ecu, i.e. September 1989. 
Contrary to the Treaty with Greece, which was negotiated 
before the EMS and the ecu became operational, no firm 
commitment was entered into with Spain and Portugal to 
proceed with incorporation in September 1989 when the 
matter was due to come up for consideration. This explains 
148 
also the legal format of these provisions : a joint declaration 
annexed to, but not part of, the Treaty itself. 
The change in approach reflects the growing awareness of 
the need to avoid disturbances on the market. This being 
so, the peseta and escudo were actually introduced in the 
ecu basket on the occasion of the 1989 revision. 
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